

THE ENERGY TRANSITION AND DECARBONIZATION:
ESSAYS AT THE INTERSECTION OF POLICY AND
TECHNOLOGY

by
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ABSTRACT

The chapters in this dissertation comprise three separate works exploring the economics of mineral, energy, and environmental policy. In the first chapter, I use analytical and computational methods to examine the output and welfare responses to a tradable performance standard (TPS) under price-responsive demand, long-lived investment, capacity constraints, and foresighted decision-making. The results validate much of the pre-existing work within the environmental economic policy literature, in that the TPS is more costly than a period-over-period emissions equivalent cap (CAP) when costs are summed across an infinite time horizon from start to finish. However, when discounting is present, after the costly transition to the steady-state has taken place and the steady-state is reached, the present value of the perpetual stream of net-benefits that defines the steady-state is greater under the TPS in most cases. This suggests that some classes of future generations — particularly those less-endowed with wealth — stand to benefit from a TPS as opposed to a CAP. The second chapter uses applied general equilibrium modeling to understand the effect on the U.S. consumer of a disruption to Chinese cobalt supply. The results suggest that a Chinese cobalt supply disruption is small and that electric vehicle adoption plays a key role in diversifying the channels for cost-reduction in the event of a Chinese export ban or other extreme supply disruption. This work can help policy-makers prioritize upstream and downstream mineral policy goals into the coming decade. The third chapter uses an applied general equilibrium model of North-South trade to explore the ability of regional climate policy to induce innovation in end-of-pipe carbon-saving technology at home and abroad. The results suggest that carbon-saving technologies such as carbon-capture and storage have unique benefits in terms of reducing carbon leakage and reducing costs associated with policy designed to curb global greenhouse gas emissions. This work highlights benefits associated with a specific class of technology that should be considered by policymakers at the forefront of the global climate policy debate.

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For my parents, Mark and Angela Becker

CHAPTER 1

TRADABLE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS IN A DYNAMIC CONTEXT

Many sectors of the economy that are targets of emissions reduction policy tend to be subject to price-responsive demand, long-lived capital, capacity constraints, and foresighted decision-making. I explore these features together, in conjunction with a sequence of tradable performance standards (TPS). First, I provide a complete characterization of the short-run and steady-state output responses analytically. Second, I validate the intermediate analytical results, explore the dynamics of the transition from pre- to post-policy steady-state, and discuss the welfare implications using a stylized numerical equilibrium model calibrated to a representative electricity sector. I show that the difference in social surplus gains between a TPS and a period-over-period sequence of damage equivalent emissions caps (CAP), summed over the infinite time horizon and discounted back to present, is always lower for a TPS, and is small relative to total social surplus gains from either policy. Most interestingly, under all but the smallest discount rates, the TPS can lead to a more cost-effective post-transition steady-state than a CAP.

1.1 Introduction

Rate-based standards come in many forms and are characterized by requiring the sum of emissions from all sources divided by total output to be less than some pre-specified intensity target. With a tradable performance standard (TPS), the average emissions rate is fixed. For production with emissions rates below the standard, operation creates permits which can be sold. For production with emissions rates above the standard, operation requires the purchase of permits to cover the difference. The equilibrium that arrives as a result of trading these permits determines the price of emissions and total amount of emissions, such that the average emissions intensity for the entire industry equals the TPS policy target (Fischer, 2001). A consequence of the TPS is that while the pre-specified intensity standard acts as an implicit tax on dirty or more emissions-intensive inputs to production of some good (e.g. electricity), it also provides an implicit subsidy to a producer's

output where the less emissions-intensive inputs receive a net subsidy (Fischer, 2001; Helfand, 1991; Holland *et al.*, 2009). Generally, a TPS results in inefficient outcomes by encouraging abatement efforts via emission rate reduction as opposed to curbing demand.

The typical analysis of the efficiency of a TPS proceeds by characterizing the pollution externality and the ability of a TPS to internalize the marginal external cost of the externality. Substitution towards less emissions-intensive sources as a result of the subsidy endogenously adjusts the levels of the implicit tax and subsidy. Because an emissions intensity standard taxes only the portion of emissions that exceed the standard and subsidizes inputs with emissions below the standard, the policy is considered a second-best option - as opposed to a first-best option - as it fails to address the marginal external damage of the pollution externality. This issue creates a disconnect between the damages caused by emissions and the efficient level of emissions. Cost effectiveness of the policy requires that the marginal abatement cost be equalized across all sources of pollution. This cannot be the case if some polluters are receiving a net subsidy while others are being taxed.

In this paper I focus on better understanding the TPS within a dynamic context. Much of the literature exploring the TPS is static in nature, and does not consider dynamics or foresight.¹ The closest related work is Fischer & Newell (2008), where technical change and spillovers are explored in a two-stage stylized electricity model. While foresighted decision-making and discounting is represented in this work, the methods are specifically targeted to the research question and do not allow for a close examination of the initial short-run response, the steady-state policy response, and the transition from the first period through the steady-state.

It is important to analyze a TPS in a dynamic framework because many emissions intensive sectors (e.g. electricity) depend on long-lived capital (e.g. generation capacity) that needs to be replaced as it ages. Also, issues related to climate tend to be longer term problems where investment is likely to be an important margin of adjustment. Regarding foresight, agents make investment decisions regarding long-lived capacity that require some degree of foresight and have

¹Static analyses range from general policy comparisons to examination under imperfect competition, emissions leakage, pre-existing tax distortions, technical change, to energy efficiency implications in the following works: Burtraw *et al.* (2014); Bushnell *et al.* (2017); Fell *et al.* (2017); Fischer (2003, 2011); Fischer & Newell (2008); Holland (2012); Li & Shi (2017); Parry & Williams (2011); Paul *et al.* (2014)

implications for the future. Expectations about the future have implications for decision making today.

There are potential factors not captured in a static analysis that could provide new insight when considered in a dynamic context. Adjustment costs and their intersection with the foresighted decision-maker are one such factor. Amigues *et al.* (2013) consider the extraction of a renewable and non-renewable resource, taking into account that the extraction of the renewable source requires capital investment in renewable electricity generating units (EGUs) and payment for adjustment costs (Gould, 1968). Amigues *et al.* (2013) show that the best strategy is to start to build renewable power early and spread investment over time as optimal investment in renewables is independent from existing fossil sources. Coulomb *et al.* (2019) study the transition from a dirty fuel (e.g. coal) to a clean fuel (e.g. gas) and renewable source of power under infinite resource stocks, capacity constraints, a carbon budget, and adjustment costs. They confirm the findings of Amigues *et al.* (2013). In particular, they find that investment in gas can start before coal is phased out and that investment in renewables can start before gas or coal are phased out. The reason for this is that the foresighted planner smooths investment over time in order to reduce adjustment costs.

Additionally, consider that the implicit subsidy to low emitting sources of production under a TPS may incentivize firms to retire dirtier sources and invest in cleaner sources. Firms may even decide to retire dirtier sources early and replace the capacity with cleaner alternatives in order to capture the subsidy. With a TPS, as low emitters enter (and high emitters exit), the average baseline emissions rate falls, loosening the constraint on average emissions, causing the price of permits to fall (Fischer, 2001). These characteristics could have important implications for how decision makers deploy capital in a foresighted context compared to policies, such as a carbon tax or emissions cap, that prioritize output reduction as a form of abatement.

Another factor that could provide new insight is the incorporation of discount rates. Discounting is incorporated to represent the assumption that net benefit flows in the future are not as important to agents as net benefits in the present. Higher discount rates encourage agents to shift abatement efforts towards the present. The channel by which this abatement effort primarily oc-

curs, whether by fuel switching or output reduction, could change the abatement cost and social surplus implications of comparative policies within particular regions of the time horizon, such as the steady-state.

In this paper, I explore a TPS under capacity constraints and investment using a stylized equilibrium model. In section 1.2, I define an analytical model that I use to provide a complete characterization of the initial period and steady-state output responses to the TPS policy. The existing literature compares the TPS in relation to a first-best outcome and acknowledges that output and emissions can increase or decrease, providing a proof that it can (Holland *et al.*, 2009). However, it is still unclear why this happens. Policymakers have expressed interest in output effects of rate-based policies. Specifically, if a policy designed to reduce emissions can't actually accomplish the goal under certain circumstances, then it should be understood why this occurs and what course of action policymakers should take to prevent this. Also, policymakers have expressed interest in whether a given policy increases or decreases the price of a good, as this has distributional and equity implications. Fischer (2010) explores the output response of a similar rate-based standard in a renewable portfolio standard, whereas I perform a similar analysis as it relates to a TPS.

I find that there exists a performance standard that leaves the price of output unchanged from the no-policy case in the post-policy, post-transition steady-state. Using this performance standard as a reference point, I find that if I set a new standard that is more (less) stringent than this reference point and the new standard binds, the price of output will be higher (lower) and quantity demanded will be lower (higher) in the post-policy steady-state. These intermediate results are important in understanding how the prices and quantities of the model respond to the TPS and should be used as an aide in understanding the output from the numerical model in section 1.3. Furthermore, these results highlight the fuel-switching nature of the TPS, as the slope of the demand curve has no bearing on the position of the standard that leaves prices and quantities unchanged. Additionally, the results show how certain conditions need to be met in order for prices to possibly decrease, and how any policy that is set with a realistic degree of stringency will be unlikely to cause emissions or output to increase. Knowing when these output responses occur and whether they are positive

or negative can help determine whether emissions will decrease (Holland *et al.*, 2009).

In section 1.3, I use a numerical model to validate the analytical results and to place the model within the context of an electricity sector. The numerical model is also used to explore the costs and benefits of the TPS in comparison to a no-policy scenario as well as that of a period-over-period sequence of damage equivalent emissions caps (CAP). Analysis of the numerical output shows that steeper marginal investment cost curves cause investment to be spread further across the time horizon, as expected. I also find that my results agree with existing literature, as the present value of all social surplus that accumulates to the TPS over an infinite time horizon is always less than that of the CAP, except when there is a zero emitting fuel and the performance standard is set to zero (Fischer, 2001; Holland *et al.*, 2009). Additionally, the difference in present value of total social surplus changes that accumulate to the TPS and CAP over time are small relative to total social surplus changes associated with either policy. First, this suggests that dynamic considerations don't change the well-known results in the literature — that an emissions cap is more cost-effective than a TPS, except under special circumstances (Holland, 2012). Secondly, the result indicates that if the goal is to reach zero emissions in the future, either policy is suitable (Holland *et al.*, 2009). Thirdly, even if zero emissions cannot be achieved, there is not a big difference between the two policies in terms of overall net benefits², so it might be best to implement the most politically feasible option.

The final result relates to changes in post-transition steady-state social surplus. Recall, one of the main purposes for exploring a TPS in a dynamic model is the unique ability to view the response to the TPS during different segments of the time horizon, such as the initial policy response, the transition that takes place from imposition of policy to a new steady-state, and the post-transition steady-state itself. Introducing a discount rate results in a post-transition steady-state that is more cost-effective under a TPS than a CAP. This is true for all but the lowest discount rates. A purely static analysis could not yield this result due to the lack of a discount rate and its interaction with

²Assumes marginal damages of 20 USD/metric ton of CO₂ emitted. Lower marginal damages increase the % differences in net benefits, whereas higher marginal damages decrease % differences. However, the differences are most sensitive to how stringently the TPS is set. The more stringent, the lower the % differences in present value of abatement costs between a CAP and TPS.

the foresighted decision-maker. In fact, with a discount rate of zero, we know from the overall result that the post-transition steady-state must be more cost-effective under a CAP than a TPS, due to the fact that the steady-state surplus values sum to infinity and the CAP must be more cost-effective than the TPS overall. Discounting places a finite value on the perpetual stream of constant nominal benefit flows that accrue to either policy in the post-transition steady-state. This changes the abatement patterns across time relative to a zero-discount rate counterfactual.

This result has equity implications, in that some classes of future consumers – specifically those who do not stand to benefit from an intergenerational transfer of wealth – may prefer a TPS to a CAP. Policymakers concerned with the impact climate policies might have on lower income households can take this into consideration. Also, the literature (Nordhaus, 2007) on social discount rates and climate change tends to focus on the particular rate of discount chosen and determining whether the net present value of a policy is positive or negative, rather than a comparison of different policies. Philosophical arguments propose the use of a lower social discount rate in order to reflect the fact that institutions of society last longer than any one person and therefore must place greater weight on the well-being of posterity. If one assumes that government has a lower discount rate than the agents responding to policy, and government is responsible for policy choice and agents for policy response, the post-transition steady-state welfare result in this paper suggests that a TPS may have a rational appeal to policymakers who take a longer term view.

In addition to the benefits associated with a TPS compared to other policies noted by Fischer (2019), Popp (2019), and Goulder *et al.* (2019), the results in this work highlight a new cost-effectiveness feature of the TPS. Specifically, that it can lead to a post-transition steady-state that is more cost-effective than the alternative emissions cap. Additionally, over the entire infinite time horizon, while the TPS is less cost-effective than an emissions cap, it isn't much worse from a pure cost-effectiveness comparison perspective. The numerical section also highlights many research avenues that could be pursued in further exploration of the TPS in a dynamic setting and, additionally, provides a baseline for what to expect from a more applied model.

This paper proceeds with a discussion of the analytical intuition (section 1.2) where the initial period and steady-state policy responses are discussed in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. Then I turn to the numerical results in section 1.3 which proceeds with a discussion of the model setup (section 1.3.1), the scenario definition (section 1.3.2), the evolution of the model variables through time (section 1.3.3), and a discussion of abatement cost and social surplus (section 1.3.4). Concluding remarks are provided in section 1.4.

1.2 Model

In this section I define an analytical model used to explore the initial and steady-state responses to the TPS policy instrument. Throughout this section, I use language applicable to the electricity sector. However, the discussion is relevant to other industrial sectors that are subject to long-lived capacity, large costs of investment, and capacity constraints. In section 1.2.1 I lay out a dynamic model and discuss the initial period response analytically. I also define the period-over-period emissions equivalent cap (CAP) and compare the policy response under perfectly inelastic demand. In section 1.2.2 I build upon the model and assumptions developed in section 1.2.1 and perform an analysis of the pre- and post-policy steady-states under different elasticity of demand assumptions and linearly increasing marginal investment costs. The results from this section should be used to inform expectations about the numerical model output.

1.2.1 Dynamic model and first-period policy response

While the following model is dynamic, framing the model statically proves useful in understanding how the prices and quantities in the model respond to the TPS policy instrument under various segments of the time horizon. By breaking down the dynamic model into component parts such as the first-period or the steady-state, I am effectively decomposing the dynamic model into static parts. It is also useful to discuss the intuition of a TPS as it compares to a CAP due to its ability to internalize the marginal external costs of the pollution externality at a relatively low cost. This section should highlight some of the key similarities and differences between a TPS and a CAP. Additionally, I discuss how changing the slopes of demand and supply curves can im-

compact model output as well as how adding investment and capacity constraints can impact policy responses. The changes to the prices and quantities brought about by these policy instruments are important in understanding the implications for costs and benefits associated with a TPS. Costs and benefits of these policies are discussed in later sections. In this section, assumptions are relaxed step-by-step in order to provide a clear understanding of the policy instrument and the drivers of outcomes.

In the simple model to follow, I assume a perfectly competitive electricity sector with two sources of generation ($X_{f,t}$) – a high (H) carbon source and a low (L) carbon source. Combined generation ($\sum_f X_{f,t}$) from the two fuel sources (f) must equate with the level of electricity demanded (Q_t) in a given time period (t) that occurs in discrete intervals over an infinite time horizon. Over time, generation capacity ($K_{f,t}$) is retired at a rate of depreciation (δ). As capacity is retired, additional megawatts must be added through investment ($I_{f,t}$). Investment occurs contemporaneously with generation in a given period. Each fuel has an associated emissions intensity (ω_f) which determines the rate at which emissions are produced from generating electricity.

These characteristics of the electricity sector are represented in the maximization problem below:

$$\max_{X,I,Q} \sum_t \left[\int_0^{Q_t} P(Q) dQ - \sum_f C_{f,t}^I(I_{f,t}) - \sum_f C_{f,t}^X(X_{f,t}) \right] \quad (1.1)$$

subject to :

$$\sum_f X_{f,t} \geq Q_t \quad (1.2)$$

$$K_{f,t} \geq X_{f,t} \quad (1.3)$$

$$K_{f,t-1} * (1 - \delta) + I_{f,t} \geq K_{f,t} \quad (1.4)$$

$$(CAP \text{ case}) \quad \Omega_t \geq \sum_f \omega_f X_{f,t} \quad (1.5)$$

$$(TPS \text{ case}) \quad \sigma_t \geq \frac{\sum_f \omega_f X_{f,t}}{\sum_f X_{f,t}} \quad (1.6)$$

$$X_{f,t}, I_{f,t}, Q_t \geq 0 \quad (1.7)$$

where $X_{f,t}$, $I_{f,t}$, and $K_{f,t}$ represent generation, investment, and capacity in period t for fuel type f , respectively. Equation 1.1 represents the sum of net benefits across the time horizon. Where benefits ($\int_0^{Q_t} P(Q)dQ$) are a function of quantity demanded (Q_t) which equals generation summed across all fuel sources in equation 1.2. $C_{f,t}^I(I_{f,t})$ and $C_{f,t}^X(X_{f,t})$ represent total costs of investment and generation, respectively. Net benefits are maximized in equation 1.1 by choosing generation and investment. The objective function is constrained by equations 1.2 - 1.7 using only one of equations 1.5 or 1.6. Equation 1.3 requires that generation not exceed capacity for each fuel type in a given time period. Equation 1.4 dictates the evolution of capacity via depreciation and investment in each time period for each fuel type. The depreciation rate (δ) is constant throughout the time horizon. Equation 1.5 represents the constraint for the CAP case which equates the aggregate emissions cap (Ω_t) with emissions being produced from generation. Equation 1.6 represents the constraint for the TPS which requires the rate of emissions from generation to be less than or equal to some intensity target (σ_t). The choice variables are greater than or equal to zero for all fuel types and time periods.

The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} = & \sum_t \left[\int_0^{Q_t} P(Q)dQ - \sum_f C_{f,t}^I(I_{f,t}) - \sum_f C_{f,t}^X(X_{f,t}) \right] \\
& - \sum_t PD_t (Q_t - \sum_f X_{f,t}) \\
& - \sum_t PK_{ft} (X_{ft} - K_{ft}) \\
& - \sum_t PI_{ft} (K_{ft} - K_{f,t-1}(1 - \delta) - I_{f,t}) \\
(CAP \text{ case}) & - \sum_t PCAP_t \left[\sum_f \omega_f X_{f,t} - \Omega_t \right] \\
(TPS \text{ case}) & - \sum_t PTPS_t \left[\sum_f \omega_f X_{f,t} - \sigma_t \sum_f X_{f,t} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{1.8}$$

where the rental rate on capacity ($PK_{f,t}$) is associated with the capacity constraint, the price of investment ($PI_{f,t}$) is associated with the equation of motion, and the permit prices are associated with each policy constraint ($PCAP_t$ and $PTPS_t$). The first order conditions for each case with

Before exploring Figure 1.1 in more detail, further assumptions are needed. For simplicity, assume that marginal costs of generation ($\partial C^X(X_{f,t})/\partial X_{f,t} = MC_{f,t}^X > 0$) and an analogous marginal cost function for investment³ are constant and that both fuels are operating at their physical capacities to generate in the BAU state. Further assume that $MC_{H,t}^X = MC_{L,t}^X$ and $MC_{H,t}^I = MC_{L,t}^I$. At this point, assuming that the emissions intensity for the high carbon fuel is higher than the emissions intensity for the low carbon fuel ($\omega_H > \omega_L > 0$) guarantees that under enforcement of either policy constraint (equation 1.5 or 1.6) coal will be the marginal fuel in production. In order to assess the policy instrument immediately upon enforcement, assume that the time horizon is a single period. Lastly, assume that the BAU case establishes benchmark levels for the average emissions intensity and the aggregate level of emissions, Φ_t and Ψ_t respectively. Φ_t and Ψ_t are related by generation in the BAU state such that $\Psi_t = \Phi_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{BAU}$. These benchmark values are then reduced by a rate of emissions reduction (ρ_t) to establish the policy targets such that $\Omega_t = (1 - \rho_t)\Psi_t$ and $\sigma_t = (1 - \rho_t)\Phi_t$. This specification of Ω_t and σ_t defines the CAP and TPS policy cases respectively.

Returning to Figure 1.1 note that two states of the world exist, the BAU state and the CAP/TPS state. Given the assumptions above, Figure 1.1 illustrates how a CAP and TPS are equivalent policies in quantity space when quantity demanded is fixed. Total emissions and total generation are represented by the left and right hand sides of Figure 1.1 respectively. Quantity demanded is represented by the line segment FI . Quantity demanded is met by generation from H or L which are stacked in the columns on the right side of the diagram. In the BAU case, H produces half of the electricity and L produces half of the electricity, shown by the fact that line segment $FG = GI$. In order to meet demand, electricity is generated, which produces emissions of CO₂. Under the BAU case, aggregate emissions are given by line segment AE . Again, emissions attributed to each fuel source are stacked in the columns on the left side of the diagram. Recall that the emissions intensity for H is greater than the emissions intensity for L ($\omega_H > \omega_L$). Given that H and L contribute equally to the generation mix in the BAU case, it follows that H produces a larger share of total emissions than that of L. This is represented by the fact that $AC < CE$ in Figure 1.1.

³Marginal investment costs are defined: $\partial C^I(I_{f,t})/\partial I_{f,t} = MC_{f,t}^I > 0$

The CAP/TPS case imposes a policy that will reduce the average or aggregate emissions rate by the same percentage. This in combination with perfectly inelastic demand will lead to an equivalent reduction in aggregate emissions (given by segment AB) regardless of whether it is the rate (1.6) or level (1.5) of emissions that is regulated. This is because output of electricity will not change. Recall that H and L are operating at their physical capacities to generate in the BAU state. When emissions are reduced via a CAP or TPS, perfectly inelastic demand prevents consumers from abating emissions by reducing consumption of electricity. Abatement of emissions must occur via fuel switching. In order to reduce emissions via fuel switching, L must increase its share of generation and H must decrease its share in order to dilute aggregate emissions via relative differences in emissions intensity. In Figure 1.1, the switch from H to L is given by the line segment GH . Building new capacity in L for generation and leaving excess H capacity leads to a generation mix that is heavier in L production than in the BAU case. The new generation mix results in an emissions mix diluted by L relative to BAU. The result is represented in Figure 1.1 by the fact that emissions from L make up a higher share of the emissions mix in the CAP/TPS case than the BAU case (given by $BD/BE > AC/AE$). L capacity is constrained, thus more L capacity needs to be built in order to satisfy the policy. On the other hand, producers substitute away from H, leaving excess (unused) H capacity in the sector. This is how emissions can be reduced via fuel switching alone, which regardless of policy choice is the only abatement option given our assumptions.

In the case of perfectly inelastic demand total generation must meet the fixed level of quantity demanded ($Q_t = d_t$) such that:

$$\sum_f X_{f,t}^{BAU} = \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS} = \sum_f X_{f,t}^{CAP} = d_t \quad (1.14)$$

where $\sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS}$ and $\sum_f X_{f,t}^{CAP}$ represent total generation after enforcing the TPS or CAP, respectively. Under perfectly inelastic demand, there is effectively no difference in quantity response between a CAP and TPS using the same rate of emissions reduction (ρ) to establish each policy target. Recall that Φ_t and Ψ_t are related by generation in the BAU state such that:

$$\Psi_t = \Phi_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{BAU} \quad (1.15)$$

The benchmark values are then reduced by a rate of emissions reduction (ρ) to establish each respective policy target such that:

$$(CAP) \quad \Omega_t = (1 - \rho)\Psi_t \quad (1.16)$$

$$(TPS) \quad \sigma_t = (1 - \rho)\Phi_t \quad (1.17)$$

To formalize why establishing each policy target in such a way under perfectly inelastic demand results in emissions equivalent policy, I specify the CAP policy target (Ω_t) that results in the same level of annual emissions as a TPS ($\sigma_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS}$). Given that the TPS is specified according to equation 1.17, an emissions equivalent CAP is specified as follows:

$$\Omega_t = \sigma_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS} = (1 - \rho)\Phi_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS} = (1 - \rho)\Psi_t \frac{\sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS}}{\sum_f X_{f,t}^{BAU}} \quad (1.18)$$

$$\Omega_t = \sigma_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS} = \sum_f X_{f,t}^{TPS} \omega_f \quad (1.19)$$

This specification in equation 1.19 is used throughout the paper in reference to the CAP policy instrument, best understood as a sequence of emissions caps set to meet emissions in each period implied by the sequence of TPSs. Substituting equation 1.14 into equation 1.18 reduces to

$$\Omega_t = \sigma_t \sum_f X_{f,t}^{BAU} = (1 - \rho)\Psi_t \quad (1.20)$$

which corresponds to equation 1.16.

While Figure 1.1 provides a high-level summary of how quantities can change under these policies, there are other factors at play. Prices are changing as well. Marginal policy costs ($PC_{f,t}$) are represented by the last term in equations 1.9 and 1.10 such that $PC_{f,t}^{CAP} \equiv PCAP_t \omega_f$ and $PC_{f,t}^{TPS} \equiv PTPS_t(\omega_f - \sigma_t)$. The CAP places a price on emissions from both L and H. This tax on all sources of generation will increase electricity prices via equation 1.9. Equations 1.9 and 1.10 show a larger marginal policy cost associated with the fuel with the higher emissions intensity. Given our other assumptions, this ensures that all production of electricity from H is abated

prior to any L. In a situation such as Figure 1.1 where demand is perfectly inelastic, the CAP and the TPS will bind their emissions constraints (equation 1.5 and 1.6) to the same degree, producing identical emissions prices ($PCAP = PTPS$) but different marginal policy costs and electricity price by equations 1.9 and 1.10.

In the TPS, the implicit subsidy drives the difference in marginal policy costs. If we assume that $PK_{f,t}$ is fixed, electricity price will increase or decrease by the marginal policy cost associated with each fuel type and policy instrument. However, PD_t cannot scale with permit price because the marginal policy costs are different for each fuel type. An adjustment in the capacity rental rate ($PK_{f,t}$) is required in order to reconcile the differences between fuel types such that equations 1.5 and 1.6 hold. Permit prices are reflective of the fact that H produces only the amount at which it can equate rental prices to operating profits. When the capacity constraint no longer binds for H, as exhibited in Figure 1.1, the rental rate for H falls towards its lower bound at 0, where it is no longer considered scarce. Due to the fact that marginal investment costs are constant for each fuel ($\partial MC_f^I / \partial I_f = 0$) and complementary slackness associated with equation 1.3 holds, the capacity rental rate (PK_f) must be either positive and constant, or 0. This is supported by equations 1.12 and 1.13. We have also assumed that marginal operating costs are constant and equal across fuel types. This means that in each period prices equilibrate such that

$$\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f \quad (1.21)$$

where Δ is the difference between the policy (CAP or TPS) case and the BAU (e.g. $\Delta PD = PD^{TPS} - PD^{BAU}$). Equation 1.21 is obtained by subtracting equation 1.11 from either of equations 1.9 or 1.10 and dropping the t index. Permit prices scale to the point where it is more cost effective to build a marginal unit of L than to continue producing a marginal unit of electricity with existing H. L will bind its capacity constraint. Equation 1.21 is used throughout this paper to explain the behavior of all variables in this model.

Further examination of equations 1.9 - 1.13 as they relate to L shows positive marginal policy costs for the CAP ($\Delta PC_L^{CAP} > 0$), negative marginal policy costs for the TPS ($\Delta PC_L^{TPS} < 0$), and zero change in the capacity rental rate for both cases ($\Delta PK_L = 0$). Given our assumptions, this

implies that electricity price is higher under the CAP case ($\Delta PD^{CAP} > 0$) and lower under the TPS case ($\Delta PD^{TPS} < 0$) via equation 1.21.

Consider further, a situation where marginal investment costs are no longer constant but increasing in $I_{f,t}$. Increasing marginal investment costs can capture scarcity in capital and labor in the broader market (external adjustment costs) and scarcity in labor that is reallocated away from production and towards investment (internal adjustment costs). Due to the large costs of investment associated with the electricity sector, it is reasonable to assume that adjustment costs exist in some capacity for fossil fuels. While I abstract from renewable fuels in this analysis, increasing costs of investment can be used to represent renewable resource extraction and scarcity (Coulomb *et al.*, 2019) as well as other associated infrastructure challenges (e.g. transmission capacity). As $I_{f,t}$ increases within the period, marginal investment costs are equated to investment prices ($PI_{f,t}$) which will increase. As $PI_{f,t}$ increases, the rental rate of capital ($PK_{f,t}$) increases by equation 1.12. This becomes more important in later sections when I relax the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand, as this influences the level of output, emissions, and damages associated with a TPS. As shown in equations 1.9 and 1.10, electricity prices must be high enough to cover marginal operating, policy, and capacity rental costs in equilibrium. This intuition is expanded upon in section 1.2.2.

1.2.2 The steady-state policy response

In the previous section I discussed the initial response to the TPS policy under perfectly inelastic demand. In this section I build upon the model and assumptions developed in the previous section. I perform an analysis of the pre- and post-policy steady-state under different elasticity of demand assumptions and linearly increasing marginal investment costs. The pre-policy steady-state is the BAU steady-state. The BAU steady-state is one in which all prices and quantities are constant in perpetuity. I establish an analytical framework for predicting steady-state outcomes under a TPS. This framework accounts for changes in all prices and quantities and gives insight into steady-state periodic social surplus changes relative to the BAU scenario.

Climate change is a long-term problem, therefore the steady-state outcomes are important to take into consideration as social surplus accrues perpetually. It is also important to know where a policy will eventually lead us after planners have had ample time to respond to a policy. Emissions levels are a focus of the steady-state analysis because marginal damages from emissions are assumed to be constant. Therefore, emissions levels are a direct indicator of damages.

The primary intuitive result is that there exists a TPS policy target that does not change electricity price or quantity demanded in the steady-state. In order for this to be true, the standard must be set such that changes in capacity rental costs and marginal operating costs directly offset changes in marginal policy costs (Section 1.2.2.1). If the standard is more (less) stringent than this standard and the standard binds, electricity price will be higher (lower) and quantity demanded will be lower (higher) in the post-policy steady-state (Section 1.2.2.2). Emissions can be inferred from the quantity response. Social surplus changes inclusive of avoided damages can then be calculated.

1.2.2.1 Establishing a starting point for further analysis

In this section I set up the steady-state investment problem and show how to establish a TPS policy target (σ) that does not change electricity price or quantity demanded in the steady-state, regardless of the prevailing elasticity of demand. It is important to establish this policy target as a starting point for analysis in the following section. The assumptions and model setup developed in this section serve as a base with which to explore alternative TPS policy targets and specifications of demand elasticity in section 1.2.2.2.

Recall the first order conditions from our model developed in section 1.2.1. Assume that in a steady-state, the capacity constraint (1.3) and the policy constraint (1.6) bind in perpetuity. Note that in the steady-state all variables are unchanged across time, allowing us to drop the t index. The following first order conditions prove useful for the analysis:

$$\mathcal{L}_{PD} : Q = \sum_f X_f \quad (1.22)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{PK} : K_f = X_f \quad (1.23)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{PI} : I_f = K_f \delta \quad (1.24)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{PTPS} : \sigma = \frac{\sum_f \omega_f X_f}{\sum_f X_f} \quad (1.25)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_Q : P = PD \quad (1.26)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_X : PD = MC_f^X(X_f) + PK_f + PTPS(\omega_f - \sigma) \quad (1.27)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_K : PK_f = PI_f \delta \quad (1.28)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_I : PI_f = MC_f^I(I_f) \quad (1.29)$$

I will use these first order conditions (1.22 - 1.29) to derive a reduced form of the model. Substituting (1.29) into (1.28) yields:

$$PK_f = MC_f^I(I_f) \delta \quad (1.30)$$

Substituting (1.30) into (1.27) yields:

$$PD = MC_f^X(X_f) + MC_f^I(I_f) \delta + PTPS(\omega_f - \sigma) \quad (1.31)$$

Further substitution of (1.23) and (1.24) into (1.31) yields the reduced form:

$$PD = MC_f^X(K_f) + MC_f^I(K_f \delta) \delta + PTPS(\omega_f - \sigma) \quad (1.32)$$

where MC_f^X is constant. Equation 1.32 shows how marginal investment costs and marginal policy costs determine the electricity price in a steady-state where the only investment is the replacement of steady-state capacity. Noting equation 1.30 and expanding upon it, the capacity rental rate (PK_f) in the steady state is given by:

$$PK_f = MC_f^I(I_f) \delta = MC_f^I(K_f \delta) \delta \quad (1.33)$$

At this point I will establish the TPS policy target at which electricity price and total quantity remains unchanged in the post-policy steady state. The first step is to solve for the policy target (σ) that leaves electricity price unchanged. I begin by differentiating 1.27 which yields the following:

$$dPD = dPK_f + dPTPS(\omega_f - \sigma) \quad (1.34)$$

where a variable prefixed with a d represents a change in the variable from the BAU to the TPS steady-state as a result of the policy. I am trying to solve for the policy target (σ) that results in zero change in electricity price ($dPD = 0$). Setting the left hand side of equation 1.34 equal to 0 and solving for σ yields,

$$\sigma_0 = \frac{dPK_f}{dPTPS} + \omega_f \quad (1.35)$$

Where σ_0 corresponds to the policy standard that ensures $dPD = 0$. Assuming that only a high carbon (H) and low carbon (L) fuel exist I can set the policy target equal for each fuel:

$$\sigma_0^L = \sigma_0^H \quad (1.36)$$

$$\frac{dPK_L}{dPTPS} + \omega_L = \frac{dPK_H}{dPTPS} + \omega_H \quad (1.37)$$

solving (1.37) for $dPTPS$ yields:

$$dPTPS = \frac{dPK_L - dPK_H}{\omega_H - \omega_L} \quad (1.38)$$

Substituting (1.38) into (1.35) results in the following:

$$\sigma_0 = \frac{dPK_f(\omega_H - \omega_L)}{dPK_L - dPK_H} + \omega_f \quad (1.39)$$

Equation 1.39 is a general form of the TPS target that results in $dPD = 0$. Recall that marginal policy costs are given by $PC \equiv PTPS(\omega_f - \sigma)$. This equation specifies the policy target (σ_0) that will ensure that equation 1.21 is equal to 0 as follows:

$$dPD = dPK + dPC = 0 \quad (1.40)$$

To fully appreciate equation 1.39 it is necessary to consider how the marginal investment cost function drives dPK and hence σ_0 . First, I reiterate the assumptions that demand can take on any elasticity and the marginal investment cost curves are increasing in investment ($\partial MC_f^I(I_f)/\partial I_f > 0$). The relationship between the capacity rental rate and the marginal investment cost curves in the steady-state follows from equation 1.33 such that:

$$dPK_f = \delta dMC_f^I(I_f) = \delta dMC_f^I(K_f \delta) \quad (1.41)$$

In the steady-state, the change in the capacity rental rate is the change in the marginal investment cost multiplied by the depreciation rate. By assuming that the policy target binds ($\sigma < \Phi$), it follows from equation 1.41 that $dPK_L > 0$, $dPK_H < 0$, $dMC_L^I > 0$, and $dMC_H^I < 0$. Finally, assuming that the marginal investment cost curves are linear means:

$$dMC_L^I(I_L) = \frac{\partial MC_L^I(I_L)}{\partial I_L} dI_L = \gamma_L dI_L = \Delta MC_L^I(I_L) \quad (1.42)$$

$$dMC_H^I(I_H) = \frac{\partial MC_H^I(I_H)}{\partial I_H} dI_H = \gamma_H dI_H = \Delta MC_H^I(I_H) \quad (1.43)$$

where γ_f is some constant marginal cost. Substituting 1.41 into 1.39 yields:

$$\sigma_0 = \frac{\delta dMC_f^I(\omega_H - \omega_L)}{\delta(dMC_L^I - dMC_H^I)} + \omega_f \quad (1.44)$$

Cancelling the δ s and substituting (1.42) and (1.43) results in the value of σ_0 specified in terms of the characteristics of the linear marginal investment cost functions, given below:

$$\sigma_0 = \omega_L + \frac{\gamma_L dI_L(\omega_H - \omega_L)}{\gamma_L dI_L - \gamma_H dI_H} \quad (1.45)$$

Equation 1.45 establishes a relationship between the relative slopes of the marginal cost functions for each fuel and the placement of a standard that will result in $dPD = 0$. In order for PD to remain unchanged, $Q = \sum_f X_f = \sum_f K_f = \sum_f I_f / \delta$ needs to remain unchanged. This implies that it is always the case that $dI_H = -dI_L$. Given this fact, equation 1.45 reduces to:

$$\sigma_0 = \omega_L + \frac{\gamma_L(\omega_H - \omega_L)}{\gamma_L + \gamma_H} \quad (1.46)$$

Consider the case where the marginal investment cost functions for the high and low carbon fuels are linear and of the same slope ($\gamma_L = \gamma_H$). In this case, equation (1.46) reduces to,

$$\sigma_0 = \omega_L + \frac{\omega_H - \omega_L}{2} = \omega_H - \frac{\omega_H - \omega_L}{2} \quad (1.47)$$

which places σ_0 at the midpoint between ω_H and ω_L . Changes in PK_H and PK_L also need to directly offset PC_H and PC_L as $PTPS$ scales with equation 1.25, respectively.

Lemma 1 *For a demand function of any slope, given an initial interior solution, there exists a standard (σ_0) that does not change electricity price or quantity demanded in the post-policy steady-*

state. This standard may or may not lie in a binding position.

Lemma 1 provides a useful starting point for examining the steady-state policy responses. The exercise in section 1.2.2.2 conceptualizes Lemma 1 and then uses it as a benchmark from which to perform different counterfactual experiments.

1.2.2.2 Counterfactual experiments using a simple example

In this section I set up a simple example to help illustrate the steady-state response to a TPS set at different positions relative to σ_0 . I explore how different demand elasticities impact outcomes when the standard is not set at σ_0 . I find that if the standard is more (less) stringent than σ_0 and the standard binds, electricity price will be higher (lower) and quantity demanded will be lower (higher) in the post-policy steady-state.

To begin the analysis I set up a simple example and reiterate some important assumptions. For the moment, assume that demand can take on any elasticity between 0 (perfectly inelastic) and negative infinity (perfectly elastic). Figure 1.2 illustrates the initial BAU steady-state. The BAU steady state is defined by linearly increasing marginal investment cost curves of identical slope. Marginal investment cost for the low carbon fuel is greater than marginal investment cost for the high carbon fuel. Steady-state investment in the low carbon fuel is half of steady-state investment from the high carbon fuel (i.e. $2I_L^{BAU} = I_H^{BAU}$). Steady-state price of investment for the low carbon fuel is equal to that of the high carbon fuel.

Given the example setup in Figure 1.2, we can calculate σ_0 using equation 1.45. As previously discussed, due to the fact that $\frac{\partial MC_H^I / \partial I_H}{\partial MC_L^I / \partial I_L} = 1$, σ_0 reduces to equation 1.47. Additionally, setting the policy target within the system of equations 1.23 - 1.29 at this level results in a binding policy constraint such that $\sigma = \sigma_0 < \Phi$. Upon enforcement of this policy, a new steady-state is eventually reached where the following results:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta PC_H / \Delta PC_L &= -1 \\ \Delta PK_H / \Delta PK_L &= -1 \\ \Delta PD &= PD^{TPS} - PD^{BAU} = 0\end{aligned}$$




Figure 1.2: Definition of the BAU Steady-State using Marginal Investment Cost curves

Δ is the difference between the TPS steady-state variable and the BAU steady-state variable. In this section, I use ΔPC_f and PC_f interchangeably, as marginal policy costs are always zero in the BAU steady-state.




Figure 1.3: Phase 0 - $\sigma = \sigma_0$ such that $\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f = 0$

In order to visually illustrate the policy response in this example, I turn attention to Figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 shows features related to the policy target (right panel) and policy response (left panel). The interaction of the features in the left and right panels of Figure 1.3 show how the capacity rental rate and associated policy costs respond to a given policy target, respectively. Taken together, the sum of ΔPK_f and PC_f result in the change in the price of output (ΔPD) as a result of the TPS.

Before discussing how to use the graphical analytical tool depicted in Figure 1.3 to perform counterfactual analysis, I discuss the features of the tool. The right panel of Figure 1.3 relates to the policy target, which is associated with σ . The origin denoted by a 0 in the right panel is associated with the policy target as well. Note the horizontal (PC_L) and vertical (PC_H) axes associated with the policy target origin. The feasible set of values that marginal policy costs can take on lies to the left ($PC_L \leq 0$) and above ($PC_H \geq 0$) the origin, as L always receives a subsidy and H is always taxed. The line emanating from the origin, referred to from this point forward

as the “policy target line”, represents the relative marginal policy costs, which is dictated by the placement of the policy target (σ). Each policy target line is associated with a specific policy target choice. In the case of Figure 1.3, the slope is equal to 1, indicating that σ_0 is the midpoint between ω_L and ω_H . The line BD represents the feasible combinations of marginal policy costs (PC_f), given a binding policy constraint associated with $PTPS > 0$. The policy target line intersects line BD at point C . Point C establishes the marginal policy costs (PC_L and PC_H) associated with a given policy target choice.

The left panel of Figure 1.3 relates to the policy response. Responses to policy arise as a result of changes in investment levels, which cause changes in the capacity rental rate (ΔPK_f) when marginal investment costs are not constant. The origin, denoted by a 0 in the top left of the panel, is associated with the features of Figure 1.3 that relate to the policy response. The feasible set of values that ΔPK can take lies in the space to the right of ($\Delta PK_L \geq 0$) and below ($\Delta PK_H \leq 0$) the origin, as L will always see increases in investment and H will always see decreases as a result of the TPS. The line emanating from the origin, referred to from this point forward as the “policy response line”, represents the relative changes in the capacity rental rate ($\frac{\Delta PK_H}{\Delta PK_L}$) associated with a given policy target choice, marginal investment cost function, and elasticity of demand assumption. The line GI represents the set of feasible combinations of capacity rental rate responses to the binding policy constraint associated with $PTPS > 0$. The intersection of the policy response line and GI occurs at point H . Point H represents the optimal response (ΔPK_L and ΔPK_H) to the TPS given a policy target choice, marginal investment cost functions for L and H, and an elasticity of demand assumption.

As in Figure 1.3, if the policy target is set such that $\sigma = \sigma_0$, then the policy target line and the policy response line will have the same slope ($\frac{\Delta PK_H}{\Delta PK_L} = \frac{PC_H}{PC_L}$). Recalling equation 1.21, note that in Figure 1.3 the marginal policy cost and change in capacity rental rate sum to 0 for a given fuel, such that $\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f = 0$. The dividing double line (KM) in Figure 1.3 links the policy response and policy target. For example, in Figure 1.3, $\Delta PK_H + PC_H = 0 = \Delta PD$ is shown by the intersection of KM and EJ at point L .




Figure 1.4: Maps Figure 1.3 into price and quantity space

The following analysis proceeds in phases. Phase 0 is represented in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4. Phase 0 serves as a benchmark from which counterfactual experiments in phases 1 and 2 are performed. An important assumption I make in the counterfactual analysis is that once Phase 0 establishes a level of $PTPS$, I hold fixed $PTPS$ at the level established in Phase 0. This is done in order to improve tractability of the analytical model without losing the core intuition by preventing lines BD and GI from shifting. Phase 1 explores the case of perfectly inelastic demand and a stricter policy target set such that $\sigma < \sigma_0$. Phase 2 explores the case of perfectly elastic demand under the stricter policy target established in phase 1. Together, phases 1 and 2 establish the range of possible outcomes under different demand elasticities.

Before continuing to phases 1 and 2, it is necessary to explore how the phase 0 intensity map impacts output in Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4 shows electricity price as a function of total capacity (left panel) and investment price as it relates to investment (right panel). Figure 1.4 shows price and quantity responses for the policy target established in Figure 1.3. Figure 1.4 reiterates the fact that the magnitude of marginal policy costs are equal and the slopes of the investment cost curves are equal. Changes in investment levels and investment prices for the low and high carbon fuel perfectly offset. This translates into perfectly offsetting changes in capacity and capacity rental

rate, resulting in a zero change in total capacity. Marginal policy costs exactly offset changes in capacity rental rates, resulting in a zero change in electricity price. A zero change in electricity price corresponds to a zero change in total capacity. A summary of the phase 0 result is below:

$$\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f = 0 \quad (1.48)$$

$$\Delta PC_H / \Delta PC_L = (\omega_H - \sigma) / (\omega_L - \sigma) = -1 \quad (1.49)$$

$$\Delta PK_H / \Delta PK_L = \Delta PI_H / \Delta PI_L = -1 \quad (1.50)$$

$$\Delta I_H + \Delta I_L = 0 \quad (1.51)$$

$$\Delta K_H + \Delta K_L = 0 \implies \Delta \sum_f X_f = 0 \quad (1.52)$$




Figure 1.5: Phase 1 - $\sigma < \sigma_0$ under perfectly inelastic demand such that $\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f > 0$

Figures Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 are associated with phase 1. In Figure 1.5, any reference to “1” indicates an element associated with phase 1. Phase 1 shows the response to a stricter standard ($\sigma < \sigma_0$) under perfectly inelastic demand. The stricter policy target is represented by a rotation of the policy target line clockwise, effectively making the slope of the policy target line steeper. By placing the standard closer to the low carbon fuel, the high carbon fuel bears a higher burden of the cost of compliance. Hence, marginal policy costs for the high carbon fuel are greater in magnitude than the low carbon fuel. This is represented by the intersection of the new policy




Figure 1.6: Maps Figure 1.5 into price and quantity space

target line with BD at point N . The result is that $PC_H^1 > PC_L^1$ and $PC_f^1 > PC_f^0$. Turning attention to the policy response, perfectly inelastic demand prevents deviation from phase 0 (noting that $PTPS$ is assumed fixed). Total capacity will remain unchanged due to perfectly inelastic demand. This means that electricity price must increase in order to ensure that $\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f$.

Turning to Figure 1.6, it can be seen how changing relative marginal policy costs via the policy target relative to phase 0 impacts quantities under perfectly inelastic demand. As expected, quantities do not change relative to phase 0 under perfectly inelastic demand. An increase in electricity price is the only way to balance the phase 1 marginal policy costs and capacity rental rates associated with a zero change in total capacity, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.6. See below for a summary of results from phase 1:

$$\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f > 0 \quad (1.53)$$

$$\Delta PC_H / \Delta PC_L = (\omega_H - \sigma) / (\omega_L - \sigma) < -1 \quad (1.54)$$

$$\Delta PK_H / \Delta PK_L = \Delta PI_H / \Delta PI_L = -1 \quad (1.55)$$

$$\Delta I_H + \Delta I_L = 0 \quad (1.56)$$

$$\Delta K_H + \Delta K_L = 0 \implies \Delta \sum_f X_f = 0 \quad (1.57)$$

Phase 2, given in figures Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8, assumes the same adjustment to the policy target line as phase 1 but allows for perfectly elastic demand. This effectively allows for adjustments in total capacity in order to maintain the prevailing electricity price, forcing $\Delta PD = 0$. Again, any reference to a “2” in Figure 1.7 indicates an element associated with phase 2. First, the rotation of the policy target line in phase 2 (Figure 1.7) is identical to the rotation of the policy target line in phase 1 (Figure 1.5). This carries the same implications regarding relative marginal policy costs as phase 1. The difference between figures Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.5 is that in Figure 1.7 the policy response line rotates clockwise around the origin. The policy response line rotates until its slope is identical to that of the policy target line. The intersection of the new policy response line and GI at point P dictates the changes in capacity rental rates for H and L. The policy response line rotates until its slope is just equal to that of the policy target line, coinciding with a zero change in electricity price ($\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f = 0$).

Figure 1.8 shows how electricity price and quantities adjust to the stricter policy target under perfectly elastic demand. In order to ensure that electricity price remains unchanged, quantities must respond such that changes in the capacity rental rate for each respective fuel perfectly offset changes to marginal policy costs brought about by the policy. In order for this to be true, investment in the low carbon fuel will increase, but by less than in phase 0. Investment in the high carbon fuel will decrease by a larger amount than in phase 0. As depicted in the right panel of Figure 1.8, investment in the low carbon fuel will increase by less than investment in the high carbon fuel decreases. As a result, the price associated with investment in the low carbon fuel will increase by less than the investment price associated with the high carbon fuel decreases. This results in a steady-state comprised of a smaller amount of total capacity than in phase 0 (or the BAU steady-state). A summary of results from phase 2 is below:

$$\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f = 0 \quad (1.58)$$

$$\Delta PC_H / \Delta PC_L = (\omega_H - \sigma) / (\omega_L - \sigma) < -1 \quad (1.59)$$

$$\Delta PK_H / \Delta PK_L = \Delta PI_H / \Delta PI_L < -1 \quad (1.60)$$

$$\Delta PC_H / \Delta PC_L = \Delta PK_H / \Delta PK_L < -1 \quad (1.61)$$

$$\Delta I_H + \Delta I_L < 0 \quad (1.62)$$

$$\Delta K_H + \Delta K_L < 0 \implies \Delta \sum_f X_f < 0 \quad (1.63)$$

Phase 1 and phase 2 place boundaries on the possibilities for steady-state outcomes given varying demand elasticities. Any demand elasticity that is not perfectly inelastic will cause a clockwise rotation in the policy response line for any standard that is placed such that $\sigma < \sigma_0$. Additionally, not depicted in Figure 1.7 due to the assumption that $PTPS$ is fixed, the policy target frontier will shift towards the origin relative to its phase 1 position. This is due to a loosening of the policy constraint (1.25) brought about via abatement of consumption. In phase 1, all abatement is achieved through fuel switching via investment. In phase 2, a mix of the two forms of abatement occurs. The analysis above leaves us with the following intuitive result:

Proposition 1 *If the standard (σ) is more (less) stringent than σ_0 and the standard binds ($\sigma < \Phi$), electricity price is higher (lower) and quantity demanded is lower (higher) in the post-policy steady-state.*

The intuitive exercise discussed in this section highlights some of the key drivers underlying the TPS and the model construct. Most notably, the policy outcome is sensitive to the placement of the policy target, the relative slopes of the marginal investment cost curves, the degree of difference between the rate at which marginal policy costs and capacity rental rates scale, and the elasticity of demand. This analytical framework also provides a policy response for all prices and quantities in the steady-state. This allows for calculation of emissions levels in the post-policy steady-state and further analysis of damages, abatement cost, and social surplus.

This result is not limited to dynamic models as it is static in nature. In fact, due to the assumptions made, PK could simply be represented by an upward sloping marginal cost function of any

kind. The analytical results here can be referenced in lieu of a detailed decomposition of the output effects of a TPS in the case of most applied analyses.

1.3 Numerical Results

In the previous sections I established analytical intuition for the behavior of the dynamic model under the initial and steady-state responses to the TPS policy instrument. In section 1.3.3, I use a numerical version of the model to examine the evolution of the model variables through time under a TPS. In section 1.3.4, I discuss the costs and benefits associated with the TPS policy, and compare the TPS results to the BAU scenario and that of an emissions equivalent CAP. Prior to discussing the results, I relay some important details related to the numerical model setup and define the model scenarios in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.

1.3.1 Numerical model setup

Before discussing the scenario definition and model results, it is important to make note of some characteristics that place this model within the context of electricity markets. While electricity markets are the subject of this analysis, a detailed representation is beyond the scope of the study. A highly detailed representation is not necessary for determining the underlying relationship between investment costs, capacity constraints, policy stringency, and time. However, electricity markets are subject to large investment costs and long-lived generation capacity. These features subject the markets to capacity constraints which may be either binding or non-binding. These features are relevant in many industrial sectors of an economy.

Given the scope of the numerical analysis, it is important to maintain the relationship between costs of generation and investment. Particularly the fact that investment costs are large and that investment produces capacity which can be used over an extended period for the purpose of generating electricity at an additional operating cost. Table 1.1 provides some of the key parameters used within the numerical model, as well as their values.

The parameters are chosen to loosely represent operating costs relative to investment costs within the electricity sector (EIA, 2018a,b,c; IEA, 2018; NREL, 2018). The value for elasticity

Table 1.1: Key Model Parameters

Parameter	Value	Description
\bar{d}_t	100	MW - constant reference demand for each period (t)
$MC_{f,t}^X$	30	$\$/MWh$ - constant operating costs for each fuel (f)
ω_H	2000	$lb CO_2e/MWh$ - emissions intensity for H
ω_L	0	$lb CO_2e/MWh$ - emissions intensity for L
δ	0.05	depreciation/asset decay rate
ε	-0.3	elasticity of demand
r	0.01	rate of time preference used for discounting
hiy	8760	operating hours in each period (t)

of demand was chosen to represent consumer responses to price over the medium to long term (Deryugina *et al.*, 2020). The values for exogenous demand and the depreciation rate were chosen to ease interpretation of the results. Furthermore, the emissions intensity of L relative to H does not have a major impact on the intuition obtained from the numerical results. However, when $\omega_L = 0$ it has the added benefit of showing convergence in social surplus between the CAP and TPS as the standard approaches zero. The number of operating hours in each year are included to make sure that costs over each period (t) are aligned in terms of operations and investment. For example, generation must meet demand which is modeled in megawatts (MW). The cost of generating at 100 MW over the course of a year is $100 * MC_{f,t} * hiy$ in dollars, because 100 megawatts generated over 1 period of 8760 hours is $100 * 8760$ megawatt-hours (MWh). If the depreciation rate is 0.05 and the capacity constraint binds, then 100 MW of capacity must be maintained every period in the steady-state. This means that investment must replace the 5 MW of depreciated capacity at a high cost (e.g. $\$1,000,000/MW$).

In the numerical model I choose the slope and intercept of the marginal investment cost curves. The intercept term is always positive and identical across fuel types while the slope can vary for the scenarios modeled. I choose the slope and intercept so that the business-as-usual (BAU) steady-state is one in which \bar{d}_t is constant throughout the time horizon at an initial period marginal price of

investment ($PI_{f,t=0}$) equal to \$1,000,000/MW. The value of \$1,000,000/MW was chosen to place investment costs in the general vicinity of US electricity sector costs. The slopes are determined by the following function:

$$PI_{f,t} = [(1/(1+r))^t] * [\alpha + \beta_f * I_{f,t}] \quad (1.64)$$

where α is the intercept term of the marginal investment cost function and β_f is the slope term. In an example where the slopes are identical (i.e. $\beta_L = \beta_H$) the BAU steady-state is such that $I_{f,t} = \frac{\bar{d}_t * \delta}{2}$. In the BAU steady-state, $\bar{d}_t = \sum_f X_{f,t} = \sum_f K_{f,t} = 100$ and $\delta = 0.05$. The BAU steady-state corresponds to one where capacity is split equally between each fuel such that $K_{H,t} = K_{L,t} = 50$ MW and investment is such that $I_{f,t} = \delta K_{f,t} = 2.5$ MW. This is due to the identical intercepts and slopes. Setting $\alpha = 0$, $PI_{f,t=0} = 1e6$, and $I_{f,t} = 2.5$ in equation 1.64 and solving for the slope yields $\beta_f = 4e5$.

Once I have the slope and intercept term established, I solve the system of equations with exogenous demand fixed at \bar{d}_t . The marginal value from the market clearance condition equating total generation ($\sum_f X_{f,t}$) to quantity demanded (\bar{d}_t) determines the reference level for the discounted electricity price (\overline{pd}_t) which falls at a rate of $(1+r)$ over time in the BAU steady-state. The first order condition of the Lagrangian to this problem with respect to the total quantity demanded shows that the benchmark electricity price \overline{pq}_t is equal to $\frac{\overline{pd}_t}{(1/(1+r))^t}$. Therefore, \overline{pq}_t is constant across the entire time horizon.

Using these new values for \overline{pd}_t and \overline{pq}_t I allow for price responsive demand where the following equilibrium conditions hold:

$$\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t * \overline{pq}_t * \left(\frac{Q_t}{d_t}\right)^{1/\varepsilon} \geq PD_t \quad \perp Q_t \quad (1.65)$$

$$\sum_f X_{f,t} \geq Q_t \quad \perp PD_t \quad (1.66)$$

where Q_t is total quantity demanded. Solving the model with the updated benchmark values for \overline{pq}_t and \bar{d}_t will replicate the BAU steady-state. This provides a basis for comparison with counterfactual policy scenarios allowing for price-responsive demand.

A full set of numerical model equations can be found in appendix A.

1.3.2 Scenario definition

In order to explore the TPS further, I have decided upon a set of scenarios indicating different model assumptions by varying the slopes of the marginal investment cost curves and policy stringencies. See Table 1.2 for details.

Table 1.2: Scenario Definition

Scenario	Slopes	Policy Stringency
S1A	High/Steep	Low/Loose
S1B	High/Steep	High/Strict
S2A	Low/Flat	Low/Loose
S2B	Low/Flat	High/Strict

The number (e.g. 1,2) in the scenario name corresponds to the specification of the marginal investment cost functions whereas the letter (e.g. A, B) corresponds to the policy stringency. Scenario S1A corresponds to identical and linear marginal investment cost curves of relatively steep slope with a policy target set at 0.7 times σ_0 . The marginal cost curves for each fuel type emanate from the same point for each scenario, therefore σ_0 equals the reference average emissions rate (Φ). This means that a standard set at 0.9 times σ_0 corresponds to a 10% reduction from the reference emissions rate ($\sigma = \sigma_0 * 0.9 = \Phi * (1 - 0.1)$). Scenario S2A corresponds to identical and linear marginal investment cost curves of relatively flat slope with a policy target set at 0.7 times σ_0 . The policy target associated with the highly stringent policy is set at 0.3 times σ_0 .

The slope and intercept associated with scenario 1 corresponds to $\beta_f = 4e5$ and $\alpha_f = 0$. The slope and intercept for scenario 2 corresponds to $\beta_f = 4e4$ and $\alpha_f = 9e5$. The relatively flat marginal investment cost curves associated with scenario 2 are probably closer to that of the electricity sector than those in scenario 1.

1.3.3 Evolution of model variables through time

In this section I discuss the evolution of the model variables through time. I discuss the initial period response to the TPS policy followed by a discussion of the transition to the steady-state. I refer back to the theory developed in the previous section where applicable.




Figure 1.9: Initial period response to TPS — ΔPC_f , ΔPK_f , ΔPD

Figure 1.9 shows the initial period response to the TPS policy. Recall that the relationship between electricity price, the capacity rental rate, and the policy cost is defined by the following equation:

$$\Delta PD = \Delta PK_f + \Delta PC_f \quad (1.67)$$

Figure 1.9 shows that this relationship holds for each scenario and each fuel type (i.e. H and L on the right axis). Marginal policy costs (left column) for H are greater than zero in each scenario. This is associated with a permit price that is greater than zero and an emissions intensity for H that is greater than the intensity standard. The capacity rental rate is 0. Therefore, the change in the capacity rental rate from the BAU (middle column) for H is less than zero for all cases. A capacity rental rate of zero suggests that the capacity constraint does not bind in the initial period for H, as expected. The change in electricity price (right column) is the sum of the change in marginal policy cost and change in capacity rental rate, which is positive.

L sees a negative marginal policy cost, which indicates a net subsidy is received by producers of the low carbon fuel. Changes in the capacity rental rate from the BAU are greater than zero. This indicates that investment changes from the BAU for L are also greater than zero. This increase in investment comes at a higher cost, which is reflected in the capacity rental rate. The sum of the subsidy associated with the marginal policy cost and the increase in the capacity rental rate is equal to the change in the output price from the BAU level, which is positive.

The increase in the output price indicates that total quantity demanded falls, hence total generation falls. The increase in the capacity rental rate for L is associated with an increase in investment for L, which is associated with an increase in capacity to generate. The capacity rental rate would not increase unless the capacity constraint were binding. This means that generation associated with L increases. If total generation decreases, and generation of L increases, then generation of H must decrease. If total generation decreases, then aggregate emissions decrease.

Note in comparing scenarios S1A with S2A, the scenario with the steeper marginal investment cost curves (S1A) results in a higher capacity rental rate and smaller subsidy for L, which results in a higher electricity price. This is due to the fact that responding to policy is more costly when the marginal investment cost curves are steeper. Additionally, a more stringent rate standard results in a larger marginal policy cost for H and smaller subsidy for L given identical cost structures across policy scenarios (e.g. S1A vs. S1B). The more stringent standard also increases investment required in order to meet it, as depicted by the increased rental rates for L and electricity price when

comparing policy case A versus B. All of this intuition can be derived from the results referenced in Figure 1.9.

Total quantity demanded falls in the initial period. This is due to the fact that the slopes of the marginal investment cost curves are steep enough in all scenarios to cause consumers to abate consumption in the initial period. Rather than choosing to invest enough in L to reach the steady-state capacity level immediately, investment is delayed in order to save by spreading costs across multiple periods. This is the result of a foresighted effort to maximize the difference between benefits and costs across the entire time horizon.




Figure 1.10: Path of Investment — $I_{f,t}$

Figure 1.10 shows investment levels relative to the BAU scenario by fuel type and time period. The horizontal black line indicates the BAU steady-state level of investment for each fuel type.

Changes can be inferred relative to this line. The first row of Figure 1.10 corresponds to scenarios S1A (left column) and S1B (right column) and the second row corresponds to scenarios S2A and S2B. In comparing the first and second rows, three key observations can be made. First, it is clear that scenario S1A shows lower initial levels of investment in L than S1B. This validates the previous discussion related to the initial policy response. Second, S2A reaches steady-state levels of investment sooner than S1A. This is due to the fact that investment is more costly in S1A and it is therefore more cost effective to consume less and spread the costs across the time horizon. Thirdly, related to the second observation, H investment begins to re-enter in S2A sooner than S1A. This is due in part to the flatter marginal investment cost curves in S2A. Investment in L can be increased at a lower marginal cost in S2A and decreased investment in H does not lower marginal investment costs as much. This skews the investment path in favor of L, allows H to depreciate without investment for longer, and allows H investment to re-establish a new steady-state rental rate faster at relatively low marginal costs.

In comparing the less stringent policy (left column) and the more stringent policy (right column) of Figure 1.10 it is clear that more investment is made in L in order to satisfy the policy initially and across the entire time horizon. This shows that an unexpected immediate increase in policy stringency can have significant implications on investment levels and costliness of the TPS initially and through the transition period. While not explicitly modeled, these results highlight the intuition that there may be benefits to allowing time to plan ahead for the TPS policy.

Figure 1.11 shows the capacity utilization rate by scenario with scenarios grouped in columns by the policy stringency. Figure 1.11 supports the intuition above. It shows full capacity utilization is reached sooner in the scenarios associated with the relatively flat marginal investment cost functions (i.e. S2A and S2B). This is a requirement for reaching the steady-state. This figure also highlights the differences between policy stringencies. The stricter policy takes longer for the capacity constraint to bind for H and to reach a steady-state as investment is smoothed over time in order to reduce overall costs.




Figure 1.11: Capacity utilization for H




Figure 1.12: Percentage reduction in emissions from BAU

Figure 1.12 shows the percentage change in emissions from the BAU case for each TPS scenario grouped by policy stringency. As expected, the more stringent policy target associated with column B shows a larger reduction in aggregate emissions levels. Additionally, S1A shows larger emissions reductions than S2A due to steeper marginal investment cost curves associated with S1A. In short, more damages are avoided due to the higher costs of investment associated with the steeper marginal investment cost curves. Consumers prefer to reduce more consumption at higher marginal costs of investment. The capacity rental rate increases as a result of higher marginal investment costs which outstrip the net subsidy for production of L. This increases the price of output and decreases quantity produced referenced in equation 1.67. Reducing consumption comes with the added benefit of avoiding damages from emitting. This result has important implications in assessing the damages avoided as a result of the TPS, an important element of the social surplus calculation.

Figure 1.13 shows the steady-state period-over-period changes in marginal policy cost (ΔPC_f), changes in capacity rental rate (ΔPK_f), and changes in output price (ΔPD) in each column from left to right. The top row is associated with H and the bottom row is associated with L. As a discount rate of 1% was used in this model, the price output from the model is adjusted to a future value in order to view the steady-state in terms of perpetually constant values instead of values perpetually decreasing at the rate of $\frac{1}{1+r}$. Regardless of discounting, the values are of the same proportion to one another.

The results in Figure 1.13 validate the theory developed in section 1.2.2. The emissions rate standard (σ) is chosen such that $\sigma < \sigma_0$, where the definition of σ_0 is established in relation to lemma 1. Since σ_0 is equal to the reference period-over-period average emissions intensity in the BAU steady-state such that $\sigma_0 = \Phi$, the standard is binding. Following from proposition 1, due to the fact that σ is more stringent than σ_0 and demand is price responsive, the output price will increase and total quantity demanded will decrease. If quantity demanded decreases, we know from Holland *et al.* (2009) that emissions levels will decrease as well.




Figure 1.13: Steady-state response to TPS — ΔPC_f , ΔPK_f , ΔPD

Additionally, steeper marginal investment cost curves result in a greater steady-state reduction in quantity demanded from the BAU. This can be seen by comparing S1A with S2A in the right column of Figure 1.13. As expected, more stringent policy is associated with a higher steady-state electricity price. This is evidenced by comparing S1A with S1B for example.

1.3.4 Abatement cost and social surplus

Table 1.3: Present Value of change in surplus measures for TPS from BAU (\$/(hour*year))

Scenario	ΔCS	ΔPS	$\Delta CInv$	ΔAC	ΔDam	ΔSS	$\Delta SS_{TPS-CAP}$
S1A	-13029	11920	3653	5123	28129	23006	-170
S1B	-50775	45636	16855	23921	65162	41240	-105
S2A	-1526	1390	784	956	27568	26612	-34
S2B	-7236	6511	4132	5054	64297	59243	-19

Turning attention to costs and benefits associated with the TPS policy, I begin by discussing the results in Table 1.3. Table 1.3 shows present value of changes in the key metrics associated with the social surplus calculation. Please see appendix B for detailed surplus calculations. All values except for the rightmost column represent changes from the BAU value for each metric (i.e. $\Delta = TPS - BAU$). The far right column represents social surplus changes relative to an emissions equivalent CAP. Each scenario initially defined in Table 1.2 is listed in the far left column of Table 1.3. The column headings correspond to present value changes in consumer surplus (ΔCS), producer surplus (ΔPS), investment costs ($\Delta CInv$), abatement costs (ΔAC), avoided damages (ΔDam), and social surplus (ΔSS) summed across time, such that:

$$\Delta AC = -1 * (\Delta CS + \Delta PS) + \Delta CInv \quad (1.68)$$

$$\Delta SS = \Delta Dam - \Delta AC \quad (1.69)$$

The values themselves are less important than the relationships between scenarios and across the different elements of the surplus calculation. For example, ΔAC is larger for S1A than S2A. This is due to the fact that S2A corresponds to the scenario with the flatter marginal investment

cost curves. Steeper marginal investment cost curves associated with S1A and S1B result in a larger change in electricity price initially, through the transition, and into the steady-state. This has implications for the magnitude of changes in consumer and producer surplus, the sum of which always represents a positive net cost for the scenarios modeled. Changes in total investment costs will also be larger for S1A and S1B than in S2A and S2B.

Marginal damages are constant across time and all levels of emissions. Therefore, the choice of the value can influence whether or not social surplus changes are positive. For the scenarios modeled, avoided damages exceed abatement costs at a marginal damage level of \$20/mt CO₂e, indicating positive changes in social surplus relative to the BAU scenario.

The far right column of Table 1.3 shows the difference between changes in social surplus from the TPS relative to the period-over-period emissions equivalent CAP. The CAP always shows greater present value of social surplus changes summed across time than the TPS except for the case where the emissions intensity of L is zero ($\omega_L = 0$) and the standard is set to zero ($\sigma = 0$). If $\omega_L = 0$, as the standard is tightened, the difference between the present value of ΔSS_{TPS} and ΔSS_{CAP} approaches zero. This movement can be seen in Table 1.3 by comparing scenarios A and B for a given marginal investment cost curve.

Additionally, it is worth noting that the difference in the present value of social surplus changes between a TPS and a CAP is small relative to present value of social surplus gains from either policy. The surplus differences due to the policy choice itself accounts for roughly 0.74% and 0.03% of ΔSS under the TPS for scenarios S1A and S2B respectively.

As it relates to abatement cost and social surplus measures, there are two key observations from the numerical output listed below.

Numerical Result 1 *The present value of all social surplus changes from the benchmark case will always be lower for the TPS than for the period-over-period emissions equivalent CAP, except when $\sigma = 0$ and $\omega_L = 0$. So, dynamic considerations do not change the well-known result in the literature that an emissions cap is more cost-effective than a TPS overall, from $t = 0$ to $t = \infty$.*

Numerical Result 2 *Once the steady-state is reached in period T , after the costly transition has occurred between periods $t = 0$ to $t = T$, the value of the perpetuity⁴ of steady-state social surplus changes can be higher or lower for the TPS relative to the emissions equivalent CAP. Meaning, when discounting is present, the sequence of TPSs can be more cost-effective than a sequence of emissions equivalent caps only over specific segments of the infinite time horizon, such as the steady-state segment existing between periods $t = T$ to $t = \infty$.*

Table 1.4: Ratio of periodic steady-state social surplus change ($\Delta S S_T^{TPS} / \Delta S S_T^{CAP}$)

Slope MC_f^I Discount rate (r)	Steeper (1)	Flatter (2)
0	0.998864	0.999988
0.01	1.004387	1.000573
0.03	1.018866	1.002116

When taken together, numerical results 1 and 2 state that, while the present value of social surplus must always be greater under a CAP, the value of the net benefit flows accruing to the TPS in the post-transition, steady-state period can be greater than those accruing to the CAP. Table 1.4 shows the ratio of changes in periodic steady-state social surplus under the TPS versus the CAP for a TPS policy target that is more stringent than σ_0 . A value greater (less) than 1 indicates the TPS (CAP) has greater steady-state social surplus change. Table 1.4 shows that for all but the smallest discount rates, the TPS shows greater steady-state changes in social surplus than the CAP. Also note that steeper marginal investment cost functions exacerbate the sensitivity to the discount rate.

These results can be viewed through the lens of a comparison in abatement response between a zero-discount rate and a positive discount rate. First, in response to a higher discount rate, the TPS shifts investment in the low carbon fuel towards the present. This leads to a shift in output increase towards the present. Effectively, output is shifted towards the earlier periods in the

⁴The term “perpetuity” here is a financial term indicating the value of a perpetual constant nominal stream of cash flows. Given a net benefit flow in period T , $\Delta S S_T$, where T is a single period within the steady-state, the value of the “perpetuity” is $\Delta S S_T / r$, where r is the periodic effective rate of interest, or discount rate. Therefore, an infinite stream of constant cash flows has a finite value when discounting is present.

transition and away from the later periods of the transition and throughout the steady-state. This means that emissions follow a similar path. The endogenously determined emissions level in each period changes, showing an increase in earlier periods and a decrease in later periods, compared to a zero-discount rate counterfactual. The sequential CAP is set to the endogenously determined periodic emissions levels by the TPS. The CAP responds by decreasing investment across the entire time horizon (a shift). Also, the CAP increases output in the earlier periods of the transition, sacrificing output in the later periods of the transition and throughout the steady-state. Effectively, the difference in output between the TPS and CAP compared between the zero discount rate and high discount rate case, show a much larger output difference under the high discount rate across the time horizon. Abatement costs are similarly front-loaded in the time horizon. The CAP shows a reduction in costs related to investment early in the time horizon, and a slight reduction into the steady-state. However, the CAP shows a decrease in consumer and producer surplus across the entire time horizon. The reductions to investment costs outweigh the reductions in consumer and producer surplus in the earlier periods, however the reductions in consumer and producer surplus outweigh the gains in investment cost reduction in the later periods and throughout the steady-state. These dynamics lead to a greater cost-effectiveness for the CAP (than the TPS) in the earlier periods under a high discount rate, and lower cost-effectiveness for the CAP (than the TPS) in the later periods and into the steady-state.

In summary, a higher discount rate causes the TPS to invest more in the earlier periods. This leads to higher endogenously determined emissions levels early-on. Over time, the emissions levels implied by the TPS more closely approach the zero-discount rate levels, though emissions are slightly lower in the steady-state when discount rates are high. The CAP sees the higher emissions in the earlier periods and lower emissions in later periods and responds accordingly. This leads to a reduction in abatement costs compared to the TPS in the early periods and an increase relative to the TPS in the later periods. In the post-transition steady-state, the TPS is more cost-effective than the CAP.⁵

⁵Note that this result should be checked for robustness to an endogenously specified TPS that meets an exogenously specified emissions cap.

1.4 Conclusion

In this paper I explore the behavior of a TPS in a dynamic setting. I define an analytical model and discuss the initial and steady-state responses to the TPS policy instrument intuitively. I also use a numerical model to provide additional validation of the analytical results, further explore the transition of the model variables from the initial policy response to the steady-state, and discuss abatement cost and social surplus relative to a no-policy case and a period-over-period emissions equivalent cap.

The intuitive analysis uncovers an emissions intensity standard that does not change the price of electricity in the post-policy steady-state. If the emissions intensity target is set more stringently than the standard that leaves price unchanged, electricity price will rise and quantity demanded will fall. In this case the TPS will result in a lower level of steady-state emissions. The numerical analysis validates this analytical result. Additionally, the numerical model finds that investment levels and abatement costs are sensitive to the slopes of the marginal investment cost curves as well as the policy stringency. Steeper marginal investment cost curves cause investment to be spread out further across the time horizon, as consumers reduce consumption to a greater degree. Abatement costs are also larger in environments with steep marginal investment cost curves.

In comparing the TPS surplus measures to that of a period-over-period damage equivalent CAP, the present value of social surplus changes from the no-policy case is smaller for the TPS than the CAP, though not by much. Discounting exacerbates the cost-effectiveness advantage that the CAP has over the TPS in general. However, introducing a discount rate leads to a situation where the post-transition steady-state is more cost-effective for the TPS than for the CAP. This suggests that some classes of future consumers may prefer a TPS to a CAP. Finally, as expected, if the TPS policy target is set to an emissions intensity of zero at the outset, there is no difference in the present value of social surplus between the TPS and CAP across time, regardless of the discount rate.

Future research could explore the ability for decision makers to plan for expected policy with and without policy uncertainty. Different representations of capital accumulation and adjustment

could be a valuable addition to this research. Alternative methods for specifying the TPS and comparison policies across the time horizon as well as methods for use of permit or tax revenue from a cap and trade system or carbon tax (i.e. banking and borrowing of permits). Other research could surround policy implementation in a dynamic context. For example, given a carbon budget, determine the best way to set the TPS policy target. Furthermore, other factors such as technology cost improvements could be explored. Applied models that account for capital adjustment, price responsive demand, and foresight can use these results to inform expectations about model output. An applied model that includes these aspects could provide more reliable projections related to a specific industry in question. A final aspect that this work does not consider is the fact that different mixes of power generation come with different risk and variability characteristics. This could be another interesting feature to incorporate in comparing a TPS to a CAP.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM IMPACTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY OF A DISRUPTION TO CHINESE COBALT SUPPLY

In this work, I explore the short-run welfare consequences of a disruption to Chinese cobalt supply under various electric vehicle deployment futures. I find that the cost of a 25% reduction in Chinese exports is small, and as of 2017, likely less than a 0.005% reduction in U.S. personal consumption expenditures. A complete halt to Chinese cobalt exports is more costly, however, the high EV deployment case based on projections for 2030 shows little to no difference in welfare changes relative to the current (2017) state of the cobalt markets. This is partly due to assumptions surrounding decreased intensity of cobalt use in future battery applications, faster electric vehicle growth in China than other regions of the world, and the global supply landscape. In addition, increased EV deployment and associated cobalt use can be substituted for conventional vehicle types. Vehicle substitution between conventional and electric types frees up cobalt for use in sectors with less ability to substitute away from cobalt, providing a channel for U.S. cost reduction in response to a disruption. Diversification of U.S. vehicle technologies, along with continued good-standing trade relationships outside of China, can help the U.S. avoid significant short-term costs of a disruption to Chinese cobalt supply.

2.1 Introduction

Global concerns surrounding climate change have led to the development of clean substitutes to conventional sources of greenhouse gas emissions. As of 2019, clean technologies such as renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs) are seeing considerable growth, with more expected to come (IEA, 2018, 2019). A feature common to many of the technologies at the forefront of the transition from dirty to clean is the use of battery storage. Large additions to global battery storage capacity are necessary to see mass adoption of variable renewable energy sources and electric vehicles.

Among the available battery technologies, lithium-ion batteries have emerged as a main contender in the electric vehicle space and some forms of stationary storage. Cobalt provides performance benefits unique to mobile applications, and is expected to be used in varying quantities in nearly all electric vehicle applications now and through the coming decade. The cobalt supply chain lacks diversity in that the majority of cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and refined in China. Finally, few, if any substitutes exist for cobalt in electric vehicle batteries. These features of cobalt highlight risks to users in securing the needed cobalt supply in support of global greenhouse gas abatement efforts. The United States (U.S) is particularly reliant on imports of cobalt and products that contain cobalt such as batteries.

The major risks to the global and U.S. economies are twofold. First, achievement of greenhouse gas abatement and other environmental goals could be thwarted should cobalt become physically unavailable or much more expensive than at present due to resource depletion. Secondly, there is a risk that a supply-side or demand-side disruption could lead to a short-term change in global cobalt availability. This could arise unintentionally and affect all users of cobalt equally, it could arise intentionally due to a geopolitical dispute and benefit one region while damaging others, or an unintentional problem could create the need for intentional protectionist trade action.

In this work, I focus on the second major risk, and explore intentional policy measures that could be taken by China in an effort to reduce trade with the rest of the world. I ask, what are the costs to the U.S. economy of a disruption to Chinese cobalt supply? In particular, how much would the U.S. be willing to pay to avoid a Chinese export quota on refined cobalt?⁶ Finally, given that rapid deployment of battery technology in electric vehicles is expected through 2030, is there cause for concern? Particular emphasis is placed on the channels that drive cost increases and decreases. Policymakers can use this information to proactively address uncertainties associated with the potential for a future supply disruption.

In this paper, I explore these questions using a global multi-regional, multi-good, static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model coupled with the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP9)

⁶I use changes in a money-metric consumption index in economics known as equivalent variation to measure this welfare effect.

database (Aguiar *et al.*, 2016). Light-duty vehicles production and substitution amongst conventional, plug-in hybrid, and battery electric vehicles in production is explicitly incorporated into the model. This allows for examination of substitution towards less cobalt-intensive vehicle types as a result of an increase in the cost of cobalt contained within an electric vehicle. Furthermore, I model the use of cobalt in non-EV applications as well. These features allow for a more precise accounting of impacts on the motor vehicles sector and interactions with the economy as a whole.

I perform a counterfactual policy experiment, representing a global supply disruption via an export quota. Two different export quotas are modeled; a less stringent export quota requiring a 25% reduction in Chinese exports and a more stringent quota indicating an export ban. These two policies are chosen so a comparison can be made that illustrates the way markets respond to increasing policy stringency. In the former case, Chinese exports still exist, and flow where they are most needed, mitigating the need for extreme changes in global cobalt trade and production. This case is meant to represent a situation where China chooses to strategically curtail exports in an effort to inflict damage to the United States. In the latter case, Chinese exports are non-existent, which highlights the adjustments needed from the rest of the world on the supply-side and demand-side more clearly. This case is meant to represent a less-likely situation where China, in the name of national or global security, chooses to shut off refined cobalt exports to the rest of the world.

The export quota is imposed against each of three different global benchmarks. The first benchmark is designed to represent the state of the cobalt markets in 2017 (CUR). The second and third benchmarks embed expectations for the year 2030, obtained from the International Energy Agency's (IEA) New Policies Scenario (NPS) and more aggressive EV 30% global adoption target scenario (E30), respectively. Each of these scenarios contain different assumptions about the degree of electric vehicle penetration in different regions of the world as well as lithium-ion battery capacity and intensity of cobalt used within each battery. Furthermore, the benchmark is embedded with assumptions about the global distribution of cobalt supply and demand for cobalt in non-ev applications.

I find that cobalt supply disruptions can be costly in the event of an extreme supply disruption such as an export ban. When imposed against a 2017 global benchmark, short-run welfare changes range from a -0.0118% to -0.1171% reduction in U.S. consumption expenditures. Under a 25% reduction in Chinese exports, the implications for the USA are much smaller, ranging from -0.0018% to -0.0059% in 2017. Given U.S. personal consumption expenditures of roughly 13 trillion USD in 2017, the welfare losses to the U.S. for a 25% export quota range from 0.234 to 0.767 billion USD. Taheripour & Tyner (2018) use a CGE model to estimate the welfare impacts from a 30% Chinese tariff on soybeans imported from the U.S. Their results suggest welfare losses ranging from 2.745 to 3.869 billion USD. Our cobalt results for a comparable policy measure are much lower. Especially considering that China engages in protectionist policy not just bilaterally with the U.S., as in Taheripour & Tyner (2018), but with all trading partners in our study.

Most notably, under an export ban, the welfare losses are smaller for the future EV deployment cases under certain model assumptions. Substitution away from cobalt intensive EV production towards conventional vehicle production provides a channel by which other cobalt intensive industries can reduce costs. Substitutability between conventional and electric vehicles is low as of 2017 (Xing *et al.*, 2019). However, improvements to EV charging infrastructure that accompany higher adoption of EVs into 2030 are expected to significantly relieve range anxiety, effectively increasing substitutability between vehicle types (Wood *et al.*, 2017). The results under the export ban indicate a significant diversification benefit associated with a diverse portfolio of vehicle types.

This is not to say that there aren't other factors influencing this result. Namely, embedded into the E30 and NPS global benchmarks are decreased intensity of cobalt use in lithium-ion batteries for EVs, a fixed global cobalt production mix relative to 2017, and electric vehicle adoption in China outpacing the rest of the world. These forces decrease the share of global cobalt output attributable to exports from China, hence lowering damages felt as a result of an export ban. Nonetheless, the results clearly show that greater substitution between conventional and electric vehicles can provide a significant cost reduction.

The results highlight areas for policymakers to focus on in reducing potential costs from a supply disruption. Many of these are well-known, but include (i) decreasing the cobalt required in lithium-ion batteries, (ii) developing cobalt extraction as byproducts or primary products outside of the DRC, (iii) diversifying the locations of cobalt refining capacity outside of China, (iv) diversifying the locations of li-ion battery component manufacturing, (v) cultivating relationships with trading partners outside of China, and (vi) developing the ability to obtain secondary cobalt supply from recycled battery products.⁷ Finally, if it is assumed that increased EV deployment drives increased substitutability between EVs and conventional vehicles types, and other regions outside of China increase production by any amount in response to increased demand from EVs, then a commitment to deep penetration of electric vehicles in the United States can provide a rich base of cobalt containing products that can be reallocated in times of crisis to serve more critical non-EV industries such as aerospace, defense, and mobile communications.⁸ Policymakers can use the results from this work to help prioritize different strategies to reduce the risk of a supply disruption. Specifically, they should consider the design of policy instruments able to achieve climate goals without eliminating the possibility of short-term substitution between conventional and electric vehicle types.

Currently, there is no examination of the welfare impacts of a cobalt supply disruption in the literature. Criticality assessments and various studies of the world's ability for supply to meet demand over the coming years exist in the literature.⁹ Most of the models used to assess future cobalt supply and demand use a mass balance method, sometimes in conjunction with a system dynamics model. These studies are bottom-up representations of an economic or physical system that also

⁷Recycling of batteries is not explicitly modeled. However the impact of a robust secondary supply of cobalt can be speculated on. If secondary supply can be obtained on short notice, this will be cost-reducing, and one way to increase secondary supply is to increase the stock of electric vehicles.

⁸To clearly illustrate the benefits to some of these policy goals and to help policymakers prioritize different risk mitigation strategies, future iterations of this work should explore the implications of changing the 2030 benchmark global production mix so that (i) all new production from now to 2030 is provided by China and alternatively (ii) that the production mix scales so that China's export share of global output remains the same in the 2030 benchmarks as in present day.

⁹Details in this realm are provided in the following works: Chung *et al.* (2015); Dias *et al.* (2018); Leader & Gaustad (2019); Leader *et al.* (2019); Nguyen *et al.* (2020); Olivetti *et al.* (2017); Sverdrup *et al.* (2017); Tisserant & Pauliuk (2016); Valero *et al.* (2018)

tend to represent only a single sector or region. While the analysis here abstracts over some of the finer details of the cobalt supply chain and its interconnectedness to other minerals upstream, it has the unique benefit of capturing high-level interactions amongst downstream industries within a region and across regions of the world. Furthermore, the top-down CGE model allows us to quantify the costs associated with a supply disruption.

Other studies in the economics literature explore trade implications in commodities markets. Specifically, Fally & Sayre (2018) develop a general equilibrium model of production, consumption, and input-output linkages to explore gains from trade in primary commodities. They find that aggregate gains from trade are largely understated in models that do not account for key features of primary commodities such as inelastic supply, inelastic demand, and regional differences in natural resources. Their model is analyzed in terms of aggregate indexes of different types of commodities rather than a single critical commodity as we explore here. In fact, little consideration is given to production and use of cobalt in their analysis, which limits their ability to capture specific concerns around cobalt use in batteries and electric vehicles, as I do here.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses pertinent cobalt background information related to production and use. Particular attention is paid to the global distribution of production and use in batteries and electric vehicles. Section 2.3 discusses the strategy employed, including model structure and assumptions. Section 2.4 pertains to the setup and assumptions embedded in the benchmark global economy. Section 2.5 lays out the three global benchmarks and policy counterfactuals in detail. Section 2.6 contains a discussion of the model output and welfare results. Concluding remarks are provided in section 2.7.

2.2 Cobalt background

In this section I introduce the cobalt supply chain. I first discuss cobalt production and use of cobalt at a high level. I then discuss some notable aspects of cobalt use in batteries, and some important specifics related to the EV supply chain. The information contained within this section is drawn upon in later sections when making key model assumptions and establishing the benchmark

global economy.

2.2.1 Production and use

Mining of cobalt is highly concentrated and the USA and China mine very little cobalt domestically. The majority of cobalt is produced as a byproduct of copper or nickel production. Over 70% of global cobalt production in 2017 was mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia (Roskill, 2018). Most of the cobalt ore and concentrate is exported prior to being refined into a cobalt metal or chemical product. China imports more than 95% of all imported cobalt ores and concentrates from the DRC and is also responsible for over 95% of DRC exports (Roskill, 2018). China clearly has a relationship with various west and central African sources of mineral resources. This relationship is evidenced in its Going Out Strategy, initiated around the year 2000 in which China encouraged entities to expand overseas (outward) foreign direct investment (OFDI) (Davies, 2013; OECD, 2008). Additional support for Chinese governmental interest in these areas is evidenced in The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Foster *et al.*, 2009). These programs have helped China establish deep economic and cultural ties with the DRC and suggest a likelihood that China exercises a significant degree of control over natural resource extraction in the region.

The cobalt refining process is also highly concentrated. Cobalt is extracted and then refined into a metal or chemical product. Different use cases of cobalt require different refined versions of cobalt. China is a large importer of cobalt ores and concentrates from mines in the DRC. It refines the cobalt further into a useable product in chemical or metal form. In 2017, China was responsible for roughly 60% of total refined production, 80% of refined chemical production, and 30% of refined metal production (Roskill, 2018). This places China in a position of global importance in the cobalt supply chain.

Cobalt is used widely in industries at the forefront of the aerospace, technology, and energy sectors. First uses of cobalt chemicals include lithium-ion batteries, NiMH batteries, catalysts, soaps, and pigments. Cobalt metals are used first to produce super-alloys, wear-resistant alloys, magnetic alloys, hard metals, fabricated metal products, and coatings. These products are typically

used as inputs in further production within the manufacturing or energy sectors. For example, lithium-ion batteries are used in electric mobility and portable electronics applications. Cobalt containing catalysts are used in oil and gas desulphurization as well as in production of recyclable plastic bottles. Pigments are used to provide color to glass and ceramic products as well as to add color to inks. Super-alloys are used to produce high strength heat-resistant turbine blades in gas turbine engines for use in the aerospace and energy sectors. Other wear-resistant alloys are used to produce medical prosthetics, vehicle engine components, and cemented carbides. Hard metals are used to produce hand tools and power tool attachments. Magnetic alloys are used in magnets and magnet containing products such as recording and storage devices or generators. Metals are also used for electroplating and wear resistant coatings in electronics and spacecraft.¹⁰

2.2.2 Cobalt and lithium-ion batteries

A closer look into the lithium-ion battery supply chain proves useful in illustrating the complexities of the cobalt supply chain. Lithium-ion batteries are also a major source of concern as adoption of electric vehicles accelerates over the coming decades. Additionally, electric light-duty vehicle production is explicitly incorporated into the model, therefore a close examination of the supply chain will help drive model assumptions in later sections.

Overviews and assessments of the battery materials supply chain exist in the literature.¹¹ One key takeaway from this literature is that not all lithium-ion batteries are the same. Lithium-ion batteries have many different characteristics and not all lithium-ion batteries contain cobalt. Some sectors of the economy, while reliant on lithium-ion battery storage, may not be as reliant on a cobalt-containing battery chemistry and thus will not be directly affected by a change in cobalt price. Also, lithium-ion battery packs, cells, other battery components, and refined raw materials, such as cobalt, are often not produced in the same region.

¹⁰A rich description of different uses of cobalt can be found at CobaltInst (2019)

¹¹Overviews and projections for cobalt supply and demand in the face of electric vehicle adoption and battery development can be found in the following works: Chung *et al.* (2015); Coffin & Horowitz (2018); DeCarlo & Matthews (2019); Mayyas *et al.* (2019); Olivetti *et al.* (2017); Tsiropoulos *et al.* (2018)

Table 2.1: Cobalt Content of different li-ion battery chemistries

Type	kg Co/kwh	Details
NCA	0.13	Electric vehicles
NCM111	0.4	
NCM433	0.35	
NCM523	0.23	Power tools, electric vehicles
NCM622	0.19	
NCM811	0.09	
LCO	0.6	Portable electronics
LFP	0	Electric buses, grid storage
LMO	0	Power-tools, some EVs

Table 2.1 shows the elemental cobalt contained within a given li-ion battery chemistry. Note that there are various NCM and NCA chemistries that are used in electric vehicle applications. Also note that portable electronics employ the LCO chemistry which requires a higher cobalt content. The LFP and LMO chemistries contain no cobalt. The LFP chemistry is preferred for grid storage applications as well as larger storage applications in the mobility sector such as electric buses and trains (IEA, 2018, 2019; RMI, 2019).

The typical lithium-ion battery supply chain consists of three main stages: cell manufacturing, module manufacturing, and pack assembly. The cell consists of a cathode, anode, and an electrolyte. The module consists of multiple cells in a case attached to terminals. The battery pack is the final stage of production which consists of modules, electrical connections, and cooling equipment. Packs and modules tend to be produced at the same location. In the case of electric vehicles the pack is assembled in close proximity to production of the electric vehicle itself (Coffin & Horowitz, 2018). However, it is often the case that cell production and pack assembly occur at different locations. For example, the U.S. imports a majority of cells and li-ion battery components from Japan for assembly into modules and packs domestically (Coffin & Horowitz, 2018). Also, the U.S. imports a significant portion of batteries for non-EV use from Japan, China, and South Korea (Coffin & Horowitz, 2018). The tendency for pack assembly to take place close to the EV manufacturing facility provides support for the assertion that most EV battery packs produced in

the US obtain cells from Japan or South Korea.

China has made significant investments in li-ion battery production capacity resulting in an increase in production and exports from 2013-2017. According to Coffin & Horowitz (2018), reported imports of Chinese lithium-ion batteries are more likely battery components such as cells rather than packs themselves. While China still produces most cells domestically, this suggests that China also imports cells and other components from Japan, South Korea, and the rest of the world for use in production of batteries domestically.

Consider that cobalt containing li-ion battery cathodes require a chemical product. Global cobalt chemical refining capacity is split between Belgium, Finland, and China (Roskill, 2018). Japan and South Korea require cobalt in chemical form in order to produce battery cathodes and cells. This requires imports of refined cobalt metal and the ability to refine metal product into a chemical via some vertically integrated production process. Alternatively, it requires direct imports of cobalt in refined chemical form (oxide or sulphate). While the data is ambiguous, the general conclusion can be drawn that some portion of Japanese and South Korean cobalt imports are sourced from China (Coffin & Horowitz, 2018). At that juncture, some portion of Chinese cobalt is used to produce battery cells that are exported back to China where packs are produced for export and subsequent use in production of goods domestically.

2.3 Model and assumptions

In the previous section, I introduced cobalt and some facts around the cobalt supply chain. In this section, I define the model and establish some important underlying assumptions. After discussing the setup here, I explain the calibration of the model to existing data in section 2.4. I leverage information in the previous section to provide context and justification to the model structure and assumptions. A detailed algebraic representation of the full model is provided in appendix D. In this section I simplify the discussion by using nesting diagrams and pointing to key model equations for clarification, instead of a full algebraic representation.

The model chosen to answer the research question is a multi-region, multi-good, static computable general equilibrium model. This type of model allows me to capture sectoral tradeoffs and international trade patterns that arise from a policy outside of the control of the U.S. Furthermore, due to the global nature of the cobalt and battery supply chains, this type of model allows me to capture some of the regional patterns of production and use that define cobalt. The model is global in nature with regional production, consumption, and trade. As the objective is to assess the impact on the USA of a supply disruption stemming from China I choose to account for three explicit regions: the United States (USA), China (CHN), and the rest of the world (ROW). This regional aggregation provides enough detail to answer the research question. The highly aggregated ROW region also provides benefits in simplifying the some of the intricacies of the cobalt supply chain.

I choose to model 6 aggregated sectors of the economy. Details of these sectors are listed in Figure C.1. These six sectors are associated with the goods that are consumed in producing output associated with these six sectors. Of these six sectors, the most notable are the cobalt (COB) sector, the extraction and refining of chemicals, metals, and minerals (CMM) sector, the motor vehicles (MVH) sector, and the other manufacturing sectors that contain cobalt (OMC) in their finished products.

A discussion of each of these sectors is to follow. I begin with a discussion of the structure of the CGE model and how the COB sector fits into this model. Figure 2.1 shows the model structure for a single region with detail regarding a single production sector (OMC) to provide a picture of how COB moves from refined production through the model to impact final consumption. The model assumes a single representative agent (RA) who is endowed with capital (K), labor (L), and a fixed cobalt natural resource factor (RCO). The RA employs these factors to produce income with which it consumes a money-metric index of utility (C). This consumption index is defined by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. Consumption occurs on an Armington composite of all of the 6 sectors except for COB (Armington, 1969). I assume that there is no final demand for COB, it is only used in production of other goods. The RA employs K and L as well as an Armington composite of the five intermediate goods (INT) to produce an index of INT




Figure 2.1: Structure of CGE Model with detailed OMC nest

and value-added (VA) that is substitutable with COB in production. For example, in Figure 2.1 the index INT,VA is substitutable with COB in production of OMC at the substitution elasticity given by σ^{LDV} . OMC is then exported or used domestically in other production sectors or in final consumption (C).

It is important to note that COB is the value of elemental cobalt contained at a given stage of production. It is assumed that cobalt clears in a global world market as there is no COB product differentiation based on region of origin. For example, COB produced in CHN is either consumed domestically in other production sectors or exported to the world market where price clears at the world price. Alternatively, the USA imports COB from the world market at the global market clearing price. COB used in a given production sector is the sum of imported cobalt and cobalt produced for domestic use.




Figure 2.2: COB Production Block - Nesting Structure

The structure depicted in Figure 2.1 and outlined thus far shows how cobalt interacts with the global economy downstream and its relationship to the OMC sector. I begin with a description of the cobalt production structure, shown in the nesting diagram in Figure 2.2. I assume that cobalt production is defined by a constant elasticity of supply function. Using methods detailed in Rutherford (2002), I can calibrate the substitution elasticity between RCO and the VA,INT index (σ^{RCO}) to an exogenously specified constant elasticity of supply curve. Upward sloping supply is

consistent with the increases in marginal costs associated with optimizing byproduct production in the short-term as well as in capturing some of the sector specific short-term increasing marginal costs of capital adjustment associated with refinery expansion. It is assumed that the resource stock and sector specific capital are embedded in RCO. Additionally, the decision to model cobalt as a refined product at 100% purity is an abstraction from reality. This assumption implies the ability to costlessly transform refined metal into chemical and vice versa which is beneficial in terms of model tractability and in establishing the benchmark global economy. I defer an assessment of the implications of this assumption until the results are discussed in section 2.6.




Figure 2.3: MVH Production Block - Nesting Structure

OMC is not the only sector in which COB is used. COB is also used in production of electric vehicles, which is embedded in the MVH production structure. Figure 2.3 shows the production structure of the MVH CES production nest. Note that there are five additional goods that determine the MVH index. The MVH nesting structure was developed to be tractable with the GTAP database. A more detailed discussion of the GTAP database is contained in the next section. MVH consists of light-duty vehicles (LDV) and other motor vehicles and parts (OMVH). LDV is an index of conventional vehicles (ICE), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), and battery electric

vehicles (BEV). Hybrid electric vehicles are contained within the ICE production block. ICE is assumed to use no COB. PHEV and BEV use COB but at different intensities. BEV requires the use of more COB than PHEV per dollar of output. The interaction of these five MVH sub-sectors determines the activity level of the MVH index as a whole. MVH is the traded good and the good used in production in other sectors.

σ_g^{COB} shows the substitution elasticity between COB and INT,VA. The intuition behind this parameter indicates that if the price of COB increases relative to the price of other inputs, BEV and PHEV producers are incentivized to shift towards battery chemistries that require less COB. While different battery chemistries are not modeled explicitly at the component level, the elasticity of substitution determines the degree to which this shift towards less cobalt intensive battery chemistries occurs, given an increase in the relative price of cobalt.

To clarify the modifications related to cobalt in particular, I describe some of the key zero profit conditions algebraically. First, cobalt is produced using some fixed natural resource factor and a value-added composite consisting of capital and labor inputs. The unit profit function for this behavior is shown below:

$$\Pi_{cob,r}^Y = p_{cob,r}^Y - \left[\theta_{cob,r}^{RCO} p_{cob,r}^{RCO} p_{cob,r}^{1-\sigma^{RCO}} + (1 - \theta_{cob,r}^{RCO}) p_{cob,r}^{VA} p_{cob,r}^{1-\sigma^{RCO}} \right] \leq 0 \quad (2.1)$$

where $p_{cob,r}^Y$ is the price of cobalt in region r , $p_{cob,r}^{RCO}$ is the price of the fixed natural resource factor, and $p_{cob,r}^{VA}$ is the price of the value-added composite. The substitution elasticity (σ^{RCO}) can be calibrated to an exogenously specified elasticity of supply using information on the cost share of the fixed natural resource factor in cobalt output ($\theta_{cob,r}^{RCO}$). COB is then either consumed domestically or exported to the world market, where it is then imported by other regions for use in production.

The unit profit function for other output blocks that use cobalt in production is shown below:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\theta_{g,r}^{cob} p_{g,r}^Y p_{cob,r}^{1-\sigma_g^{COB}} + (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{cob}) p_{g,r}^{IV} p_{g,r}^{1-\sigma_g^{COB}} \right] p_{g,r}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_g^{COB}}} \leq 0 \quad (2.2)$$

where $p_{g,r}^Y$ is the price of output good g in region r . $p_{g,r}^{IV}$ is the price index associated with the INT,VA composite good in production of good g . $\theta_{g,r}^{COB}$ is the benchmark cost of cobalt used as a share of total output of good g in region r . The substitution elasticity σ_g^{COB} determines the ability

of good g to substitute away from cobalt and into the composite of other inputs.

A final key equation relates to the production of the LDV composite good. Below is the unit profit function that allows for substitution between vehicle types in production of the LDV good:

$$\Pi_{ldv,r}^Y = p_{ldv,r}^Y - \left[\sum_i \theta_{i,g,r}^{LDV} p_{i,r}^{Y^{1-\sigma^{LDV}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{LDV}}} \leq 0 \quad (2.3)$$

where $i \in [BEV, PHEV, ICE]$. The other zero profit conditions as well as market clearance, income balance, and constraints are provided in appendix D.

The model structure allows for the examination of a cobalt supply disruption under various PHEV and BEV penetration scenarios. It also allows for explicit representation of potential substitution away from cobalt at the battery chemistry level and substitution away from BEV and PHEV into ICE as a result of an increase in the relative price of COB. Furthermore, interactions and substitution with other uses of cobalt can be represented via the OMC sector. In the next section I discuss the model calibration and data used to establish the benchmark global economy.

2.4 Benchmark calibration methodology

In this section I discuss the mapping of GTAP data to model sectors, the calibration of the model, and other calculations and assumptions necessary to produce the global benchmark. The global benchmark is a necessary requirement in order to produce a baseline from which counterfactual policy analysis can be performed.

Before continuing, it is important to keep some key pieces of information about the reality of the cobalt supply chain in mind. Mainly, in assessing the regional implications of cobalt production and use it is important to consider the complications that arise as a result of this complex and diverse supply chain within the context of the research question. Specifically, the locations of various aspects of the cobalt supply chain play a role in the impact a supply disruption might have. Data relating to use of a given raw material in terms of elemental content is unlikely to be readily available, which creates complications in establishing a basis of comparison of cobalt used in different technologies and at each step of the supply chain. Calculations based on assumptions about the regional and sectoral distributions of production and use as well as the physical characteristics

of a given technology prove valuable in determining what industries and regions rely on cobalt and to what extent.

Figure C.1 shows a concordance between the model sectors, GTAP 9 sectors (McDougall *et al.*, 2013), and the ISIC revision 3.1 (UN, 2002) classification codes associated with the UNIDO IDSB database (UNIDO, 2019). The model draws upon data from the GTAP 9 2011 database and uses data from the UNIDO database to inform some of the calculations and assumptions in the calibration process. This concordance defines the initial model aggregation scheme.

After aggregating the GTAP sectors into the 5 model sectors it is necessary to determine the values required for the COB production sectors in each region as well as the values required for the MVH production nests (PHEV, BEV, ICE). I also need to determine how much COB is used in the PHEV, BEV, and OMC sectors within each region.

Cobalt production data is obtained from the USGS and the Roskill cobalt reports (Roskill, 2018; USGS, 2019). The production quantities used for modeling purposes are the quantities of combined refined chemical and metal production in tons of elemental cobalt. The average annual price of cobalt metal is expected to be somewhere between 15-20 USD/lb through the next decade (Roskill, 2018). I use a value of 20 USD/lb in the model calibration to calculate the output value of cobalt for each modeled region (USA, CHN, and ROW). I assume that China exercises complete control over the upstream supply of cobalt ores and concentrate which are sent to China for processing into a refined product. The motivation behind this assumption has been discussed in section 2.2, but relates to China's strategic interest and degree of influence in the DRC. In assuming "complete control", I assume that the resources in the DRC may as well exist within Chinese borders. This allows me to treat extraction and refining of cobalt as a vertically integrated process that takes place within China. This process is governed by a constant elasticity of supply function that is calibrated to short-run supply elasticity estimates from the literature (Fally & Sayre, 2018). I use the global refined production share of cobalt by each region and total global production in 2017 to inform usage estimates, which are detailed below.

Before continuing to a discussion of EV production and cobalt usage calculations it is important to note some of the driving factors behind the aggregation methodology. For the sake of transparency, it is also important to understand the assumptions embedded into the benchmark calibration. A complication arises due to the fact that cobalt can be refined into many different metal or chemical products, such as metal powder, metal cathode, sulfate chemical, oxide chemical, etc. While the metals tend to consist of high concentrations of cobalt, a sulfate might consist of only 30% elemental cobalt. Additionally, just because a metal product is refined in China, does not mean that it will not be refined further into a chemical in Japan or South Korea prior to use in a battery cell.

A major assumption is that cobalt is produced and consumed in elemental contained form as an input to sectors representing the final stage of manufacturing prior to consumption or use in services. Hence, all reference to COB indicates elemental cobalt contained in the manufactured product. For example, in reality, cobalt is used to produce lithium-ion battery cathodes, which are used to produce cells, which are subsequently assembled into a pack and installed into an electric vehicle, laptop, computer, or smartphone. Rather than modeling each different type of battery chemistry I simply assume that different applications of batteries require different concentrations of COB. Therefore, given that electric vehicles use a specific mix of battery chemistries on average, I can determine how much COB is used in the PHEV and BEV sectors. Alternatively, consider super-alloy production. Rather than model super-alloys explicitly, I simply assume that cobalt in conjunction with other goods are used to produce jet engine turbines in the aerospace industry. The assumptions detailed above provide a more precise indicator of reliance a specific region and sector has to cobalt while keeping the model tractable. With some additional assumptions detailed towards the end of this section, this can be relied upon to capture the impact of a Chinese supply disruption.

The first step in determining COB usage in the MVH and OMC sectors for each region is to begin with the LDV nest. Vehicle sales and production statistics from the IEA are used to determine the number of BEVs, PHEVs, and ICEs, which yields LDVs (IEA, 2018; Lutsey *et al.*,

2018). Given assumptions about average battery size and the average battery chemistry, I can determine the cobalt contained within the BEV and PHEV sectors for each region. Data related to the cobalt content of a battery chemistry in kg/KWh as well as average battery capacity in KWh allows me to calculate the cobalt content of the average vehicle within a region.¹² Multiplying by the number of vehicles yields the cobalt use in the PHEV and BEV sectors. To calculate the value share of cobalt used in production of electric vehicles, I need to determine PHEV and BEV output. This requires data for costs of different types of electric vehicles (Lutsey & Nicholas, 2019). I use the cost data to determine the output of the BEV and PHEV sectors. I use the cobalt price and cobalt use in the PHEV and BEV sectors to compute the value share of cobalt used in production of PHEV and BEV.

The next step is to determine the cobalt used within the OMC sector. The cobalt used in the OMC sector is the cobalt that remains after use in production of PHEV and BEV. In order to determine the global distribution of cobalt within the OMC sector I use the UNIDO IDSB revision 4 database (UN, 2007; UNIDO, 2019) in combination with cobalt first-use data at the global level (DeCarlo & Matthews, 2019; Dias *et al.*, 2018; Roskill, 2018). The UNIDO data provides output data for 4-digit ISIC codes at the country level. The cobalt first-use data provides shares of global use (assumed to equal global production). Figure C.2 provides a mapping between the first-use category and the final use in manufacturing category. Additionally, Table 2.2 shows the global shares of first-uses of cobalt and the regional share of global final use output in manufacturing associated with the first-use categories.

Assume that the leftmost column of Table 2.2 indicates a set of first-use categories (u). The next column to the right indicates the share of global cobalt use attributable to each element of set u , defined as θ_u^{FIR} . The three right-most columns in Table 2.2 indicate the regional (r) output share of global output associated with each final-use in manufacturing group of ISIC categories established in Figure C.2, defined as $\theta_{u,r}^{FIN}$. The product of first-use share (θ_u^{FIR}) with regional-output share of global ($\theta_{u,r}^{FIN}$) and global production net of EV use, determines how much cobalt

¹²Many different works provide data related to cobalt contained within a battery chemistry: (Chung *et al.*, 2015; Dias *et al.*, 2018; Lutsey & Nicholas, 2019; Lutsey *et al.*, 2018; Mayyas *et al.*, 2019)

Table 2.2: Cobalt use and regional distribution of use

Category	First-use	Final-use in Mfg.		
	World	USA	CHN	ROW
batt	0.48	0.08	0.68	0.24
supa	0.19	0.42	0.17	0.41
hard	0.09	0.07	0.50	0.43
mago	0.09	0.10	0.58	0.32
cata	0.06	0.11	0.12	0.77
pigm	0.06	0.11	0.65	0.24
soap	0.03	0.32	0.21	0.47

is used in final-use in manufacturing within each region. Summing across first-use groupings (u) yields cobalt use in the OMC sector by region.

To clarify algebraically, assume that the quantity of cobalt used in a given sector (i, j) and region (r, s), is given by $\overline{qco}_{i,r}$ in tons of cobalt. We have already calculated $\overline{qco}_{i,r}$ for the BEV and PHEV sectors. Assume that cobalt production (tons Co) for a given region is given by \overline{prod}_r . Furthermore, data regarding global distribution of portable electronics battery capacity (KWh) use in production obtained from Roskill (2018) is given by $portcap_r$. Cobalt use in OMC is calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{qco}_{omc,r} = & \sum_{u \neq \text{"batt"}} [\theta_u^{FIR} \theta_{u,r}^{FIN} \sum_s \overline{prod}_s] \\ & + \sum_{u = \text{"batt"}} \left[\theta_u^{FIR} \sum_s \overline{prod}_s - \sum_s \left(\overline{qco}_{bev,s} + \overline{qco}_{phev,s} + portcap_s * 0.6 * \frac{2.204}{2000} \right) \right] \theta_{u,r}^{FIN} \\ & + portcap_r * 0.6 * \frac{2.204}{2000} \end{aligned}$$

where 0.6 is the kg of cobalt contained per kwh of battery capacity for the LCO battery chemistry common to portable electronics applications.

At this point, I can determine the global distribution of cobalt use by region and sector. Using information for $\overline{qco}_{i,r}$ and the price of cobalt I calculate the value of cobalt used in OMC, BEV, and PHEV as a share of total value of cobalt used by each country. However, I still need output in the base year for each vehicles index within the MVH production block. I use the UNIDO database

(UNIDO, 2019) to determine the constant average growth rate of automobiles output (roughly 8%) by region and discount the 2017 output calculated earlier for PHEV, BEV, and ICE back to 2011. I use these values to disaggregate the MVH sectoral output into OMVH and LDV, and then LDV into PHEV, BEV, and ICE. I then determine cobalt value in use of electric vehicles using the 2017 cobalt intermediate input shares of BEV and PHEV output.

To clarify, let $\theta_{i,r}^{QCO}$ be the quantity share of regional cobalt use by sector, given by:

$$\theta_{i,r}^{QCO} = \frac{\overline{qco}_{i,r}}{\sum_j \overline{qco}_{j,r}} \quad (2.4)$$

Also, let $\theta_{i,r}^{VCO}$ be the value share of cobalt use in production of good i in region r . Firstly, I already calculated this for BEV and PHEV in the 2017 year as follows:

$$\theta_{bev,r}^{VCO} = \frac{\overline{qco}_{bev,r} * cobalt\ price}{2017BEV\ output} \quad (2.5)$$

The calculation for PHEV is analogous to that of BEV. After discounting 2017 BEV output back to the base year for the GTAP database (2011), I calculate the cobalt value in use ($\overline{vco}_{i,r}$) and value shares for all sectors that use cobalt. Assume that benchmark output is defined by $\bar{y}_{i,r}$. This requires two steps. First, take the COB intermediate input share of BEV output ($\theta_{bev,r}^{VCO}$) multiplied by output in the BEV sector ($\bar{y}_{bev,r}$) to obtain the benchmark value for cobalt in use of BEV production in the base year ($\overline{vco}_{bev,r}$). Secondly, in order to calculate the cobalt value in use for the OMC aggregate, use the following method:

$$\overline{vco}_{omc,r} = \frac{\theta_{omc,r}^{QCO} \overline{vco}_{bev,r}}{\theta_{bev,r}^{QCO}} \quad (2.6)$$

This ensures that the distribution of 2011 cobalt use across i and r is proportional to that of 2017. The intermediate input shares of cobalt use in sector i are now easily obtainable by dividing $\overline{vco}_{i,r}$ by $\bar{y}_{i,r}$. Finally, it is necessary to calculate cobalt output by region ($\bar{y}_{cob,r}$). This is obtained by summing $\overline{vco}_{i,r}$ across all regions and sectors, then multiplying this by each region's share of global cobalt production. Regional cobalt production shares are shown in the first row of Table 2.3.

I just discussed how to obtain COB production by region and COB use by region and sector scaled to the 2011 benchmark GTAP database. This data allows me to determine the value of net

Table 2.3: Refined cobalt production share of global in 2017

	USA	CHN	ROW
COB	0.003	0.619	0.379
metal	0.000	0.274	0.726
chemical	0.004	0.860	0.136

imports for each of the 3 regions as the difference between $\sum_i \overline{vc\overline{o}}_{i,r}$ and $\overline{y}_{cob,r}$. A discussion of benchmark output, use, and net import data is saved for section 2.5. However, the general outcome is as follows. ROW and USA use more cobalt than they produce. CHN produces more COB than it uses. In order for the world market for COB to clear, CHN must be exporting to the world, and USA and ROW must be importing from the world such that global use equals global production. Cobalt trade occurs free of transportation cost or benchmark tariffs.

The final steps are to apply the default GTAP MVH cost structure to the OMVH, ICE, BEV, and PHEV sectors proportionally. Additionally, I need to balance the benchmark economy by disaggregating cobalt production, use, and trade from the CMM sector and RCO from K in the CMM sector.

At this point it is necessary to highlight some final key assumptions implied by this benchmark setup. Most importantly, given the setup, it is not clear whether a modeled export quota truly represents the reality of an export quota. In order for the quota to be reflective of the current state of the global economy, I need to assume that all battery packs exported from CHN that end up in the USA contain cells that are produced in ROW, otherwise the Chinese cobalt quota would create a strategic trade advantage in Chinese battery production. Given information discussed in section 2.2, this assumption is not completely unreasonable. Additionally, any first-use of cobalt metal product (e.g. superalloys, magnets, cemented carbides, etc) consumed by ROW or USA that requires Chinese cobalt is produced outside of China. If these assumptions are dropped, the export quota might be more reflective of a production quota. An example would be a supply disruption in the DRC which causes CHN to stop producing products for export that use cobalt as well as the export of cobalt itself. Either interpretation could be considered useful.

2.5 Three global benchmarks and counterfactual scenario definition

In order to assess the impacts of a supply disruption and address concerns about costliness of a supply disruption in a future with significant electric vehicle adoption I define 3 different global benchmarks for comparison. The first global benchmark corresponds to the current (2017) state of global cobalt use (CUR). Two other global benchmarks are established based on the IEA's NPS baseline EV penetration scenario (NPS) and EV 30@30 scenario (E30) (IEA, 2018). These two projections from the IEA are chosen because they are well documented and output from these projections is used in other cobalt modeling studies (Nguyen *et al.*, 2020). Embedded within each of these global benchmarks are assumptions about the share of LDVs attributable to BEV and PHEV, battery sizes, battery chemistries, and vehicle costs. See Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 for a comprehensive list of scenario specific parameter specifications and sources for data.

Table 2.4: CUR - Scenario Setup

parameter	units	USA	CHN	ROW	Source
EV shr	EV/LDV	0.019	0.024	0.01	IEA (2018); Lutsey <i>et al.</i> (2018)
EV mix	BEV/EV	0.51	0.81	0.51	IEA (2018); Lutsey <i>et al.</i> (2018)
BEV cap	kwh/BEV	65	27	39	Chung <i>et al.</i> (2015); IEA (2018, 2019); Lutsey <i>et al.</i> (2018)
PHEV cap	kwh/PHEV	12	15	12	Chung <i>et al.</i> (2015); IEA (2018, 2019); Lutsey <i>et al.</i> (2018)
Implied Batt Chem	kg Co/kwh	0.23	0.23	0.23	Dias <i>et al.</i> (2018); IEA (2018)
COB Supply Elasticity	value	0.2	0.2	0.2	Fally & Sayre (2018)

Table 2.5: NPS and E30 - Scenario Setup

parameter	units	NPS	E30	Source
World EV shr	EV/LDV	0.15	0.33	IEA (2018)
USA EV shr	EV/LDV	0.08	0.30	IEA (2018)
CHN EV shr	EV/LDV	0.26	0.42	IEA (2018)
EV mix	BEV/EV	0.5	0.7	IEA (2019)
BEV cap	kwh/BEV	75	75	IEA (2018, 2019)
PHEV cap	kwh/PHEV	15	15	IEA (2018, 2019)
Batt Chem	kg Co/kwh	0.135	0.135	IEA (2018, 2019)
COB Supply Elasticity	value	0.2	0.2	Fally & Sayre (2018)

Table 2.4 shows the various parameters for the CUR scenario. The first row (EV shr) of Table 2.4 shows the share of EVs in total LDV produced for each model region. EV mix shows the share of BEVs in total EV. BEV cap and PHEV cap show the battery capacity of each battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicle, respectively. The Implied Batt Chem indicates how many kg of cobalt is contained in each KWh of battery capacity. This is calculated using data related to total EV battery capacity and total use of cobalt in EVs globally.

Table 2.5 shows the same data as Table 2.4 but in a slightly different format. Each column is associated with the benchmark calibration point. The first row represents the global EV share in global LDV. Using the second and third rows, the EV share for ROW can be computed. Note the assumptions surrounding elasticity of cobalt supply shown in the last row of Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. These elasticity estimates represent short-run estimates for supply elasticity obtained from the literature. The values in these tables combined with detail from section 2.4, fully inform the benchmark calibration point for each of the three global benchmarks.

An additional defining aspect of these global benchmarks is that each region's share of global production is the same across all three global benchmarks. This assumption warrants discussion. By construction, the benchmark calibration points established in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 change the global distribution of cobalt use. Notice that more electric vehicles are assumed to exist in China in the NPS and E30 scenarios relative to other regions. Also, notice that when compared to the CUR scenario, China sees much larger growth in EV adoption. Furthermore, notice that the battery capacity in China grows much more from CUR to the NPS and E30 cases than in other regions. Finally, note that the battery chemistry decreases cobalt used per kwh across all regions as we move into the future. Combining this with the assumption that the global cobalt production mix is fixed, implies that Chinese exports occupy a smaller share of global trade in the NPS and E30 benchmarks than in the CUR benchmark, as cobalt trade is determined by production net of use in a given region. This will naturally decrease the cost of an identical export quota imposed against the NPS and E30 benchmarks relative to the CUR benchmark.

Table 2.6: Benchmark Output, Use, and Net Imports of refined/contained cobalt USD billions

	CHN	ROW	USA	World
CUR				
Output	1.820	1.114	0.008	2.942
Use	1.204	1.225	0.512	2.942
Net Imports	-0.616	0.111	0.505	0.000
<i>CHN Export Share of Global Output</i>				0.209
NPS				
Output	2.864	1.753	0.012	4.629
Use	2.206	1.813	0.610	4.629
Net Imports	-0.658	0.060	0.598	-0.000
<i>CHN Export Share of Global Output</i>				0.142
E30				
Output	4.963	3.038	0.021	8.021
Use	3.354	3.500	1.167	8.021
Net Imports	-1.609	0.462	1.146	0.000
<i>CHN Export Share of Global Output</i>				0.201

Table 2.6 shows data for output, use, and net imports for each region and global benchmark. Recall from section 2.4 that this data relates to the value of contained cobalt produced and used. The difference between production and use for each region determines trade. First notice that the cobalt output is higher in NPS than CUR, and even higher in E30. This is due entirely to assumptions related to EV adoption. The final row of each benchmark subsection of Table 2.6 shows the share of global cobalt output attributable to Chinese cobalt exports. Notice that Chinese exports occupy a much smaller share of global output in the NPS relative to the CUR or E30 benchmarks. This is representative of the fact that China increases domestic demand more quickly than other regions relative to CUR but produces at the same share of global output. The difference results in a raw value of exports that is close to the CUR benchmark, even though output is 50-100% higher in NPS. When the export quota is levied on the NPS benchmark, it is possible that costs to other regions as a result of the policy are lower. The E30 benchmark shows a benchmark share that is roughly in line with CUR. However, due to the larger global output, this implies that

Chinese cobalt exports are much larger in absolute terms.

I assume the supply disruption enters as a Chinese export quota on refined cobalt. I explore two policy scenarios, a 25% reduction in exports and an export ban (100% reduction). These two policies are chosen so a comparison can be made that illustrates the way markets respond to increasing policy stringency. In the former case, Chinese exports still exist, and flow where they are most needed, mitigating the need for extreme changes in global cobalt trade and production. This case is meant to represent a situation where China chooses to strategically curtail exports in an effort to inflict damage to the United States, or to exploit its global dominance by collecting quota rents. In the latter case, Chinese exports are non-existent, which highlights the adjustments needed from the rest of the world on the supply-side and demand-side more clearly. This case is meant to represent a less-likely situation where China, in the name of national or global security, chooses to shut off refined cobalt exports to the rest of the world.

There remain a couple of parameters in which quality estimates do not exist. Where estimates are non-existent, I inform the baseline values based on anecdotal information and run different sensitivity scenarios to clearly illustrate the impact a specific parameter has on the output. I do this with respect to two important parameters. First, the elasticity of substitution between COB and all other inputs to production of OMC (σ_{omc}^{COB}). Estimates from the literature place the short-run demand elasticity for cobalt somewhere between -0.24 and -0.09 for the World, and closer to -0.029 for the USA (Fally & Sayre, 2018). However, due to the fact that the OMC sector is highly aggregated, the value of cobalt used in OMC relative to output is small. Substitution elasticities at near zero levels in highly aggregated indices, such as OMC, can result in overestimations of the cost associated with a particular policy. Therefore, I model two different substitution elasticities of 0 and 0.2, to show how important this channel is in changing the results. I assume that the true substitution elasticity falls somewhere in between, and that it depends on how short-term the analysis is. For our purposes, I assume short-term amounts to less than one or two years.

The second parameter relates to the substitutability between light duty vehicle types (σ^{LDV}). This elasticity parameter defines how easy it is to substitute from a conventional vehicle to a battery

electric vehicle, and vice versa. I model three different values for this parameter of 0.1, 0.5, and 2. The degree of substitutability in the LDV nest can influence the results in meaningful ways. Recent literature suggests that while BEV and ICE may not be highly substitutable today, in the future, it is likely that they will be more substitutable. I note this piece of information here, and defer a detailed discussion until the next section.

2.6 Results

In this section I discuss model output from the scenarios defined in the previous section. I first discuss the impact the quota has on sectoral output, intermediate demand for cobalt, factor demand, and trade. I then proceed with a discussion of how U.S. welfare changes as a result of the Chinese export quota.

Recall from section 2.5 that I choose to model two different values for σ_{omc}^{COB} and three different values for σ^{LDV} . σ_{omc}^{COB} can take on a value of 0 or 0.2 and σ^{LDV} can take on a value of 0.1, 0.5, or 2. Furthermore, I allow the export quota to take on two different stringencies. One corresponding to a 25% reduction in Chinese cobalt exports and another corresponding to a 100% reduction. Due to the difficulty of clearly illustrating the output response using all of these scenarios for each sector, region, and global benchmark, I choose a specific combination of these parameters that clearly illustrates the intuition behind the output responses. For clarity of the output response, I choose to examine the E30 global benchmark and the U.S. response to a 100% reduction in Chinese cobalt exports and selectively show data related to different substitution elasticities.

Upon imposition of the Chinese export quota, the global quantity of COB is reduced. This increases the global price of COB. Table 2.7 shows changes in activity levels and prices from benchmark values (1.0) associated with modeled sectors/commodities in the USA for the E30 global benchmark. Table 2.7 shows COB output in the USA increases across all elasticity combinations. This is due to the fact that the USA and ROW import COB from CHN. Domestic production in these regions needs to increase in order to respond to the quota. Increases in production of COB are associated with increases in price, shown in the bottom half of Table 2.7.

Table 2.7: Activity and Price Levels for the USA - E30 Benchmark - Export Ban

σ_{omc}^{COB}	σ^{LDV}	cob	omc	mvh	omvh	ldv	ice	phev	bev	cmm	omi	aog
ACTIVITY LEVELS % Δ FROM BENCHMARK												
0	0.10	48.92	-0.09	-1.39	-1.07	-1.91	-1.50	-1.87	-3.21	0.21	0.12	-0.01
	2.00	37.73	-0.05	-0.65	-0.51	-0.89	2.98	-0.64	-13.35	0.10	0.06	-0.00
0.2	0.10	34.71	-0.02	-0.56	-0.44	-0.76	-0.60	-0.75	-1.30	0.07	0.04	-0.00
	2.00	29.52	-0.02	-0.39	-0.31	-0.53	1.72	-0.33	-7.93	0.05	0.03	-0.00
PRICE LEVELS % Δ FROM NUMERAIRE PRICE												
0	0.10	1405.38	0.27	2.03	0.43	4.80	0.43	4.29	19.70	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07
	2.00	658.67	0.13	0.90	0.19	2.13	0.19	2.00	9.22	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
0.2	0.10	536.11	0.08	0.77	0.16	1.83	0.16	1.63	7.51	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	2.00	373.11	0.06	0.52	0.11	1.23	0.11	1.13	5.22	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02

Values represent % changes in index relative to the E30 global benchmark (1.0) for the USA subject to a Chinese export ban

Taking a closer look at the vehicles sector (MVH) in Table 2.7, higher cobalt prices increase the costs of producing PHEV and BEV. This drives substitution away from EVs towards conventional vehicles (ICE). In the case of high substitution elasticities ($\sigma^{LDV} = 2.0$), ICE output actually increases in response to substitution away from BEVs and PHEVs. LDV output decreases in all cases as substitution towards less cobalt intensive transportation modes (OMVH) occurs. The end result is a decrease in MVH sectoral output across all cases.

Table 2.8: Intermediate cobalt demand by select sector in USA

σ_{omc}^{COB}	σ^{LDV}	bev	omc	phev
0	0.10	0.9679	0.9991	0.9813
	2.00	0.8665	0.9995	0.9936
0.2	0.10	0.9870	0.6907	0.9925
	2.00	0.9207	0.7328	0.9967

Values represent intermediate input quantities relative to the E30 global benchmark (1.0) for the USA subject to a Chinese export ban

The results in Table 2.7 show that all sectors in which cobalt is used also show lower output. This is reflective of demand and supply adjusting in order to find a new equilibrium. Higher COB prices increase costs to produce goods that use COB. Production that requires the use of COB chooses to substitute away from COB as consumers of the final product abate consumption due to higher prices of final goods. Table 2.8 shows intermediate demand for cobalt as an input relative to the benchmark quantity. When $\sigma_{omc}^{COB} = 0$ the battery electric vehicles sector uses less cobalt than when $\sigma_{omc}^{COB} = 0.2$. Due to the fact that the substitution elasticity between cobalt and other goods in production of BEV and PHEV is zero, we can attribute this decrease entirely to output reduction in the BEV sector. Also, notice that when σ^{LDV} becomes larger, the BEV sector requires less cobalt when σ_{omc}^{COB} is lower. The assumption that cobalt is used in fixed-proportion to other inputs in production of battery electric vehicles implies that BEV output is being reduced, partly through substitution towards other vehicle types that are less cobalt intensive, shown in Table 2.7. When σ_{omc}^{COB} is low and σ^{LDV} is high, cobalt can be redistributed from BEV towards OMC. If BEV could substitute away from cobalt use in production, this effect would be even more prominent.

Table 2.9: % change in imports by region for selected sectors

Quota	σ_{omc}^{COB}	σ^{LDV}	cob			omc			mvh		
			CHN	ROW	USA	CHN	ROW	USA	CHN	ROW	USA
25%	0	0.10	-	-85.67	-0.38	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.48	-0.07	-0.06
		2.00	-	-83.69	-1.18	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.44	-0.06	-0.05
100%	0	0.10	-	-99.24	-2.82	-0.19	-0.06	-0.20	-3.97	-1.03	-0.99
		2.00	-	-100.00	-8.28	-0.10	-0.03	-0.08	-2.15	-0.44	-0.40

Values represent % changes in import index relative to the E30 global benchmark (1.0) for the each region and select sectors subject to different quota stringencies

Decreased imports of COB also accompany the export quota, as more COB is produced domestically. Table 2.9 shows that the USA relies on COB imports from ROW under an export ban. Particularly, note that ROW becomes a net exporter under a Chinese export ban, as they now have the advantage in production due to the higher benchmark quantity relative to the USA. This highlights the cost-reducing role that trade relationships with ROW play in reducing policy costs in the

USA.

The total impact of the supply disruption is a reduction in aggregate consumption. Lower output aligns with lower factor prices. Labor and capital move from cobalt intensive industries to non-cobalt intensive industries. Lower factor prices allow for higher factor employment in non-cobalt intensive sectors such as OMI and AOG, leading to increases in output.

Table 2.10: Welfare Results - % Δ from benchmark consumption

Quota Stringency		25%			100%		
σ_{omc}^{COB}	σ^{LDV}	E30	NPS	CUR	E30	NPS	CUR
0	0.10	-0.013	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.188	-0.043	-0.117**
	2.00	-0.010**	-0.004**	-0.006	-0.085**	-0.031**	-0.098
0.2	0.10	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002*	-0.066	-0.011	-0.012*
	2.00	-0.007*	-0.002*	-0.002	-0.045*	-0.010*	-0.012

* Best case scenarios with higher $\sigma_{omc}^{COB} = 0.2$

** Worst case scenarios with lower $\sigma_{omc}^{COB} = 0$

Values are the % difference between the benchmark consumption index (1.0) and the counterfactual consumption index. A measure of Hicksian equivalent variation.

Table 2.10 shows the percentage reduction in USA welfare associated with different scenarios and substitution elasticities. To simplify interpretation of the data in Table 2.10, consider that if consumption expenditures in the USA are 13 trillion USD, a -0.1% change in benchmark consumption amounts to a welfare loss of 13 billion USD. The results show a reduction in welfare across all global benchmarks, elasticities, and quota stringencies. Table 2.10 shows two cases of quota stringency associated with each EV deployment scenario in the top two column headings. The two left-most columns show different values for substitution elasticity between COB and INT,VA in production of OMC ($\sigma_{omc}^{COB} \in [0, 0.2]$) and different values for the elasticity of substitution between vehicle types ($\sigma^{LDV} \in [0.1, 2]$). The best case scenarios are indicated by an asterisk and worst case scenarios indicated by a double asterisk in Table 2.10. What differentiates the best and worst case scenarios is the value of σ_{omc}^{COB} . Realistic scenarios for σ^{LDV} are based on the intuition that vehicle types will be more substitutable in the future, also indicated by either a single or double asterisk. The welfare results vary, but they establish reasonable bounds on potential outcomes

of a supply disruption and highlight some interesting features of substitution patterns.

The results in Table 2.10 suggest that policy costs increase in most cases as a result of greater EV penetration, a more stringent export quota, and lower substitution elasticities (σ_{omc}^{COB} and σ^{LDV}). These results are expected. However, an interesting result appears in the top right quadrant of Table 2.10. When σ_{omc}^{COB} is low, σ^{LDV} is high, and the supply disruption is significant (export ban) welfare losses are actually less negative in the E30 and NPS benchmarks, relative to CUR. The difference in policy costs between the E30 and CUR benchmarks narrows, with E30 eventually becoming less costly as the substitutability between vehicle types increases.

There are a few factors influencing the welfare result in the top right quadrant of Table 2.10. A comparison between the assumptions embedded into the NPS and E30 global benchmarks compared to the CUR benchmark highlights how the benchmark calibration influences this result. First, embedded into the NPS and E30 global benchmarks are decreased intensity of cobalt use in lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles relative to the CUR benchmark. Second, growth in electric vehicle adoption and battery capacity per vehicle in CHN outpaces the USA and ROW. Third, and very importantly, the global cobalt production share attributable to each region is assumed to be the same in NPS and E30 as in CUR. These benchmark calibration assumptions decrease the share of global cobalt output attributable to exports from China in the E30 and NPS benchmarks relative to the CUR benchmark, which decreases the share of exports being removed from the global market as a result of the quota, effectively reducing costs of the E30 and NPS counterfactuals relative to the CUR counterfactual.

Nevertheless, the results in the top right quadrant of Table 2.7 clearly show that substitution between conventional and electric vehicles can be a significant channel for cost reduction. The E30 benchmark counterfactual makes this abundantly clear. This substitution pattern is influenced by the third assumption about global cobalt production shares. As long as the USA and ROW increase global production outside of CHN — in absolute terms — in the years between the CUR and 2030 benchmarks in response to increased cobalt demand from electric vehicles, and BEVs become more substitutable with other vehicle types, this channel of cost reduction will remain

relevant.

This result suggests that increased use of cobalt within the U.S. vehicles sector and in the economy as a whole may not coincide with increased cost of a supply disruption, especially when cobalt is subject to highly inelastic demand in other sectors and when the supply disruption is extreme. A study by Xing *et al.* (2019) suggests that current substitution between vehicle types is low and that battery electric vehicle consumers are in a transportation class of their own. Plug-in hybrid consumers are more likely to substitute towards conventional vehicles than battery electric in the event of a price increase. Battery electric vehicle owners are unlikely to switch to plug-in hybrid or conventional vehicles. The rationale for this behavior is that the current lack of transportation infrastructure and relatively slow refueling times associated with BEVs cause range anxiety. However, in the future, charging infrastructure is expected to improve, effectively relieving range anxiety (Wood *et al.*, 2017). This suggests that the substitution elasticity (σ^{LDV}) associated with the NPS and E30 scenarios is likely higher than the CUR scenario. A high value of σ^{LDV} allows the vehicles sector to abate consumption of COB so that it can be reallocated towards sectors where COB is more costly to substitute away from. As long as the absolute value of production outside of China increases as electric vehicle adoption occurs, increased cobalt use via EV growth will provide a diversification benefit to the USA, should a supply disruption occur in China. A relatively low value of σ_{omc}^{COB} representing inelastic demand for cobalt in aerospace, electronics, etc highlights this effect. While the elasticity of substitution is probably not zero, it is very close to zero in the short run for the aerospace and electronics industries. The OMC sector is very large and contains other industries that might not be subject to the risks of cobalt, therefore, $\sigma_{omc}^{COB} = 0$ probably over-estimates the costs associated with a supply disruption. However, it still proves useful in highlighting this result and serves as a worst-case scenario parameterization.

Given the above information, Table 2.10 shows a worst-case scenario short-run USA welfare loss associated with a Chinese export ban of -0.0851%, -0.0310%, and -0.1171% for the E30, NPS, and CUR scenarios, respectively. The CUR scenario assumes low substitutability ($\sigma^{LDV} = 0.1$) between vehicle types whereas the E30 and NPS scenarios assume high substitutability ($\sigma^{LDV} =$

2). Under a best case scenario for an export ban, the welfare costs are -0.0454%, -0.0104%, -0.0118% for E30, NPS, and CUR respectively. The results for a 25% reduction in exports are a bit less concerning, amounting from a -0.0059% to -0.0018% reduction in welfare from the CUR benchmark depending on the value of σ_{omc}^{COB} .

There exist model assumptions that can change the magnitude of the results, though I expect the main conclusions to remain in tact. A feature that could increase the costs of a supply disruption is related to the differentiation of cobalt in chemical and metal forms. As modeled, it is assumed that chemicals and metals are produced jointly with an infinite transformation elasticity. Furthermore, cobalt contained in various first-uses also has an infinite transformation elasticity. This implies that chemicals and metals can be costlessly transformed from one product to another, which mitigates the need for any product differentiation. In reality, there are costs associated with this transformation process. This is a limitation that could increase the costs associated with a supply disruption if included. It could also decrease the ability of the USA to substitute away from cobalt via substitution between BEV and ICE in the extreme policy scenario. However, global production needs to be increased by a large amount in response to the export quota, therefore lower amounts of transformation are actually occurring. The type of cobalt needed is known and production is scaled up accordingly, mitigating most of the need to transform existing production.

Additionally, in 2030 there may be climate policies in place that prevent or disproportionately disincentivize substitution away from BEVs into LDVs. This would imply a lower elasticity of substitution due to policy restrictions, which would increase total costs of the supply disruption.

Future iterations of this work should explore the implications of changing the 2030 global production mix so that (i) all new production from now to 2030 is provided by China and (ii) that the production mix scales so that China's export share of global output remains the same in the 2030 benchmarks as in present day. These two alternative cases will give policymakers much more information to work with when prioritizing different policy goals.

2.7 Conclusion

In this paper I develop an applied general equilibrium model to determine the cost to U.S. consumers of a Chinese disruption to cobalt supply in present day (2017) and in different electric vehicle deployment futures (2030). I find that outside of the extreme case of an export ban, even under the most pessimistic assumptions, the costs to U.S. consumers are small. In the extreme case of an export ban, the costs are significantly larger. However, in future EV penetration scenarios in which cobalt share of global output is 2-4 times what it is today due to increased EV penetration, there appears to be little difference between the welfare costs associated with a supply disruption today or in 2030. Under certain assumptions, the supply disruption is less costly. This is not only because demand for cobalt progresses more rapidly in China than in the United States and the rest of the world, but also because electric vehicle adoption implies a more diversified vehicles sector. A more diversified vehicles sector provides an additional channel by which cobalt can be abated in the event of a supply disruption. Effectively, a cobalt price increase will lead to substitution away from electric vehicles towards conventional vehicles. The cobalt previously used in electric vehicles can be employed in other sectors with less ability to substitute away from cobalt such as aerospace, defense, and mobile communications. The adoption of EVs adds a new, flexible channel through which to respond to supply disruptions in the short-term.

CHAPTER 3
INDUCED INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION OF END-OF-PIPE CARBON-SAVING
TECHNOLOGY

This chapter was written in collaboration with Dr. Jared C. Carbone[†] and Dr. Andreas Löschel[‡]

In this paper, we explore the ability of regional climate policy to induce innovation in energy-saving and end-of-pipe carbon-saving technologies at home and abroad. We employ a global computable general equilibrium model of North-South trade, coupled with different assumptions about technology creation and diffusion, to show how these assumptions influence investment in research and development (R&D), emissions leakage, output, as well as abatement cost and welfare. We discuss how these factors interact with a Northern emissions cap as well as a carbon tariff levied on Northern imports from Southern regions. We find that innovation tends toward R&D in carbon-saving technology, and that this channel of innovation provides unique benefits in terms of leakage reduction and abatement cost savings. This is due to the fact that the carbon-saving technology allows the North to meet CO₂ restrictions without abating as much fossil fuel use, leaving demand for fossil fuels closer to pre-policy levels in the North, and global prices similarly high. As a result, the South does not increase emissions by as much. Spillovers do not impact leakage rates significantly under an emissions cap. However, when carbon tariffs are implemented, spillovers lead to a larger reduction in leakage, as the South now has a motive to adopt carbon-saving technology developed in the North.

3.1 Introduction

As of 2020, unilateral global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is hindered due to a lack of coordination amongst developed and developing regions of the world. In particular, if the

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developed world were to implement a carbon tax or emissions cap, the developing world would be incentivized to take advantage of lower fuel prices. Also, firms in emissions-intensive industries with exposure to international trade could relocate from developed to developing regions. The outcome is an increase in developing-world emissions that partially offset the reduction by the developed world. This phenomenon — known as carbon leakage — combined with the low prospect of a unilateral policy solution, has led to the consideration of piecemeal efforts to address the global climate challenge, such as regional emissions caps or carbon taxes combined with methods of border carbon adjustment (Climate Leadership Council, 2020). Additionally, arguments have been made that technologies capable of extracting CO₂ from the atmosphere or at the source will play an important role in achieving the global temperature goals established by the Paris agreements (Anderson & Newell, 2004; Barrett, 2009; Global CCS Institute, 2020). In fact, efforts to incentivize the development and implementation of these carbon capture and storage technologies have recently been undertaken (Carbon Capture Coalition, 2019). Furthermore, attention has been given to the fact that climate policy should drive development of new technology, and that this technology could be passively transferred to the developing world to help reduce emissions there as well (Keller, 2004).

In this work, we explore features of technological change and diffusion in the face of piecemeal policy efforts by developed regions of the world to promote developing world emissions reductions. We construct a calibrated numerical model of North-South trade. In the model, the North seeks to control global CO₂ emissions. It has the possibility of affecting the cost of carbon abatement by investing in research and development (R&D), whereas the South does not. The knowledge created by the R&D process is only partially appropriable so that a positive externality exists. In this way, not only do Northern countries benefit from the R&D efforts of other Northern countries, but countries in the South benefit from the R&D efforts of countries in the North.

In addition to being linked by technological spillovers, the countries trade in carbon intensive goods, non-carbon intensive goods, and fossil-based energy. This gives countries in the South a motive to adopt new innovations, as the South is assumed to have either no interest in curbing CO₂

emissions or no ability to do so. Southern regions may choose to adopt new technologies to the extent that they reduce usage of costly factors of production or allow a region to exploit a new terms of trade advantage.

A key feature of our model is the differentiation of knowledge capital by sector of use. R&D for a given sector and region is produced using intermediate goods. This allows R&D to influence output in a few ways. First, by investing in R&D, more output can be achieved in a given industry with the same use of conventional inputs. Second, increased demand for R&D in an energy-intensive industry requires increased use of certain conventional inputs, which causes cost to increase in other industries, and can impact output in those sectors. Third, increased demand for R&D in an energy-intensive industry can lead to a redistribution of the initial R&D endowment by redirecting intermediate input use away from the R&D efforts of non-energy intensive industries and towards those most affected by a given policy. Therefore, investment in technology change can respond to different incentives presented by CO₂ restrictions and the structure of international commodity markets.

Unique to our model is the inclusion of an R&D good targeted specifically at developing “carbon-saving” technologies — technologies that directly affect the emissions requirement of an economic activity without changing the energy or other input requirements that one normally associates with the production of carbon emissions. Real world examples of this type of technology exist under the umbrella of carbon capture and storage (Global CCS Institute, 2020). This type of R&D is produced in the same way as conventional R&D. All else equal, R&D in carbon-saving technology allows for the same use of fossil inputs — and the same sectoral output — at lower proportional marginal emissions levels. Our work highlights the importance of this technology in reducing emissions leakage and abatement costs.

We model two policy scenarios. First, we model the implementation of a system of domestically tradable emission permits in each Northern region that results in a 10% reduction in emissions relative to the benchmark level. Second, we introduce carbon tariffs levied only on imports to Northern regions from Southern regions as a means to incentivize Southern adoption of carbon-

saving technology. Carbon tariffs and full border carbon adjustment measures have been studied extensively as a means to reduce leakage rates, by incentivizing the South to take part in the abatement effort (Boehringer *et al.*, 2012b). Due to spillovers, a positive R&D externality exists which can lead to the underprovision of knowledge services or underinvestment in carbon-saving R&D. A carbon-tariff on non-abating regions could be employed to incentivize Northern regions to invest more in carbon-saving R&D, helping to reduce carbon leakage further while also incentivizing non-abating regions in the South to adopt carbon-saving technology developed in the North. The carbon tariff rate endogenously responds to the changing carbon content of Southern goods as a result of technology diffusion associated with the carbon-saving technology. The results highlight the implications of these two policies in the face of four different assumptions about knowledge creation and diffusion. The assumptions include (i) No R&D is allowed, (ii) R&D is allowed but no spillovers are allowed, (iii) R&D is allowed with spillovers only amongst regions in the North, and (iv) R&D is allowed with full spillovers amongst all Northern regions and from Northern regions to Southern regions.

Under the first policy scenario, the Northern emissions cap reduces demand and increases costs associated with emissions intensive production, putting downward pressure on prices of energy goods. This induces a standard carbon leakage effect, as Southern regions take advantage of these lower prices (Felder & Rutherford, 1993). We find that the ability of the North to invest in new technology and the ability of the South to capture the benefits associated with these innovations both tend to reduce the leakage rate. R&D investment patterns associated with conventional sectors show increased R&D where emissions are most intensive, such as electricity and energy-intensive consumer goods. R&D patterns in other sectors show decreases or ambiguity. However, large amounts of carbon-saving R&D are present. This carbon-saving innovation allows for greater use of fossil energy in the North under the same carbon restrictions. As a result, prices of fossil fuels are higher with R&D, causing less energy use and energy intensive production to migrate to the South. This suggests that the operative channel for leakage reduction is through investment in carbon-saving R&D.

Spillovers tend to mute the R&D response induced by the emissions cap. The primary channel for this is in spillovers between Northern countries. If knowledge is more freely available, then a given Northern region has less incentive to invest in R&D, as the cost savings from this new knowledge is not completely contained within the region. Due to the fact that Northern countries can make better use of freely available knowledge and can adjust their R&D investment in response, less knowledge is created. Leakage rates increase slightly when North-only spillovers are modeled. North to South spillovers further mute the R&D investment response in the North by a small amount, but also decrease the leakage rate.

Under an emissions cap without carbon tariffs, spillovers from North to South have a minor effect on the leakage rate. This is partly because there is no incentive for Southern regions to adopt carbon-saving technology, as emissions are not priced in these regions. This fact suggests that additional benefits could be realized if the North were to incentivize the South to adopt these technologies via a carbon tariff.

Introducing the carbon tariff causes a reduction in leakage regardless of whether R&D or technology spillovers are represented in the model. Conventional R&D associated with energy intensive industries and carbon-saving R&D are higher in the North under a tariff than without. Notably, spillovers from North to South drive a larger percentage reduction in the leakage rate compared to the no-tariff case. This is due to the fact that Southern regions now have a motive to adopt carbon-saving technology developed in the North. Sensitivity analysis shows that under highly elastic demand for carbon-saving technology, the carbon tariff's interaction with the carbon-saving technology can induce a reduction in southern emissions, yielding a negative leakage rate.

Our core scenarios show that carbon-saving R&D is a major cost-reducing factor. Furthermore, the carbon-saving R&D results in smaller increases in Southern emissions relative to the case without R&D. The net effect of carbon-saving R&D is a significant boost to global welfare. Spillovers tend to reduce welfare in the no-tariff case. As Southern consumption falls and Northern consumption increases, reductions in Southern emissions do not offset this difference due to the fact that the large Northern investment in carbon-saving technology does not spill over into the South.

Our baseline parameterization with a carbon tariff results in lower welfare than without a tariff for each R&D assumption. Note that this result is due almost entirely to the fact that intermediate goods are used in fixed proportion with one another in a given industry's production function. Future iterations of this work should explore different parameterizations in this aspect of the model. However, because the carbon tariff incentivizes the South to adopt carbon-saving technology, spillovers elicit a more muted output response to the carbon tariff. How muted this output response is determines whether or not spillovers increase or decrease welfare. For example, sensitivity analysis shows, if it is more difficult to reduce CO₂ emissions by increasing carbon-saving R&D, less carbon-saving R&D investment will take place, which reduces the spillover benefit the South receives from the North. Additionally, these spillovers to the South have less of an impact on the effective carbon content. The resulting lower spillover benefit causes Southern regions to substitute output away from exports to the North and towards use in the Southern regions. The opposite is true when it is easier to reduce CO₂ emissions with carbon-saving R&D, as trade flows are otherwise less disrupted.

There is an extensive literature that uses calibrated numerical models to study the effects of induced technological change on the costs of greenhouse gas abatement and optimal abatement levels over time.¹³ Most are based on macro-style growth models that do not model different sectors of the world economy. Grubler *et al.* (2002), Popp (2004), and Buonanno *et al.* (2003) are some of the more prominent examples of studies from this branch of the literature. Acemoglu *et al.* (2012) fits in with the growth literature, however it models a dirty and clean good in a more theoretical framework focused on optimal policy and timing. Goulder & Schneider (1999) develops a country-level computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with sector-specific R&D activities and technology spillovers, but the analysis takes place in a closed-economy setting. Similarly, Gerlagh (2008) models R&D-based technology changes that can be directed at specific inputs in specific sectors of the economy, but does not model regional economies and cannot therefore comment on the effects of international trade, carbon leakage, or technology spillovers to developing countries. Gerlagh &

¹³For overviews of the literature and methods used to account for technological change, see: Loeschel (2002); Popp *et al.* (2010); Wing (2006)

Kuik (2014) focus on the potential for technology change and international technology spillovers to modify the magnitude and sign of carbon leakage effects. The specification of technology change is based on a reduced-form specification rather than knowledge stock with spillovers approach as we use here. Also, Gerlagh & Kuik (2014) does not specifically model carbon-saving R&D, a key aspect of our analysis. Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2003) and Popp (2006) are two noteworthy growth models which introduce carbon-saving technological change via a carbon-free backstop technology and endogenous technological change via learning by doing. However, the backstop technology is a substitute for fossil-based energy production so it is fundamentally different from the end-of-pipe type of carbon-saving technology that we are imagining here. Additional work exists that models technological innovation in the face of carbon capture and storage, but sectoral R&D patterns, international trade, technology diffusion, and leakage effects are not emphasized together (Otto & Reilly, 2008; Otto *et al.*, 2008; Schroyen & Durmaz, 2019)

There is also a theoretical literature on the impacts of induced technological change on pollution policy. Our experiment is most closely linked to Di Maria & Smulders (2005) and Di Maria & van der Werf (2008), both of which explore the impacts of induced technological change in North-South models of trade. The former, however, does not focus specifically on greenhouse gas emissions and the trade linkages that are particular to this policy setting. The latter concentrates on carbon leakage effects but does not model a carbon-saving technology.

The literature covering border carbon adjustments and carbon tariffs is extensive. The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 29 study outlines a cooperative effort to explore various features of these policy instruments (Boehringer *et al.*, 2012b).¹⁴ However, this literature does not consider interaction between induced technological change and border carbon adjustments. In particular, no consideration is given to the unique ability for border carbon adjustments to incentivize adoption of carbon-saving technology in regions not subject to emissions regulation.

¹⁴Other related works from the EMF 29 study include: Alexeeva-Talebi *et al.* (2012); Boehringer *et al.* (2012a,c); Boeters & Bollen (2012); Caron (2012); Springmann (2012). Additional work outside of the EMF 29 study by Boehringer *et al.* (2014b) and Boehringer *et al.* (2018) should be noted as well.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the structure of the simulation model with particular emphasis on the specification of R&D creation and technology spillovers. Section 3.3 covers the data and assumptions used to calibrate the model. Section 3.4 describes the results of the counterfactual policy experiments. Section 3.5 explores the sensitivity of the model to key parameter choices.

3.2 Model description

The model is a static, multi-regional, multi-commodity, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model whose basic underlying structure has been used in a number of previous studies at the intersection of trade and climate policy (Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Lanz & Rutherford, 2016; Shoven & Whalley, 1984). The GTAP 9 database (Aguiar *et al.*, 2016) provides the benchmark calibration point for the conventional sectors and production activities in the model. The base year in the model is 2011. Production and consumption technologies are modeled as nested CES production functions. International trade is represented via Armington composites of foreign and domestic varieties of traded commodities (Armington, 1969). The different varieties enter nested CES production functions, where benchmark value shares and substitution elasticity parameters determine the mix of imported versus domestically produced varieties consumed by a given region. Primary fossil fuel production makes use of specific resource factors that ensure upward sloping supply schedules for these commodities (Rutherford, 2002). Carbon is modeled as an input which firms and consumers must use in fixed proportion to their demand for fossil energy inputs. While we realize that there is a difference between “Carbon” and “CO₂”, we use these terms interchangeably throughout this text in reference to CO₂ emissions. If a distinction provides new intuition, we will note this explicitly. There are seven regions and eight sectors of the world economy represented in the model. Because these aspects of the design are conventional, we forgo a more detailed description here.

It is worth noting that the majority of models designed to explore the interaction of technology and climate policy are explicitly dynamic. They typically contain mechanisms for either recur-

sive or foresighted management of the physical capital, knowledge stocks, and climate processes represented within the model. This is a natural modeling choice to make due to the fact that the impacts of climate change and cost savings associated with technological progress take time to manifest themselves. If our objective was to characterize the discounted value of abatement cost savings due to technology change or the optimal investment path over time, a dynamic modeling approach would be well-suited. However, the focus of our experiment is on characterizing the sectoral pattern of R&D investments and technology spillovers that may arise from efforts to control CO2 emissions. Therefore, for tractability and clarity of policy response, we deviate from the conventional dynamic modeling approach.

3.2.1 Modeling knowledge demand and supply




Figure 3.1: R&D as an input to production

A novel part of the model is the specification and the calibration of knowledge creation, utilization, and spillovers. Knowledge is assumed to be a factor of production in each conventional sector of the economy. Figure 3.1 presents a schematic representation of how the knowledge good enters the production block for a generic good in the model. $Y_{i,r}$ is the level of output in sector i of region r . The modification of the production structure in our CGE model is made by nesting the original production structure based on conventional inputs in a nested CES structure with knowledge services, $K_{i,r}$. In the specification of each sector’s production function, the top-level elasticity of substitution parameters in CES production functions, $\sigma_{i,r}^R$, along with the benchmark

value shares of knowledge services implied by our R&D data, determine the demand responsiveness of knowledge in that sector. Employing this type of nesting structure allows us to calibrate $\sigma_{i,r}^R$ to a pre-specified elasticity of demand (Rutherford, 2002).




Figure 3.2: R&D as an input to production of effective carbon

In addition to modeling the use of knowledge inputs in the production of conventional goods, we also assume that innovation can be useful in the production of effective carbon services. Effective carbon is produced using raw carbon emissions and knowledge based on investment in carbon-saving R&D. The technology for producing effective carbon follows the specification in Figure 3.1 with the difference being that the raw carbon emissions input replaces the nest of conventional inputs, shown in Figure 3.2. Effective carbon then enters the conventional nesting structure at fixed proportion to the fossil energy inputs in production of a given good.

The supply of knowledge comes from two distinct sources. New technologies can be invented by investing in R&D, which requires reallocating resources from other sectors in the economy. We assume that there is a common technology using conventional intermediate goods in the model that can produce new knowledge for any sector of the economy equally well. These inputs enter a simple CES production function. The second source of knowledge comes from pre-existing stocks of knowledge that are based on spillovers from previous R&D activity either in a firm's home country or from abroad. We assume that this type of knowledge cannot be flexibly reallocated from one sector to another – once a new technology has been developed for use in a given sector, it can be of no use to the firms producing in other sectors. Additionally, in our model we assume

that only countries in the “North” are capable of producing R&D. Countries in the “South” are assumed to derive their knowledge stock services purely from pre-existing knowledge based on spillover effects.

The modifications represented in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 can be clarified algebraically by discussing some key zero profit and market clearance conditions. A full model description is provided in appendix G. Assume that output ($Y_{i,r}$) in sector i region r is produced using knowledge services ($K_{i,r}$) and an index of non-R&D goods ($NRD_{i,r}$). $K_{i,r}$ consists of new knowledge production ($R_{i,r}$) and pre-existing conventional knowledge plus any spillovers ($SPL_{i,r}$). The unit profit function for output is given below:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{i,r}^Y &= p_{i,r}^Y - \\ &\left[\theta_{i,r}^{RD} p_{i,r}^{R^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} + (1 - \theta_{i,r}^{RD}) p_{i,r}^{NRD^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3.1)$$

where $p_{i,r}^Y$, $p_{i,r}^R$, and $p_{i,r}^{NRD}$ are the relative price indices associated with production of good i in region r , respectively. $\theta_{i,r}^{RD}$ represents the benchmark cost of $K_{i,r}$ as a share of output in industry i region r . The market clearance condition for knowledge services is shown below:

$$R_{i,r} + SPL_{i,r} \geq Y_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^R} \quad (3.2)$$

with supply of knowledge on the left-hand side (LHS) and demand for knowledge on the right-hand side (RHS). Demand for knowledge services on the LHS is representative of $K_{i,r}$ in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, knowledge investment ($RD_{i,r}$) is produced using a mix of intermediate goods governed by the following unit profit function:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^R = p_{i,r}^R - \left[\sum_j \theta_{j,i,r}^R p_{i,r}^{Y^{1-\sigma^R}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^R}} \leq 0 \quad (3.3)$$

where $p_{j,i,r}^R$ and $\theta_{j,i,r}^R$ indicate the price of conventional knowledge and the benchmark cost of conventional input good j for region r as a share of the value of conventional knowledge investment output for good i , respectively.

Turning attention to Figure 3.2, effective carbon services ($CRB_{i,r}$) enter the non-R&D goods index which enters the output block. The unit profit function for the non-R&D goods index is shown below:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{i,r}^{NRD} &= p_{i,r}^{NRD} - \\ &\left[\theta_{VA,i,r}^{NRD} p_{i,r}^{VA} + \sum_{j \in FE} \theta_{j,i,r}^{NRD} (p_{i,r}^A + p_r^{CRB} a_{j,i,r}^{co2}) + \sum_{j \in NE} \theta_{j,i,r}^{NRD} p_{i,r}^A \right] \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3.4)$$

where $p_{i,r}^{VA}$, $p_{i,r}^A$, and p_r^{CRB} represent the value-added price index consisting of capital and labor, the Armington price index, and the price of effective carbon services, respectively. $\theta_{j,i,r}^{NRD}$ is the share of total non-R&D output attributable to each input j . $a_{i,g,r}^{co2}$ is the emissions coefficient associated with each fossil fuel energy good ($j \in FE$). NE represents non-fossil fuel energy goods. It is important to note that the fixed-proportions cost function is a simplification that leads to larger leakage responses and more costly abatement cost results. Future iterations of this work should employ a production structure more closely aligned with Boehringer *et al.* (2018) in order to capture substitutability amongst different uses of fossil fuels.

The unit profit function for effective carbon services illustrated in Figure 3.2 is shown below:

$$\Pi_r^{CRB} = p_r^{CRB} - \left[\theta_r^{CRB} p_r^{co2^{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} + (1 - \theta_r^{CRB}) p_r^{RC^{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} \leq 0 \quad (3.5)$$

where p_r^{co2} represents the price of the raw CO2 emissions factor. θ_r^{CRB} is the share of effective carbon services output attributable to the raw CO2 factor input. σ^{CRB} is the substitution elasticity associated with that profit function. The market clearance condition for effective carbon is shown below:

$$CRB_r \geq \sum_g Y_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^Y}{\partial (p_{i,r}^A + p_r^{CRB} a_{j,i,r}^{co2})} a_{j,i,r}^{co2} \quad (3.6)$$

where supply of effective carbon services must cover demand for effective carbon services in production of good $Y_{i,r}$.

The unit profit function associated with Figure 3.2 is shown below:

$$\Pi_r^{RC} = p_r^{RC} - \left[\sum_i \theta_{ir}^{RC} p_{ir}^{Y^{1-\sigma^{RC}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RC}}} \leq 0 \quad (3.7)$$

where θ_{ir}^{RC} is the share of carbon-saving R&D output attributable to input i . Market clearance for carbon-saving R&D is specified as follows:

$$RC_r + S PLC_r \geq CRB_r \frac{\partial \Pi_r^{CRB}}{\partial p_r^{RC}} \quad (3.8)$$

where supply of knowledge services consisting of new carbon-saving R&D (RC_r) and spillovers ($S PLC_r$) must cover demand for carbon-saving R&D in production of effective carbon-services.

Together, with some additional equations specified in appendix G, the above equations define the behavior of knowledge creation and the use of knowledge in output. The constraints containing logic for knowledge diffusion are discussed in section 3.3.2 and in appendix G.

In a dynamic model, it is natural to explicitly model investment and depreciation of the knowledge stocks. In a static setting, it is less clear what the most appropriate approach is regarding the supply of R&D. We have established the assumption that R&D is produced using intermediate goods. We further assume that the level of domestic investment in R&D may respond as aggregate demand rises and falls, meaning that the knowledge stock is not fixed across all sectors. The typical treatment of physical capital in CGE models is to assume a fixed endowment of physical capital available in the economy and a fixed level of investment dedicated to capital accumulation. An argument against treating the knowledge stock in a similar fashion is that it implies that each additional unit of energy-saving or carbon-saving R&D comes at the expense of one unit of R&D services elsewhere in the economy. Grubler *et al.* (2002) employs a model with fixed knowledge stock. Other models assume an exogenous fraction (often set equal to one half) of non-energy R&D that is crowded out by investment in energy-saving R&D (Popp, 2004). Still, other studies explicitly model the R&D creation process using a production function approach where supply is governed by the level of intermediate inputs to R&D creation and an assumption of zero profits in equilibrium (Goulder & Schneider, 1999). Due to the external nature of the problem climate policy attempts to address, it seems more reasonable to allow for the total stock of R&D to respond to the

previously neglected price signal the market is receiving via the newly priced CO₂. Therefore, we adopt a specification of knowledge creation closely resembling that used in Goulder & Schneider (1999).

Our description of technology spillovers involves two elements: *i.* specifying the relationship between the private and social returns to R&D; *ii.* describing the degree to which innovations in one country can be successfully employed in other regions in the world economy. For the first element, estimates indicate that social returns to R&D are somewhere between two and four times private returns to investors (Jones & Williams, 1998); we assume a value of three. For the second element, we use logic based on Bosetti *et al.* (2008). The study describes a set of absorption capacity weights based on a country's distance from the technological frontier. Absorption capacity for a given region is calculated as the value of its knowledge stock as a share of the world knowledge stock. Thus, the higher a region's state of technology is relative to the rest of the world, the easier it is for that region to take advantage of new ideas from abroad. We calculate these weights based on our regional R&D expenditure data. Furthermore, we assume that the technology spillover experienced by country A due to R&D investment in country B is measured by their absorption capacity weight multiplied by the value of country B's R&D investment above or below benchmark levels. Therefore, if country B invests more heavily in R&D in response to the counterfactual policy we model, country A will reap the benefits to the extent that it can absorb this new information. However, if R&D investment falls in country B, our specification would register this as a loss for country A. The total spillover effect experienced by country A is the sum of these effects across all countries weighted by country A's absorption parameter. This acquired knowledge is assumed to be specific to the sectoral investment pattern of the country in which the innovation originated.

3.3 Data and calibration

The 7x8 model is based on the GTAP9 database (Aguiar *et al.*, 2016). Seven regions are distinguished: Old EU member states (E15), New EU member states (E12), United States (USA), Rest of OECD (OEC), China (CHN), Former Soviet Union (RUS), Rest of the World (ROW). The

“North” in our model is defined as those countries capable of both producing new investment in R&D and imposing carbon restrictions on their citizens. The North includes model regions E15, USA, and OEC. The remainder regions belong to the “South” and are assumed to have the ability neither to innovate nor to restrict their CO₂ emissions. The 57 sectors of the GTAP9 database are aggregated into eight sectors, namely “energy-intensive industries” (EII), “non-energy-intensive industries” (NEI), and five different energy sectors: Coal (COA), Crude oil (CRU), Gas (GAS), Gas transmission and distribution (GDT), Petroleum and coal products (OIL), and Electricity (ELE). The source sets from GTAP9 as well as the regional and sectoral mappings for our application are depicted in Figure F.1 and Figure F.2.

3.3.1 Incorporating R&D data

CGE models that build on input-output tables as part of the national accounts typically have difficulties accounting for knowledge capital since national input-output tables extended with satellite accounts on knowledge flows are scarce. Knowledge capital accounting requires the identification and capitalization of knowledge flows and subsequent incorporation of these flows in the national accounting matrix (de Haan & van Rooijen-Horsten, 2004). The UN expert group on the measurement and treatment of non financial assets focuses on the recording of R&D and intangible capital.¹⁵

For the calibration of our global model to knowledge capital data, we gather data on R&D expenditures and distribute these expenditures to the sectors in our model. Raw R&D expenditures and expenditures as a share of GDP can be obtained for most countries of the world from the UN (UNESCO, 2011). We use corresponding information for GDP and population in order to compute absolute values for R&D expenditures where necessary (OECD, 2011b; WBO, 2011). Afterward, R&D expenditures are added up according to the regional aggregation as described above. We use 2011 data, as this is the base year of the GTAP9 database. We then use ANBERD data provided by the OECD to calculate sectoral R&D expenditures (OECD, 2011a). We take

¹⁵This group is better known as the Canberra II Group and is formed as part of the process of updating the 1993 System of National Accounts

weighted average OECD shares for each aggregate sector in non-OECD model regions to obtain sectoral R&D in non-OECD regions. The ANBERD data is provided using the ISIC revision 3 classification system (OECD, 2018). The GTAP9 database sectors are mapped to these ISIC industries in order to compute sectoral R&D (McDougall *et al.*, 2013; UN, 2002). In some cases, multiple GTAP9 sectors overlap with a single 2 digit ISIC category. In these cases, we use the value added shares of capital and labor for each GTAP sector in total value added for all GTAP sectors encompassed by the 2 digit ISIC category to disaggregate the 2 digit ISIC R&D data into the GTAP sectors.

Next we capitalize expenditures on R&D flows such that we can record services derived from the knowledge stocks in separate arrays in the national accounting matrix (Otto & Reilly, 2008). An additional (column) account then registers investments in the stock of knowledge capital, whereas an additional (row) account registers the derived services in the national accounting matrix. Originally, expenditures on R&D are reported as derived services. Regarding the capitalization itself, we use the perpetual inventory method, which is a commonly used method to measure capital stocks and is in line with the Frascati manual for surveys on R&D (OECD, 2002). A key parameter in the perpetual inventory method is the depreciation rate, for which additional information is required. A 20 percent depreciation rate for knowledge capital is assumed, which is in line with empirical evidence on patent renewals in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, The Netherlands and Switzerland studied in Pakes & Schankerman (1979). This is also consistent with data on life spans of applied R&D expenditures, which suggests an average service life of four to five years. We assume the model economies to be on a steady state, which implies a fixed relation between investments in and services derived from the sector specific stocks of knowledge capital. This relation then gives us the total column and row accounts for knowledge capital stemming from the knowledge flows.

There is also a question as to how to calibrate the benchmark technology for effective carbon. Effective carbon is the composite commodity produced using raw CO₂ emissions and carbon-saving knowledge inputs. Because carbon is an unregulated public bad, it is generally assumed

in assessments of this type that the benchmark price of this input is zero, an assumption that is consistent with the idea of firms using carbon up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement is zero. Following this logic, it should be the case that the price of effective carbon in our model is zero in the benchmark. However, an implication of this assumption is that the price of carbon-saving knowledge must also be zero. If the price is zero and R&D into new carbon-saving technologies makes use of costly inputs, then the non-negativity constraint in this sector is strongly binding. This is different than the current treatment used in the other R&D sectors where it is assumed that, in the benchmark, R&D firms operate at a level that is consistent with maintaining the benchmark level of knowledge stocks at zero profits.

To avoid double counting of the knowledge flows, we debit selected entries of the national accounting matrix. Debiting for expenditures on R&D is not straightforward, as the intermediate goods matrix of the national accounting matrix needs to be debited. In this case, we need to make an assumption as to which entries of the intermediate goods matrix to debit. One can either assume that R&D leads to disembodied knowledge or to knowledge embodied in tangible goods and services. If we assume that knowledge is embodied, the intermediate goods matrix can be debited proportionally to the intermediate input shares in total output of the sectors. The former assumption, however, necessitates the additional step of creating an interindustry technology matrix to debit the intermediate goods matrix proportionally to an R&D indicator such as the number of patents that a sector manufactures and uses. Since superiority of using R&D indicators is not immediately clear and their availability typically is patchy for non-industrial sectors such as services, we follow Terleckyj (1974) and use intermediate input shares for our purposes. We balance the national accounting matrix by adjusting the (row) account for labor.

The implication of our calibration procedure is that the proportions of the intermediate inputs used to produce R&D are equal to the shares of total R&D used in each of these intermediate goods sectors based on our benchmark R&D data. It is generally believed that the production of new technology is a high-skilled, labor-intensive process. Evidence also suggests that it is the productivity of labor that grows most when technological change occurs. Our calibration assumptions

match both of these facts to the extent that most of the R&D expenditures occur in labor-intensive industries, a fact that is born out in our data.

3.3.2 Spillover calibration

The specification of international R&D spillovers in our model follows the approach by Bosetti *et al.* (2008) for international energy R&D spillovers. It concentrates on disembodied knowledge flows by introducing a transmission channel across R&D sectors in the different model regions. Technology spillovers depend on (i) the global knowledge pool, (ii) the absorption process by each country, and (iii) the way knowledge is used in the domestic R&D sectors. Bosetti *et al.* (2008) propose for the pool of international knowledge, a formulation in which the world’s technological frontier is determined by the sum of the R&D stocks across high income countries. The knowledge pool for the different countries is given by the difference between this technological frontier and each country’s R&D stock. The absorption capacity is modeled as the ratio of the country’s R&D stock and the global technological frontier. This formulation takes into account that domestic R&D efforts are needed to absorb international knowledge (Keller, 2004). Calculated absorption rates by region and sector are reported in Table E.1. Spillover of international knowledge is obtained by multiplying the knowledge pool and the absorption capacity. The spillover use in the domestic R&D sector is different from Bosetti *et al.* (2008). In their formulation, spillovers enter the domestic R&D sector as an input in the innovation possibility frontier — next to the domestic investment in R&D and the past knowledge stock.

An algebraic representation of knowledge accounting and calibration is shown below. Details within the context of the greater model can be found in appendix G. First R&D expenditures data is obtained and assumed to equal benchmark demand for knowledge services ($\overline{dk}_{i,r}$), as shown below:

$$\overline{dk}_{i,r} = R\&D\ exp\ data_{i,r} \tag{3.9}$$

Then the absorption rate ($\gamma_{i,r}$) is calculated

$$\gamma_{i,r} = \frac{\overline{dk}_{i,r}}{\sum_{r \in nth} \overline{dk}_{i,r}} \quad (3.10)$$

and modified to allow for flows from region s to region r in $(\alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS})$, shown below:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS} &= \gamma_{i,r} \\ \alpha_{i,r \in nth, r \in nth}^{ABS} &= 1 \\ \alpha_{i,s \in sth, r \in nth}^{ABS} &= 0 \\ \alpha_{i,s \in sth, r \in sth}^{ABS} &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3.11)$$

Note that this zeros specific flows from a given southern region ($s \in sth$) to other regions. Once the above absorption parameter is specified, before moving to spillovers, it is necessary to use the perpetual inventory method to determine benchmark R&D investment ($\overline{rd}_{i,r}$), given demand for knowledge services, the depreciation rate (δ), the population growth rate (g), and the rate of interest (r), below:

$$\overline{rd}_{i,r} = \frac{(\delta + g)\overline{dk}_{i,r}}{\delta + r} \quad (3.12)$$

Once investment is obtained, ensure that knowledge markets clear by specifying a pre-existing knowledge stock ($\overline{ks}_{i,r}$) that cannot be adjusted:

$$\overline{ks}_{i,r} = \overline{dk}_{i,r} - \overline{rd}_{i,r} \quad (3.13)$$

Now that knowledge accumulation has been specified, it is necessary to incorporate the process of spillover creation. This is shown for conventional knowledge,

$$SPL_{i,r} = \overline{ks}_{i,r} + 3 \sum_{s \in nth} \alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS} (R_{i,s} - \overline{rd}_{i,s}) \quad (3.14)$$

and for carbon-saving knowledge,

$$SPLC_r = 0.01 * \overline{rdc}_r \overline{cb}_r + 3 \sum_{s \in nth} \left[\sum_i \left(\frac{\alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS}}{card(i)} \right) (0.01 * \overline{rdc}_s \overline{cb}_s RC_s) \right] \quad (3.15)$$

where $\overline{rdc}_r = 1$ and \overline{cb}_r is benchmark raw co2 emissions. The value of three indicates the degree to which social returns to R&D are greater than private returns to R&D. The values for SPL_r and $SPLC_r$ enter the income balance and market clearance conditions discussed in appendix G.

The R&D expenditures data combined with our assumption regarding R&D investment and knowledge spillovers provide enough information to characterize the benchmark value of the knowledge stocks in the world economy. However, a second key determinant of how important endogenous technological change and spillovers are in our setting is how responsive we assume R&D is to the changes in relative prices induced by emission restrictions or other forms of climate change policy. In the core model simulations, we calibrate the top-level elasticity of substitution parameter in the nested CES production functions for each sector such that the own-price elasticity of demand for knowledge services in the production of other goods is set to unity (Rutherford, 2002). The exception to this rule is the primary energy sectors (COA, CRU, GAS) where we use the calibration of this elasticity parameter to imply an elasticity of supply of unity in each of these sectors (Rutherford, 2002), which is assumed to be unity for our scenarios. We also explore the implications of changing demand and supply elasticity values to which we calibrate the model in the sensitivity analysis described in section 3.5.

3.4 Results

The results discussed in this section relate to the imposition of a 10% reduction in CO₂ emissions in each model region within the North. Each region is assumed to achieve this reduction by establishing a sectorally mobile but region-specific tradable emissions permit system. Specifically, we are interested in exploring the equilibrium effect of these policies on the global level of carbon emissions via leakage rates and the levels of R&D investment in different sectors of Northern economies. Furthermore, we are interested in how these outcomes are affected by the ability to invest in R&D with and without technology spillovers. Algebraic details are provided in appendix G.

After examining the results of the emissions restriction, we introduce a carbon tariff imposed by Northern regions on imports from Southern regions. We examine the impact of the carbon tariff in comparison to the results from the no-tariff scenario. Details to the specification of the tariff and how it fits into the larger model algebraically are provided in appendix G.

Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the two policies under the prevailing R&D and spillover assumptions.

3.4.1 Core scenario

Table 3.1: Core Scenario Emissions

	% Difference from Benchmark				gigatons CO2 BENCHMARK
	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	
CHN	1.928	0.954	0.954	0.923	7.000
USA	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	5.107
RUS	3.100	1.491	1.491	1.487	1.668
E15	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	3.010
E12	12.357	5.768	5.769	5.765	0.650
OECD	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	3.257
ROW	3.966	1.995	1.995	1.991	7.709
Total	-1.989	-3.009	-3.009	-3.018	28.400
South	3.363	1.661	1.661	1.647	17.026
North	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	-10.000	11.374
Leakage	0.503	0.249	0.249	0.246	0.000

Table 3.1 describes the results of the core scenario on regional and global CO₂ emissions. Regional emissions data is shown in the first seven rows. The same emissions data for Northern and Southern regions as well as global total is shown below this. The leakage rate is shown in the final row of Table 3.1. Benchmark emissions are provided in gigatons of CO₂ in the far right column. The emissions data in the first 4 columns are shown as percentage changes from the benchmark emissions level. The leakage rate is calculated as the change in carbon emissions generated by the South relative to the change in carbon emissions generated by the North. The columns in Table 3.1 describe emissions relative to the benchmark equilibrium for a counterfactual policy scenario and its interaction with different assumptions about the endogeneity of R&D investment and technology spillovers.

The No R&D results are generated by a model where knowledge production is fixed at benchmark levels and cannot respond to the CO₂ restriction. The results serve as a benchmark from

which we measure the impact of knowledge creation and spillovers. By construction, emissions levels in the North fall by 10% from benchmark levels. Emissions levels increase in the South due to the effects of carbon leakage. Both the decline in price for fossil fuels and the increase in the cost of producing energy-intensive goods drive demand for emissions from North to South. As a result, roughly 50% of the emission reductions in the North are offset by emissions increases in the South.¹⁶

The No SPL results model the effect of introducing endogenous R&D investment in the North without the effects of spillovers. The absorption parameters that describe the strength of spillover effects have been set to zero so that no region benefits from the innovations of others. Relative to the No R&D results, regions in the South reduce their emissions level in the counterfactual experiment. The North remains subject to the same 10% emissions restriction, so emissions in these regions remain unchanged. Global emissions decline further by roughly 1% relative to the No R&D results. The reduction in Southern emissions also implies a reduction in the leakage rate from roughly 0.503 to 0.249, a 50% reduction relative to the No R&D rate.

The NORTH SPL column shows the model results when technology spillovers are only allowed across Northern regions. The leakage rate is unchanged to slightly higher than the No SPL result. Allowing for spillovers from North to South in the FULL SPL column, yields a reduction in the leakage rate relative to the No SPL and the NORTH SPL results, however, this reduction is small relative to the comparison between the No R&D and No SPL results.

In order to understand the factors that influence the emissions results in Table 3.1, it is useful to examine changes in the pattern of R&D investments. Table 3.2 shows percentage changes in conventional R&D investment levels relative to the benchmark equilibrium as well as carbon-saving R&D investment levels in billions of 2011 US dollars, by sector and version of the model aggregated across all Northern regions. The model versions are listed in the rows of Table 3.2. The

¹⁶Estimates for leakage rates tend to fall in the range of 10-30% (Boehringer *et al.*, 2018). Our model deviates from this norm due to the lack of flexibility in substitution between different conventional input types, specifically fossil fuels. This production structure should be updated in future iterations of this work to reflect a more accurate representation of electricity production and fossil fuel use. However, the comparison across R&D assumptions to follow remains relevant, and is likely not to deviate in sign, only magnitude.

Table 3.2: Core Scenario Northern R&D

	% Δ from BMK								USD Bln
	coa	oil	gas	ele	gdt	eii	nei	cru	crb
No SPL	-4.979	-2.935	-8.221	24.485	-8.940	0.555	-0.574	-5.590	9.674
NORTH SPL	-0.886	-0.503	-1.834	4.212	-1.609	0.105	-0.098	-0.988	8.152
FULL SPL	-0.884	-0.503	-1.833	4.212	-1.608	0.104	-0.097	-0.987	8.151

sectors to which the R&D is directed are listed in the columns. The final column, *crb*, relates to carbon-saving R&D.

Comparing the benchmark levels of R&D to the equilibrium counterfactual levels that arise in the model without spillovers, we see that the general pattern of investment follows the carbon-intensity of the sectors where the investment takes place. Electricity generation (ELE) and energy-intensive goods production (EII) both see increases in R&D investment at the expense of investment in primary energy production and the production of non-energy goods. However, the largest increases in investment are directed at the development of new, carbon-saving technologies (CRB) which goes from inactivity in the benchmark equilibrium to producing services worth approximately 9.7 billion USD total across all Northern regions in the No SPL case. In fact, the net effect on total energy-saving R&D investment induced by the emissions cap is roughly -1.6 billion USD.¹⁷ This means that total energy-saving R&D across all conventional sectors decreases due to the emissions cap, whereas carbon-saving R&D activity increases.

There are, in principle, two reasons why the R&D responses could impact the carbon leakage effect as described in Table 3.1. First, new R&D investment in EII reduces the fossil fuel inputs requirement and counteracts the increase in costs in this sector due to the carbon restrictions. Second, new investment in the carbon-saving technology directly reduces the raw carbon content of production in all upstream sectors. With less raw carbon content per unit of fossil energy used, these sectors may continue to use fossil energy at levels closer to the benchmark. In practice, the results in Table 3.2 tell us that the second channel – carbon-saving technology change – is the

¹⁷Calculated as the sum of the raw difference between benchmark R&D investment and counterfactual R&D investment across conventional sectors and northern regions.

operative one in our simulations.

Comparing the R&D investment patterns between the No SPL and NORTH SPL model results in Table 3.2, we see a significant retreat in the amount of new investment in the carbon-intensive sectors (EII and ELE) and in the carbon-saving technology as a result of spillovers. When knowledge is suddenly made freely available via spillover effects, it is less important for any given sector within a region to invest in knowledge creation, as the benefits of the new knowledge can no longer be fully internalized by the region and industry in question. Knowledge is appropriated by other regions, and their production decisions reflect the new, freely available knowledge. As previously discussed, Table 3.1 shows a slight increase in the leakage rate in the NORTH SPL case. The cost reducing impact of Northern spillovers is slightly less than the cost increasing effect of reduced R&D, which leads to a slight reduction in northern carbon intensive output and fossil fuel demand. Lower fossil fuel demand in the North yields an increase in the leakage rate.

Allowing for spillovers from North to South in the FULL SPL case, we see a slight reduction in Northern R&D relative to the NORTH SPL result. Nonetheless, Table 3.1 shows that the carbon leakage rate falls slightly relative to the No SPL results. This is because the Northern R&D investment that remains is now accessible to firms in the South for cost reduction. The South does not have an R&D investment response. Rather, it adopts the Northern technologies for their reduced factor requirements, which results in lower emissions as a byproduct.

3.4.2 Introducing a carbon tariff

By construction, the fact that Southern regions have no interest in curbing CO₂ emissions implies that they have no direct interest in implementing the carbon-saving technology to curb emissions. There is no price on emissions in the South, therefore spillovers associated with Northern investment in carbon-saving technology provide no cost reduction to Southern firms in emissions intensive industries. The large investment in carbon-saving R&D and lack of a spillover effect from this primary channel of Northern cost reduction suggests that further reductions in leakage could be obtained if the South cared about carbon-saving technology.

One way for the North to incentivize Southern adoption of carbon-saving R&D is to implement a carbon tariff. We introduce carbon tariffs to the model and examine the impact on leakage rates and R&D investment in comparison to the results without a carbon tariff. The tariff rate imposed on imports from a given Southern region is set equal to the price of CO2 emissions implied by the 10% emissions reduction in each Northern region. The specification of the tariff rate also allows spillovers from Northern carbon-saving R&D to impact the CO2 content of goods exported from South to North. For simplicity, the benchmark CO2 content applied to the embodied tariff consists of direct emissions from fuel consumption, the default calculation for the GTAP9 database. No carbon tariffs exist on trade between Northern regions.

Table 3.3: Tariff vs No-Tariff Leakage rate

	TARIFF?	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	% Δ No SPL	% Δ FULL SPL
BASE1	no	0.503	0.249	0.249	0.246	-50.50	-1.20
CTAR1	yes	0.447	0.197	0.197	0.188	-55.93	-4.57

% Δ No SPL = % diff between No R&D and No SPL

% Δ FULL SPL = % diff between No SPL and FULL SPL

Table 3.3 shows leakage rates under a carbon tariff compared to the previously discussed no-tariff results. The table rows indicate whether or not a carbon tariff is present. The first 4 columns indicate the model versions and the R&D and technology spillover assumptions. The final two columns show the percentage reduction in the leakage rate in the No SPL relative to the No R&D version as well as from FULL SPL relative to the No SPL version, from left to right.

Generally, Table 3.3 shows that carbon tariffs decrease the leakage rate relative to the no-tariff case. The carbon tariff increases the cost of producing goods in the South that are destined for Northern regions. As a result, emissions intensive industries in the South curb output relative to the no-tariff version. When Northern R&D is allowed, the carbon tariff results in a larger percentage decrease in the leakage rate relative to no tariff (% Δ No SPL). Furthermore, spillovers from North to South cause an additional reduction in the leakage rate. Under a carbon tariff, the leakage rate decreases by a larger percentage relative to the no-tariff result when spillovers are present (% Δ FULL

SPL).

Table 3.4: Tariff Northern R&D

	% Δ from BMK								USD Bln
	coa	oil	gas	ele	gdt	eii	nei	cru	crb
No SPL	-5.024	-2.441	-4.261	25.424	-8.744	0.855	-0.642	-4.930	9.901
NORTH SPL	-0.894	-0.419	-1.089	4.378	-1.576	0.156	-0.109	-0.871	8.346
FULL SPL	-0.893	-0.420	-1.096	4.375	-1.575	0.154	-0.109	-0.872	8.342

Table 3.4 shows a comparison of R&D investment across various types of conventional R&D as well as the carbon-saving technology. The results are organized in the same fashion as Table 3.2 to facilitate a direct comparison between the carbon tariff and no-tariff R&D response.

Comparing Table 3.2 and Table 3.4, it is clear that the carbon tariff leads to larger amounts of R&D investment across virtually all industries under both the No SPL and FULL SPL results. As expected, spillovers result in a more muted R&D investment response to the policy, primarily due to spillovers amongst Northern regions. Additionally, under the carbon tariff, the percentage difference in carbon-saving R&D between the FULL SPL and No SPL shows a more negative response relative to the no-tariff scenario. Spillovers under the carbon tariff drive a larger percentage reduction in R&D levels for ELE and EII relative to the no tariff case. This is due in part to the fact that more knowledge can be appropriated via the carbon-saving technology now that the South is interested in reducing CO₂ embodied in exports to the North. However, due to the fact that the South simply appropriates new knowledge and does not exhibit a counteracting R&D investment response, the leakage rate decreases with spillovers to the South.

In summary, the carbon tariff increases conventional and carbon-saving R&D in the North. Spillovers drive a larger percentage reduction in carbon-saving R&D investment when tariffs are present. However, when spillovers are present, carbon-saving R&D investment increases relative to the no tariff case. This suggests that the benefits associated with reduced leakage outweigh the costs to private Northern firms associated with additional appropriability of carbon-saving knowledge present in the South under the tariff. Finally, by incentivizing Northern carbon-saving R&D and

spillovers of carbon-saving technology from North to South via a carbon tariff, the North can achieve greater improvements in leakage rates.

3.4.3 Welfare results

Table 3.5: No Tariff - Abatement Cost and Welfare

	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL
Abatement Cost % Δ from BMK				
CHN	-0.208	-0.115	-0.115	-0.128
USA	-0.098	-0.013	-0.014	-0.010
RUS	0.016	-0.043	-0.043	-0.049
E15	-0.345	-0.115	-0.114	-0.114
E12	-0.135	-0.119	-0.119	-0.122
OEC	-0.769	-0.348	-0.347	-0.347
ROW	-0.214	-0.143	-0.143	-0.146
South	-0.191	-0.129	-0.129	-0.134
North	-0.368	-0.141	-0.140	-0.139
Global Welfare % Δ from BMK				
No-Tariff	-0.236	-0.034	-0.034	-0.035

Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the abatement costs by each region and global welfare results for the core scenario and tariff case, respectively. Given our policy scenario setup, the different R&D assumptions and policy counterfactuals make it difficult to compare the global welfare impact strictly on a cost basis due to the emissions response from the South. Therefore, we calculate global welfare as avoided damages net of abatement costs. Abatement costs are calculated using changes in the consumption index from the benchmark — a measure of equivalent variation. A negative value for abatement cost indicates a net cost, whereas a positive value indicates a net benefit. Avoided damages are calculated as the difference from benchmark emissions resulting from the policy multiplied by the social cost of carbon, which is assumed to be 50 \$/ton of CO₂. For reference, a 1% deviation from the benchmark value of global consumption expenditures plus emissions at the social cost of carbon amounts to roughly 435 billion USD.

Table 3.6: Tariff - Abatement Cost and Welfare

	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL
	Abatement Cost % Δ from BMK			
CHN	-1.253	-0.669	-0.669	-0.668
USA	0.051	0.074	0.074	0.075
RUS	-0.624	-0.413	-0.413	-0.413
E15	0.114	0.163	0.165	0.161
E12	-1.437	-0.839	-0.839	-0.832
OEC	-0.378	-0.121	-0.119	-0.122
ROW	-1.040	-0.597	-0.597	-0.595
South	-1.078	-0.614	-0.614	-0.611
North	-0.047	0.050	0.051	0.050
	Global Welfare % Δ from BMK			
Tariff	-0.296	-0.055	-0.054	-0.053

The welfare result for the no-tariff scenario in Table 3.5 shows a decrease in welfare across all R&D and spillover assumptions.¹⁸ The reason for this is that abatement costs in the North and the South both decrease welfare by more than global emissions avoided increase welfare. However, welfare increases significantly in the presence of R&D. This can be seen by comparing the last row of the No R&D and No SPL columns of Table 3.5. The reason for this is twofold. First, abatement costs in the North and South decrease significantly in the presence of R&D, which has a positive welfare impact. Secondly, we see more damages avoided from smaller increases in Southern emissions in the presence of R&D, due primarily to carbon-saving technology.

In the no-tariff scenario shown in Table 3.5, welfare decreases further in the presence of spillovers from North to South. Spillovers increase abatement costs in the South and decrease them in the North. We know from the previous section that spillovers also decrease the leakage rate. This suggests that the increase in Southern abatement cost more than offsets the decrease in

¹⁸Again, the welfare results are sensitive to the fact that our production structure shows a simplified fixed-proportion use of energy goods. Allowing for flexibility in the use of fossil energy inputs will decrease abatement costs and yield positive welfare responses. Future iterations of this work should update to a more accurate production structure, such as that employed in Boehringer *et al.* (2018).

abatement costs in the North combined with the benefits from decreased leakage.

The welfare results for the case of the carbon tariff are presented in Table 3.6. Given our baseline model parameterization, global welfare is lower under a tariff relative to no-tariff under all R&D assumptions. However, the intuition behind the relationships between R&D assumptions is the same as in the no-tariff scenario, except in the presence of spillovers. When full spillovers are present, our baseline model assumptions yield a global welfare increase relative to the case without spillovers. This is due to the fact that the carbon-saving technology developed in the North can be used by the South to reduce emissions embodied in trade.

It is worth noting that the carbon tariff decreases global welfare compared to the no-tariff scenario.¹⁹ There are two main reasons for this. First, the fact that each Northern region implements an emissions cap without cross-border trade in permits means that each Northern region is subject to a different permit price. The prevailing permit price for a given region determines the carbon tariff rate. Exports from a Southern region initially intended for OEC, may be rerouted to the USA, where it is easier to reach a 10% reduction in CO₂ emissions. Secondly, and more importantly, emissions intensive goods can also be diverted from Northern countries and used domestically or traded amongst regions in the South. The more easily the ability to re-route goods produced for export towards domestic use, the larger the welfare losses under a carbon tariff relative to the no-tariff case.²⁰ Carbon-saving R&D lessens this distortion by allowing goods to flow where they were originally intended, leading to welfare improvements.

3.5 Sensitivity analysis

All models of endogenous technical change face formidable data constraints and ours is no exception. We test the sensitivity of our main model results regarding emissions and R&D investment responses to key parameter values within our model. We first use a Monte-Carlo simulation to identify parameters to which the model output is most sensitive. Once the parameters are selected, a set of 6 scenarios for each of the no-tariff and tariff model versions produce results for

¹⁹This result is sensitive to the production structure and fixed-proportions assumption. This should be updated in future iterations of this work.

²⁰See Boehringer *et al.* (2014a) for a more detailed discussion.

examination. The key parameters identified relate to R&D demand and supply, the Armington trade elasticities, and the magnitude of Southern technology absorption rates.

Table 3.7: Scenario Definition

Scenario	Tariff?	pelasc	Armington Shift	pelasrd	Absorption Shift
BASE1	no	1	1	1	1
BASE2	no	0.5	1	1	1
BASE3	no	1	0.5	1	1
BASE4	no	1	1	2	1
BASE5	no	1	1	1	50
BASE6	no	1.5	1	1	1
CTAR1	yes	1	1	1	1
CTAR2	yes	0.5	1	1	1
CTAR3	yes	1	0.5	1	1
CTAR4	yes	1	1	2	1
CTAR5	yes	1	1	1	50
CTAR6	yes	1.5	1	1	1

The scenarios and associated parameterizations are provided in Table 3.7. The first two columns in Table 3.7 provide the unique scenario name and whether or not a carbon tariff is associated with that scenario. For simplicity, a scenario name that begins with “BASE” corresponds to a no-tariff case, whereas a scenario that begins with “CTAR” corresponds to a case with a carbon tariff in the North on imports from the South. Each scenario name also includes a number, which indicates the specific parameter set assigned to the scenario. Scenario BASE1 and CTAR1 correspond to the core scenarios we discussed in section 3.4. The PELASC column indicates the elasticity of demand for carbon-saving R&D in the production of effective carbon. The ARMINGTON SHIFT column decreases the Armington elasticities for the aggregated EII and NEI sectors by half of the default weighted average value produced by the GTAP 9 aggregation routine. PELASRD relates to the demand elasticity for conventional R&D. ABSORPTION SHIFT increases the Southern absorption parameters by 50 times their original value.

Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show the results from scenario runs. Table 3.8 shows how leakage rates change as a result of the various scenarios with and without R&D and spillovers. Table 3.9

Table 3.8: Leakage Rate by Sensitivity Scenario

Scenario	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	%ΔNo SPL	%ΔFULL SPL
BASE1	0.503	0.249	0.249	0.246	-50.50	-1.20
BASE2	0.504	0.452	0.452	0.448	-10.32	-0.88
BASE3	0.404	0.185	0.185	0.183	-54.21	-1.08
BASE4	0.505	0.247	0.247	0.242	-51.09	-2.02
BASE5	0.503	0.249	0.249	0.205	-50.50	-17.67
BASE6	0.503	0.040	0.040	0.039	-92.05	-2.50
CTAR1	0.447	0.197	0.197	0.188	-55.93	-4.57
CTAR2	0.447	0.394	0.394	0.390	-11.86	-1.02
CTAR3	0.354	0.139	0.139	0.130	-60.73	-6.47
CTAR4	0.448	0.196	0.196	0.183	-56.25	-6.63
CTAR5	0.447	0.197	0.197	0.130	-55.93	-34.01
CTAR6	0.447	0.000	0.000	-0.025	-100.00	-Inf

%ΔNo SPL = % diff between No R&D and No SPL

%ΔFULL SPL = % diff between No SPL and FULL SPL

Table 3.9: R&D by Sensitivity Scenario

Scenario	ele			eii			nei			crb		
	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL
BASE1	24.48	4.21	4.21	0.56	0.10	0.10	-0.57	-0.10	-0.10	9.674	8.152	8.151
BASE2	42.72	7.36	7.35	1.00	0.19	0.19	-1.03	-0.17	-0.17	1.155	0.969	0.969
BASE3	27.17	4.69	4.69	1.96	0.34	0.34	-0.81	-0.14	-0.14	10.577	8.924	8.922
BASE4	64.16	11.04	11.03	4.09	0.71	0.70	-1.71	-0.29	-0.29	9.601	8.091	8.088
BASE5	24.48	4.21	4.18	0.56	0.10	0.07	-0.57	-0.10	-0.09	9.674	8.152	8.118
BASE6	4.12	0.70	0.70	0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	7.100	5.944	5.944
CTAR1	25.42	4.38	4.38	0.86	0.16	0.15	-0.64	-0.11	-0.11	9.901	8.346	8.342
CTAR2	44.58	7.68	7.68	1.52	0.28	0.28	-1.15	-0.19	-0.19	1.172	0.984	0.984
CTAR3	27.89	4.81	4.81	2.07	0.35	0.35	-0.85	-0.14	-0.14	10.737	9.060	9.056
CTAR4	66.55	11.46	11.45	4.52	0.78	0.77	-1.82	-0.31	-0.31	9.824	8.281	8.275
CTAR5	25.42	4.38	4.33	0.86	0.16	0.11	-0.64	-0.11	-0.10	9.901	8.346	8.288
CTAR6	4.19	0.71	0.71	0.09	0.01	0.01	-0.11	-0.02	-0.02	7.134	5.973	5.972

is designed to capture the R&D investment response for select sectors of importance. The results in Table 3.9 for the *CRB* sector are given in USD billions whereas the other sectors are shown in percentage change from the benchmark value.

The model outcomes are most sensitive to the parameters governing the use of carbon-saving technology in the production of effective carbon services. Comparing BASE2 and CTAR2 to their core scenario counterparts in BASE1 and CTAR1, we can see the impact of more inelastic demand for carbon-saving R&D. The results show that the leakage rate remains relatively high in the No SPL case when *PELASC* is set to 0.5. Additionally, Table 3.9 shows that investment in the carbon-saving technology decreases dramatically. Together, these two aspects highlight how the importance of the carbon-saving technology in reducing leakage changes as a result of the ease with which the carbon-saving technology can reduce CO₂. The more elastic demand for the carbon-saving technology is, the easier it is to reduce CO₂ emissions. At higher elasticities under a carbon tariff it is possible to reach a negative leakage rate, shown by scenario CTAR6.

Due to the sensitivity of the model output to parameters dictating the behavior of carbon-saving R&D, it raises the question of how to achieve a justifiable calibration of this technology. The model produces a measure of marginal abatement cost which is a key decision factor in determining the feasibility of CCS technologies in the power sector and in general, such as direct air capture technologies. While current estimates of the marginal abatement cost for power sector CCS are near 45 USD/ton as of 2019 (Global CCS Institute, 2020), direct air capture technologies are more costly with marginal costs of capture near 200 USD/ton (Fasihi *et al.*, 2019). This is expected to decrease significantly over the coming decades as tangible regulation of CO₂ emissions becomes more widespread. It is necessary to decide on a target breakeven cost of abatement for CCS, potentially using other analyses that project the deployment of CCS under different climate policy stringencies. However, once a target abatement cost for the basket of end-of-pipe technologies is decided upon, the substitution elasticity defining the production of effective carbon services can be calibrated to represent a post-policy cost of capture and storage.

Other parameters influence the results as well. Of these, the most interesting is the sensitivity to the southern absorption parameters. Small increases or decreases in the Southern absorption parameters do not matter much. However, in Table 3.9, the $\% \Delta_{\text{FULL SPL}}$ column indicates that when large increases in Southern absorption capacity are modeled in BASE5/CTAR5, spillovers lead to large reductions in the leakage rate. In contrast to the result seen when North-only spillovers are modeled, this strong reduced leakage response to a Southern increase in absorption capacity arises out of the fact that the South has no ability to curtail R&D investment in response to the increased spillover benefits. Modeling Southern R&D would also not likely change this result, as benchmark R&D expenditures and absorption rates are low in the South relative to the North.

Table 3.10: Global Welfare Percentage Change from Benchmark

Scenario	No R&D	No SPL	NORTH SPL	FULL SPL
BASE1	-0.236	-0.034	-0.034	-0.035
BASE2	-0.236	-0.189	-0.194	-0.195
BASE3	-0.257	-0.033	-0.031	-0.030
BASE4	-0.236	-0.033	-0.031	-0.030
BASE5	-0.236	-0.034	-0.034	-0.067
BASE6	-0.236	0.102	0.104	0.103
CTAR1	-0.296	-0.055	-0.054	-0.053
CTAR2	-0.297	-0.241	-0.246	-0.246
CTAR3	-0.325	-0.054	-0.051	-0.050
CTAR4	-0.296	-0.053	-0.051	-0.048
CTAR5	-0.296	-0.055	-0.054	-0.080
CTAR6	-0.296	0.104	0.106	0.109

Table 3.10 shows the global welfare results for the sensitivity cases. The most noteworthy comparison relates to the importance that carbon-saving R&D plays in influencing welfare. The differences can be seen by comparing scenarios BASE1/CTAR1, BASE2/CTAR2, and BASE6/CTAR6. These show that the easier (more difficult) it is for carbon-saving R&D to reduce the raw CO₂ required to produce goods, the greater (lower) the welfare benefits arising from R&D. When demand for carbon-saving R&D in production of effective carbon is relatively inelastic (BASE2/CTAR2) compared to the baseline scenarios, the welfare increase due to R&D is muted. However, when

demand is more elastic (BASE6/CTAR6), greater welfare gains can be realized by simply allowing for R&D. Additionally, the carbon tariff results in greater welfare relative to the no-tariff case when demand is relatively elastic. Finally, note the result in column FULL SPL for CTAR2. This shows that when demand for carbon-saving R&D is relatively inelastic, spillovers decrease, rather than increase welfare.

3.6 Conclusion

In this paper, we explore the ability of regional climate policy to induce innovation in energy-saving and end-of-pipe carbon-saving technologies at home and abroad. We employ a global numerical model of North-South trade and different assumptions about technology creation and diffusion to show how these assumptions influence investment in R&D, emissions leakage, output, as well as abatement cost and welfare. We discuss how these factors interact with a Northern emissions cap as well as a carbon tariff levied on Northern imports from Southern regions.

Under conventional emissions policy counterfactual scenarios, we find that innovation tends toward R&D in carbon-saving technology, and that this channel of innovation provides significant benefits in terms of leakage reduction and abatement cost savings. This is due to the fact that the carbon-saving technology allows the North to meet CO₂ restrictions without abating as much fossil fuel use. This leaves demand for fossil fuels closer to pre-policy levels in the North, and global prices similarly high. As a result, the South does not increase emissions by as much.

As spillovers associated with the carbon-saving technology are directly neglected by the South under a cap, we couple this with a carbon tariff. This is done to incentivize diffusion of this carbon-saving technology from North to South. We find that the carbon tariff exhibits typical characteristics such as a redistribution of abatement cost from North to South and a minimal-to-slight increase in abatement costs relative to a case without a tariff. Also, the carbon tariff provides further leakage reduction. R&D and spillovers from North to South drive further leakage reductions relative to a case without a tariff. Similarly to the no-tariff case, R&D drives significant cost reduction. However, assumptions about the ease with which carbon-saving R&D translates to lower

levels of raw CO₂ content significantly influences the degree to which technology diffusion and the carbon-saving technology impact welfare. In particular, the easier it is to reduce emissions embodied in output with carbon-saving R&D, the more attractive a carbon tariff looks in comparison to a Northern cap without a tariff.

The analysis is static in that we assume an initial steady-state and analyze this in comparison to a steady-state that results from a reduction in Northern emissions. Therefore, we neglect some of the dynamic aspects of the learning process — such as learning-by-doing — and abstract from some of the finer details related to renewable energy and clean backstop technologies. However, given the objective of this work, we have identified several unique benefits to end-of-pipe carbon-saving technology within the context of international commodity markets.

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APPENDIX A - TPS MODEL: NUMERICAL MODEL EQUATIONS

The discount factor for the purposes of the numerical model is given by:

$$df_t = \left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t \quad (\text{A.1})$$

The equations of the numerical model for the TPS with discounting are shown below:

$$\sum_f X_{ft} \geq Q_t \quad \perp PD_t \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$K_{ft} \geq X_{ft} \quad \perp PK_{f,t} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$I_{ft} + K_{f,t-1}(1-\delta) \geq K_{ft} \quad \perp PI_{f,t} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$\sigma_t \geq \frac{\sum_f \omega_f X_{ft}}{\sum_f X_{ft}} \quad \perp PTPS_t \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$df_t * \overline{pq}_t * \left(\frac{Q_t}{d_t}\right)^{1/\epsilon} - PD_t \geq 0 \quad \perp Q_t \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$df_t MC_{ft}^X(X_{ft}) + PK_{ft} + PTPS_t(\omega_f - \sigma_t)hiy - PD_t \geq 0 \quad \perp X_{ft}^{TPS} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$-PK_{ft} - PI_{f,t+1}(1-\delta) + PI_{ft} \geq 0 \quad \perp K_{ft} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$df_t MC_{ft}^I(I_{ft}) - PI_{ft} \geq 0 \quad \perp I_{ft} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Where marginal investment costs are linear such that:

$$MC_{ft}^I = [\alpha + \beta_f * I_{f,t}] \quad (\text{A.10})$$

And benchmark output prices a related by:

$$\overline{pq}_t = \frac{\overline{pd}_t}{df_t} \quad (\text{A.11})$$

The equations for the model with the CAP are the same except I replace equations A.5 and A.7 with:

$$\Omega_t \geq \sum_f \omega_f X_{ft} \quad \perp PCAP_t \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.12})$$

$$df_t MC_{ft}^X(X_{ft}) + PK_{ft} + PCAP_t \omega_f hiy - PD_t \geq 0 \quad \perp X_{ft}^{CAP} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A.13})$$

APPENDIX B - TPS MODEL: WELFARE CALCULATIONS

Changes in periodic discounted consumer surplus are given by:

$$\Delta CS_t = -\frac{\bar{d}_t PD_t^{-\epsilon} (\bar{p} d_t PD_t^\epsilon - \bar{p} d_t^\epsilon PD_t)}{(\epsilon - 1)} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

Changes in periodic discounted producer surplus are given by:

$$PS_t = PD_t \sum_f X_{ft} - df_t \sum_f MC_{ft}^X X_{ft} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

$$\Delta PS_t^{policy} = PS_t^{policy} - PS_t^{BAU} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

where marginal costs are constant. Revenues from the CAP are refunded to producers, leaving periodic changes in total policy cost equal to 0 when summed across fuel types. Policy costs are also 0 when summed across fuel types for the TPS.

Investment costs are obtained by integrating the marginal investment cost function from 0 to I_{ft} . The function is given below:

$$CInv_t = df_t \sum_f [\alpha_f I_{ft} + \frac{1}{2} \beta_f I_{ft}^2] \quad (\text{B.4})$$

Change is analogous to that of ΔPS in that:

$$\Delta CInv_t^{policy} = CInv_t^{policy} - CInv_t^{BAU} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

Change in periodic discounted avoided damages is given by:

$$Dam_t = 20 * mtCO2_t * df_t \quad (\text{B.6})$$

$$\Delta Dam_t = Dam_t^{BAU} - Dam_t^{policy} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

Each of the equations listed thus far are indexed by time, hence, they are periodic discounted flows of the respective changes from the benchmark. In order to calculate the total present value of each figure, I sum from the present to the steady state, and then take the value for the final period and discount it perpetually as follows:

$$\Delta CS = \sum_{t=0}^T \Delta CS_t + \frac{\Delta CS_T}{r} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

where T is a period within the steady-state. This same formula applies for any of the surplus components ΔPS , $\Delta CInv$, ΔAC , ΔDam , or ΔSS .

APPENDIX C - COBALT MODEL: SECTORAL AND FIRST-USE TO FINAL-USE MAPPING

COB	Pure Refined Cobalt - Contained Cobalt
CMM	Chemicals, Metals, Minerals, Mining Production Index
OMN	Minerals nec (12, 13, 14)
CRP	Chemical, Rubber, Plastic products (241, 242, 25)
I_S	Ferrous metals (271, 2731)
NFM	Metals nec (272, 2732)
OMC	Other Manufacturing (w/ COB)
FMP	Fabricated Metal Products (28)
OME	Machinery and equipment nec (29, 31, 33)
OTN	Transport Equipment nec (35)
ELE	Electronic Equipment (30, 32)
NMM	Mineral Products nec (26)
OMI	Other manufacturing (non-cobalt) composite index
AOG	All other goods composite index
MVH	Motor Vehicles and Parts (34)
OMVH	Other motor vehicles and parts
LDV	Light duty passenger and commercial vehicles
ICE	Conventional / Internal Combustion
BEV	Battery Electric Vehicle
PHEV	Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle

*MVH is the traded good

*MVH is used as an intermediate input in production of other goods

Figure C.1: Model to GTAP to ISIC Rev. 3.1 Concordance

First-use		Final-use in Mfg. (ISIC Rev. 4)
batt	Batteries	2818 Power-driven hand tools 3091 Motorcycles
supa	Superalloys	2811 Engines/turbines,excl.aircraft,vehicle engines 3030 Air and spacecraft and related machinery 3250 Medical and dental instruments and supplies
hard	Hard Metal Objects	2593 Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware
mago	Magnets / Other	26 Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products 2710 Electric motors,generators,transformers,etc.
cata	Catalysts	2220 Plastics products GTAP OIL and GAS Sectors
pigm	Pigments	2022 Paints,varnishes;printing ink and mastics 2029 Other chemical products n.e.c. 2310 Glass and glass products 2393 Other porcelain and ceramic products
soap	Soap/Detergent	2023 Soap,cleaing and cosmetic preparations

Figure C.2: Mapping – first-use to final-use in manufacturing

APPENDIX D - COBALT MODEL: ALGEBRAIC FORMULATION

D.1 Definitions

Sets and indices are listed in Table D.1. Activity levels are listed in Table D.2. Prices are listed in Table D.3. Income is listed in Table D.4. Cost shares and elasticities are listed in Table D.5 and Table D.6, respectively. Endowments and other parameters are listed in Table D.7.

Table D.1: Indices and sets

g	Index for sectors and goods. Includes private consumption good (C), govt (G), and investment (I)
i (<i>alias j</i>)	Subset of g representing goods not including C, G, I.
f	Index for factors. Capital and Labor.
r (<i>alias s</i>)	Index for Region

Table D.2: Variables - Activity Levels

$Y_{g,r}$	Output/production in sector g region r
$A_{i,r}$	Armington composite in sector i region r
$M_{i,r}$	Import composite in sector i region r
$X_{i,r}$	Exports of i from r
$QX_{i,r}$	Endogenous export tax implied by quota constraint

Table D.3: Variables - Price Levels

$p_{f,r}^F$	Price of factor f in region r
$p_{g,r}^{VA}$	Price index of VA used to produce g in region r
$p_{g,r}^{IV}$	Price index of Intermediate and value-added inputs used to produce g in region r
$p_{i,r}^A$	Price index of Armington good i in region r
$p_{i,r}^M$	Price index on imported goods
$p_{i,r}^X$	price of good i produced for export from southern region r to North
p_i^W	World price of good $i = COB$
$p_{g,r}^Y$	Price of output goods Y
$p_{g,r}^{RCO}$	Price of fixed natural resource factor for $g = COB$

Table D.4: Variables - Income Levels

ZRA_r	Household income for representative agent in region r
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Table D.5: Cost shares

General Model	
$\theta_{f,g,r}^{VA}$	share of value-added attributable to factor f
$\theta_{i,g,r}^{INT}$	share of total intermediate input used in g attributable to input i
$\theta_{g,r}^{IV}$	share INT,VA attributable to VA composite
$\theta_{g,r}^{COB}$	share of output attributable to COB use
$\theta_{i,r}^A$	share of armington output attributable to domestic variety input i
$\theta_{i,r,s}^M$	share of imports of good i from region r to region s
$\theta_{i,g,r}^{MVH}$	share of $g = MVH$ output attributable to $i = OMVH, LDV$
$\theta_{i,g,r}^{LDV}$	share of $g = LDV$ output attributable to $i = ICE, BEV, PHEV$
$\theta_{g,r}^{RCO}$	share of $g = COB$ output attributable to fixed resource factor RCO

Table D.6: Elasticities

σ^{IV}	Substitution between intermediate inputs i and VA composite in production of IV composite
σ^{VA}	Substitution between factor inputs capital and labor in the VA composite
σ^{LDV}	Substitution between ICE, BEV, and PHEV in LDV output block
σ^{MVH}	Substitution between OMVH and LDV in MVH output block
σ^{RCO}	Substitution between RCO and VA in COB output block
σ_g^{COB}	Substitution between COB and IV in output block for non-cobalt
σ^M	Substitution between imports from different regions
σ^A	Substitution between the import aggregate (M) and the domestic input (Y)

Table D.7: Endowments and other parameters

$\bar{F}_{f,r}$	Factor endowment for capital or labor input
$\bar{RCO}_{g,r}$	Fixed natural resource factor endowment
\bar{G}_r	Fixed public good demand
\bar{I}_r	Fixed investment demand
\bar{B}_r	Balance of payment
$\bar{q}r_{i,r}$	Quota levied on exports of good i from region r

D.2 Zero Profit Conditions

D.2.1 Production of goods

The unit profit function for the value-added index is shown below:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^{VA} = p_{g,r}^{VA} - \left[\sum_f \theta_{f,g,r}^{VA} p_{f,r}^F 1^{-\sigma^{VA}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{VA}}} \leq 0 \quad (D.1)$$

Unit profit for index of intermediate inputs and value added:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^{IV} = p_{g,r}^{IV} - \left[\theta_{g,r}^{IV} p_{g,r}^{VA 1-\sigma^{IV}} + \sum_i (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{IV}) \theta_{i,g,r}^{INT} p_{i,r}^{A 1-\sigma^{IV}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{IV}}} \leq 0 \quad (D.2)$$

Unit profit for all goods except MVH, LDV, and COB:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\theta_{g,r}^{COB} p_{COB,r}^{Y 1-\sigma^{COB}} + (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{COB}) p_{g,r}^{IV 1-\sigma^{COB}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{COB}}} \leq 0 \quad (D.3)$$

Unit profit for $g = MVH$:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\sum_i \theta_{i,g,r}^{MVH} p_{i,r}^{Y 1-\sigma^{MVH}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{MVH}}} \leq 0 \quad (D.4)$$

Unit profit for $g = LDV$:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\sum_i \theta_{i,g,r}^{LDV} p_{i,r}^{Y 1-\sigma^{LDV}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{LDV}}} \leq 0 \quad (D.5)$$

Unit profit for $g = COB$ production:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\theta_{g,r}^{RCO} p_{g,r}^{RCO 1-\sigma^{RCO}} + (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{RCO}) p_{g,r}^{VA 1-\sigma^{RCO}} \right] \leq 0 \quad (D.6)$$

D.2.2 Armington Aggregate

Unit profit function for armington index:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^A = p_{i,r}^A - \left[(1 - \theta_{i,r}^A) p_{i,r}^{M 1-\sigma^A} + \theta_{i,r}^A p_{i,r}^{Y 1-\sigma^A} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^A}} \leq 0 \quad (D.7)$$

D.2.3 Trade

Unit profit function for imports of armington goods:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^M = p_{i,r}^M - \left[\sum_s \theta_{i,s,r}^M p_{i,s}^{Y 1-\sigma^M} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^M}} \leq 0 \quad (D.8)$$

Unit profit function for COB imports:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^M = p_{i,r}^Y - \sum_s \theta_{i,s,r}^M p_i^W \leq 0 \quad (\text{D.9})$$

Unit profit function for COB exports:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^X = \sum_s \theta_{i,r,s}^M p_i^W - p_{i,r}^Y (1 + QX_{i,r}) \leq 0 \quad (\text{D.10})$$

D.3 Market Clearance Conditions

D.3.1 Factor Market Clearance

Market clearance for factors of production (capital and labor):

$$\bar{F}_{f,r} \geq \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{f,r}^F} \quad (\text{D.11})$$

Market clearance for the fixed natural resource factor ($g \in COB$):

$$\overline{RCO}_{g,r} \geq Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{g,r}^{RCO}} \quad (\text{D.12})$$

D.3.2 Goods Market Clearance

Output enters Armington supply and import supply:

$$Y_{i,r} \geq \sum_j A_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^A}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + \sum_s M_{i,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,s}^M}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad (\text{D.13})$$

Armington supply enters output supply:

$$A_{i,r} \geq \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^A} \quad (\text{D.14})$$

Import supply enters Armington supply:

$$M_{i,r} \geq A_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^A}{\partial p_{i,r}^M} \quad (\text{D.15})$$

Cobalt output enters the domestic supply and export supply associated with other goods:

$$Y_{i,r} \geq \sum_j Y_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + X_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^X}{\partial (p_{i,r}^Y (1 + QX_{i,r}))} \quad (\text{D.16})$$

Cobalt Export Supply enters world market:

$$X_{i,r} \geq \sum_s M_{i,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,s}^M}{\partial p_i^W} \quad (\text{D.17})$$

Cobalt import supply enters production of output goods:

$$M_{i,r} \geq \sum_j Y_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad (\text{D.18})$$

LDV and OMVH Supply equals demand for LDV and OMVH in MVH:

$$Y_{i,r} \geq \sum_j Y_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad (\text{D.19})$$

BEV, ICE, and PHEV supply equals demand for those goods in LDV:

$$Y_{i,r} \geq \sum_j Y_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad (\text{D.20})$$

Public Consumption covers fixed govt demand:

$$Y_{G,r} \geq \bar{G}_r \quad (\text{D.21})$$

Production of investment covers fixed investment demand:

$$Y_{I,r} \geq \bar{I}_r \quad (\text{D.22})$$

Production of private consumption index covers private consumption demand:

$$Y_{C,r} \geq \frac{ZRA_r}{p_{C,r}^Y} \quad (\text{D.23})$$

D.4 Income Balance Conditions

Income balance condition for representative agent:

$$\begin{aligned} ZRA_r = & p_{f,r}^F \bar{F}_r + p_{i,r}^{RCO} \overline{RCO}_{i,r} \\ & + \sum_i \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^X}{\partial (p_{i,r}^Y (1 + QX_{i,r}))} X_{i,r} p_{i,r}^Y QX_{i,r} \\ & - p_{L,r}^Y \bar{Y}_{L,r} - p_{G,r}^Y \bar{Y}_{G,r} + \bar{B}_{r,mum} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D.24})$$

D.5 Quota

The quota is specified as follows:

$$\bar{q}r_{i,r} \geq X_{i,r} \quad \perp \quad QX_{i,r} \quad (\text{D.25})$$

where $\bar{q}r_{i,r}$ is the COB export quota. $QX_{i,r}$ is the endogenous tariff rate extracted from the marginal of the constraint. This enters the COB export block as an endogenous tariff.

APPENDIX E - SPILLOVER MODEL: CALIBRATION DATA

Table E.1: Calculated absorption capacity weights

	coa	oil	gas	ele	gdt	eii	nei	cru
CHN	2.507	0.576	0.000	0.424	0.000	0.383	0.234	0.524
USA	0.488	0.479	0.199	0.103	0.292	0.492	0.410	0.484
RUS	0.014	0.039	0.053	0.006	0.432	0.032	0.029	0.068
E15	0.071	0.195	0.078	0.454	0.499	0.234	0.295	0.058
E12	0.012	0.088	0.000	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.001
OEC	0.441	0.326	0.724	0.443	0.210	0.273	0.295	0.458
ROW	0.054	0.177	0.129	0.131	0.524	0.128	0.161	0.238

APPENDIX F - SPILLOVER MODEL: GTAP9 TO MODEL MAPPINGS

CHN	China	CHN
USA	United States	USA
E15	Old EU Member States	AUT, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, GBR, GRC, IRL, ITA, LUX, NLD, PRT, ESP, SWE
E12	New EU Member States	BGR, CYP, CZE, HUN, MLT, POL, ROM, SVK, SVN, EST, LVA, LTU
RUS	Russia	RUS, XSU
OEC	Other OECD	AUS, NZL, JPN, KOR, CAN, MEX, CHE, NOR, XEF, TUR
ROW	Rest of World	XOC, HKG, MNG, TWN, XEA, BRN, KHM, IDN, LAO, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, VNM, XSE, BGD, IND, NPL, PAK, LKA, XSA, XNA, ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, ECU, PRY, PER, URY, VEN, XSM, CRI, GTM, HND, NIC, PAN, SLV, XCA, DOM, JAM, PRI, TTO, XCB, ALB, BLR, HRV, UKR, XEE, XER, KAZ, KGZ, ARM, AZE, GEO, BHR, IRN, ISR, JOR, KWT, OMN, QAT, SAU, ARE, XWS, EGY, MAR, TUN, XNR, BEN, BFA, CMR, CIV, GHA, GIN, NGA, SEN, TGO, XWF, XCF, XAC, ETH, KEN, MDG, MWI, MUS, MOZ, RWA, TZA, UGA, ZMB, ZWE, XEC, BWA, NAM, ZAF, XSC, XTW

Figure F.1: Mapping from GTAP9 Regions to Model Regions

COA	Coal	COA
CRU	Crude Oil	OIL
GAS	Natural Gas	GAS
GDT	Gas trans. and dist.	GDT
OIL	Refined Oil	P_C
ELE	Electricity	ELY
EII	Energy-Intensive Goods	PPP, CRP, NMM, I.S, NFM, FMP, OMF, OTP, WTP, ATP
NEI	Non-Energy-Intensive Goods	PDR, WHT, GRO, V_F, OSD, C_B, PFB, OCR, CTL, OAP, RMK, WOL, FRS, FSH, OMN, CMT, OMT, VOL, MIL, PCR, SGR, OFD, B_T, TEX, WAP, LEA, LUM, MVH, OTN, ELE, OME, WTR, CNS, TRD, CMN, OFI, ISR, OBS, ROS, OSG, DWE

Figure F.2: Mapping from GTAP9 Sectors to Model Sectors

APPENDIX G - SPILLOVER MODEL: ALGEBRAIC FORMULATION

G.1 Definitions

Sets and indices are listed in Table G.1. Activity levels are listed in Table G.2. Prices are listed in Table G.3. Income is listed in Table G.4. Cost shares and elasticities are listed in Table G.5 and Table G.6, respectively. Endowments and other parameters are listed in Table G.7.

Table G.1: Indices and sets

g	Index for sectors and goods. Includes private consumption good (C), govt (G), and investment (I)
i (<i>alias</i> j)	Subset of g representing goods not including C, G, I.
f	Index for factors. Capital and Labor.
r (<i>alias</i> s)	Index for Region
NE	Set of non-energy goods. Can also be used to represent aggregate index of these goods
FE	Set of final-energy goods, fuels with co2 emissions. Can also be used to represent aggregate index of these goods
XE	Set of primary fossil-fuel goods. Can also be used to represent aggregate index of these goods
STH	Set of regions in South
NTH	Set of regions in North

Table G.2: Variables - Activity Levels

$Y_{g,r}$	Output/production in sector g region r
$A_{i,r}$	Armington composite in sector i region r
$M_{i,r}$	Import composite in sector i region r
$R_{i,r}$	Conventional energy-saving R&D production
RC_r	End-of-pipe Carbon-saving R&D production
$SPL_{i,r}$	Pre-existing Conventional energy-saving knowledge plus Spillovers of new knowledge
$SPLC_r$	Pre-existing carbon-saving knowledge plus Spillovers of new knowledge
CRB_r	Effective carbon services provided to r
$SNC_{r,s}$	Effective carbon services in exports from r to s
$X_{i,r}$	Exports of i from r
$XS_{i,r,s}$	Exports of i from r to s
$D_{g,r}$	Southern output for domestic use or for export to other southern regions
$TAR_{r,s}$	Variable used to ration $\overline{cbim}_{r,s}$

G.2 Zero Profit Conditions

G.2.1 Production of goods

Production of commodities are captured by nested CES cost functions. At the top level, conventional knowledge services trade off with an index of sectoral output ex-R&D. At the second level, new conventional knowledge services are produced using intermediate goods. Also, non-r&d goods are produced using a combination of non-energy and energy intermediate goods that are substitutable with an aggregate index of value added factors. Final energy goods are used in fixed proportion with effective carbon services. At the third level, the value-added index is produced using capital and labor inputs. Effective carbon services are defined by a CES production function determined by carbon-saving knowledge services and a raw carbon factor. Finally, new carbon-saving knowledge services are produced using a combination of intermediate goods.

The unit profit function for new carbon-saving R&D is shown below:

Table G.3: Variables - Price Levels

$p_{i,r}^R$	Price of conventional energy-saving R&D (knowledge services)
p_r^{RC}	Price of carbon-saving R&D (knowledge services)
$p_{f,r}^F$	Price of factor f in region r
$p_{i,r}^{FE}$	Price index of FE used to produce i in region r
$p_{i,r}^{VA}$	Price index of VA used to produce i in region r
p_r^{CRB}	Price of effective carbon in region r
p_r^{co2}	Price of raw co2 emissions in region r
$p_{i,r}^A$	Price index of Armington good i in region r
$p_{g,r}^{NRD}$	Price index of NRD index. All goods ex-Conventional R&D
$p_{i,r}^M$	Price index on imported goods
$p_{g,r}^Y$	Price of output
$p_{i,r}^{RS}$	Price of fixed natural resource factor for $i \in XE$
$p_{r,s}^{SNC}$	Price of effective carbon in exports from r to s
$p_{r,s}^{snco2}$	Price of raw co2 emissions in exports from r to s
$p_{g,r}^D$	price of good g produced for domestic use in southern region r or for export by southern region r to other southern regions
$p_{i,r}^X$	price of good i produced for export from southern region r to North
$p_{i,r,s}^{XS}$	price of good i produced for export from southern region r to northern region s

Table G.4: Variables - Income Levels

ZHH_r	Household income for representative agent in region r
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Table G.5: Cost shares

General Model	
θ_r^{CRB}	share of effective carbon services attributable to raw co2 emissions
$\theta_{i,r}^{RC}$	share of carbon-saving R&D attributable to intermediate input i
$\theta_{i,g,r}^R$	share of conventional R&D for sector g attributable to intermediate input i
$\theta_{f,g,r}^{VA}$	share of value-added attributable to factor f
$\theta_{i,g,r}^{FE}$	share fossil energy attributable to input $i \in FE$
$\theta_{*,g,r}^{NRD}$	share of non-R&D and non-resource factor output attributable to VA, FE, and $i \in NE$
$\theta_{g,r}^{RD}$	share of output attributable to conventional R&D services
$\theta_{*,g,r}^{RS}$	share of output in g attributable to RS or RD
$\theta_{i,r}^A$	share of armington output attributable to domestic variety input i
$\theta_{i,r,s}^M$	share of imports of good i from region r to region s
Southern Modification	
$\theta_{f,g,r,s}^{VA}$	share of value-added attributable to factor f
$\theta_{*,g,r,s}^{NRD}$	share of non-R&D and non-resource factor output attributable to VA, FE, and $i \in NE$
$\theta_{g,r,s}^{RD}$	share of output attributable to conventional R&D services
$\theta_{*,g,r,s}^{RS}$	share of output attributable to RS or RD
$\theta_{r,s}^{SNC}$	share of effective carbon services attributable to raw co2 emissions
$\theta_{g,r}^D$	share of output of good g of southern region r produced for domestic use in southern region r or for export by southern region r to other southern regions
$\theta_{i,r}^X$	share of output of good i of southern region r produced for export to North
$\theta_{i,r,s}^{XS}$	share of exports of good i of southern region r produced for export to northern region s .

Table G.6: Elasticities

σ^{RC}	Substitution between intermediate inputs i in production of carbon-saving R&D
σ^{CRB}	Substitution between carbon-saving R&D and raw co2 factor in the CRB composite
σ^{VA}	Substitution between factor inputs capital and labor in the VA composite
σ^{FE}	Substitution between final energy inputs in the FE composite
σ^R	Substitution between intermediate inputs in production of energy-saving R&D
σ^{NRD}	Substitution between the VA index, and all other inputs in the NRD composite
σ^{RD}	Substitution between R and NRD in output block for non-primary fossil resources
σ^{RS}	Substitution between RS, R, and NRD in the output block for primary-fossil resources
σ^M	Substitution between imports from different regions
σ^A	Substitution between the import aggregate (M) and the domestic input (Y)
σ^X	Substitution between exports for different regions (XS) in the South-North Export Composite (X)
σ^{DX}	Substitution between the Domestic (D) and Export (X) Composites in production of Southern Output (Y)

Table G.7: Endowments and other parameters

$\bar{F}_{f,r}$	Factor endowment for capital or labor input
$\overline{RS}_{g,r}$	Fixed natural resource factor endowment
\bar{G}_r	Fixed public good demand
\bar{I}_r	Fixed investment demand
\bar{B}_r	Balance of payment
$\overline{CO2}_r$	co2 emissions cap
$\overline{cbim}_{r,s}$	co2 emissions endowment in imports by region r from region s
$\overline{dk}_{i,r}$	benchmark demand for conventional knowledge services
$\overline{rd}_{i,r}$	benchmark new investment supply for conventional knowledge services
$\overline{ks}_{i,r}$	benchmark pre-existing supply of conventional knowledge services
\overline{rdc}_r	benchmark carbon-saving R&D scale parameter set to 1
\overline{cb}_r	benchmark demand for co2 emissions region r
$\gamma_{i,r}$	Absorption rate calculation
$\alpha_{i,r,s}^{ABS}$	Absorption rate modification for spillover constraint
$a_{i,g,r}$	co2 emissions coefficient for fuel i in sector g and region r
δ	Depreciation rate on knowledge
g	Growth rate
r	Interest rate

$$\Pi_r^{RC} = p_r^{RC} - \left[\sum_i \theta_{ir}^{RC} p_{ir}^{Y^{1-\sigma^{RC}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RC}}} \leq 0 \quad (\text{G.1})$$

The unit profit function for effective carbon-services is shown below:

$$\Pi_r^{CRB} = p_r^{CRB} - \left[\theta_r^{CRB} p_r^{co2^{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} + (1 - \theta_r^{CRB}) p_r^{RC^{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} \leq 0 \quad (\text{G.2})$$

The unit profit function for the value-added index is shown below:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^{VA} = p_{g,r}^{VA} - \left[\sum_f \theta_{f,g,r}^{VA} p_{f,r}^{F^{1-\sigma^{VA}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{VA}}} \leq 0 \quad (\text{G.3})$$

The unit profit function for the final energy index is shown below:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^{FE} = p_{g,r}^{FE} - \left[\sum_{i \in fe} \theta_{i,g,r}^{FE} (p_{i,r}^A + p_r^{CRB} a_{i,g,r}^{co2})^{1-\sigma^{FE}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{FE}}} \leq 0 \quad (\text{G.4})$$

The unit profit function for new energy-saving conventional knowledge services:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^R = p_{gr}^R - \left[\sum_i \theta_{igr}^R p_{ir}^{Y^{1-\sigma^R}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^R}} \leq 0 \quad (\text{G.5})$$

The unit profit function for all goods except conventional knowledge services index shows substitution between VA, FE, and all other goods except r&d (NRD), below:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{g,r}^{NRD} &= p_{g,r}^{NRD} - \\ &\left[\theta_{VA,g,r}^{NRD} p_{g,r}^{VA^{1-\sigma^{NRD}}} + \theta_{FE,g,r}^{NRD} p_{g,r}^{FE^{1-\sigma^{NRD}}} + \sum_{i \in NE} \theta_{i,g,r}^{NRD} p_{ir}^{A^{1-\sigma^{NRD}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{NRD}}} \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.6})$$

assuming FE is produced in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{FE} = 0$) and that NRD is in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{NRD} = 0$), substituting G.4 into G.6 and applying the elasticity values yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{g,r}^{NRD} &= p_{g,r}^{NRD} - \\ &\left[\theta_{VA,g,r}^{NRD} p_{g,r}^{VA} + \sum_{i \in FE} \theta_{i,g,r}^{NRD} (p_{i,r}^A + p_r^{CRB} a_{i,g,r}^{co2}) + \sum_{i \in NE} \theta_{i,g,r}^{NRD} p_{i,r}^A \right] \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.7})$$

The unit profit function for non-fossil-fuel goods: $g \notin xe$

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_{g,r}^Y &= p_{g,r}^Y - \\ &\left[\theta_{g,r}^{RD} p_{g,r}^{R^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} + (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{RD}) p_{g,r}^{NRD^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \\ &\leq 0\end{aligned}\tag{G.8}$$

The unit profit function for fossil-fuel goods: $g \in xe$

$$\begin{aligned}p_{gr}^Y &= c_{gr}^Y = \\ &\left[\theta_{RS,g,r}^{RS} p_{gr}^{RS^{1-\sigma^{RS}}} + \theta_{RD,g,r}^{RS} p_{gr}^{R^{1-\sigma^{RS}}} + (1 - \theta_{RS,g,r}^{RS} - \theta_{RD,g,r}^{RS}) p_{gr}^{NRD^{1-\sigma^{RS}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RS}}} \\ &\leq 0\end{aligned}\tag{G.9}$$

G.2.2 Armington Aggregate

Unit profit function for armington index:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^A = p_{i,r}^A - \left[(1 - \theta_{i,r}^A) p_{i,r}^{M^{1-\sigma^A}} + \theta_{i,r}^A p_{i,r}^{Y^{1-\sigma^A}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^A}} \leq 0\tag{G.10}$$

G.2.3 Import Aggregate

Unit profit function for imports:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^M = p_{i,r}^M - \left[\sum_s \theta_{i,s,r}^M p_{i,s}^{Y^{1-\sigma^M}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^M}} \leq 0\tag{G.11}$$

G.3 Market Clearance Conditions

G.3.1 Factor Market Clearance

Market clearance for factors of production (capital and labor):

$$\bar{F}_{f,r} \geq \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{f,r}^F}\tag{G.12}$$

Market clearance for the fixed natural resource factors ($g \in xe$):

$$\bar{RS}_{g,r} \geq Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{g,r}^{RS}}\tag{G.13}$$

G.3.2 Goods Market Clearance

Knowledge market clearance - Supply of knowledge services from existing knowledge stock and spillovers ($SPL_{i,r}$) plus new knowledge investment ($R_{i,r}$) must meet or exceed demand for knowledge services:

$$R_{i,r} + SPL_{i,r} \geq Y_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^R} \quad (G.14)$$

Carbon-saving knowledge market clearance:

$$RC_r + SPLC_r \geq CRB_r \frac{\partial \Pi_r^{CRB}}{\partial p_r^{RC}} \quad (G.15)$$

Supply of effective carbon-services equals demand for effective carbon services:

$$CRB_r \geq \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial (p_{g,r}^A + p_r^{CRB} a_{i,g,r}^{co2})} a_{i,g,r}^{co2} \quad (G.16)$$

Output enters the production of Armington goods, import supply, as well as conventional and carbon-saving R&D:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i,r} \geq & \sum_j A_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^A}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + \sum_s M_{i,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,s}^M}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \\ & + \sum_j R_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^R}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + \sum_j RC_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^{RC}}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^Y \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (G.17)$$

Armington supply enters:

$$A_{i,r} \geq \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^A} \quad (G.18)$$

Import supply enters:

$$M_{i,r} \geq A_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^A}{\partial p_{i,r}^M} \quad (G.19)$$

Public Consumption covers fixed govt demand:

$$Y_{G,r} \geq \bar{G}_r \quad (G.20)$$

Production of investment covers fixed investment demand:

$$Y_{I,r} \geq \bar{I}_r \quad (\text{G.21})$$

Production of private consumption index covers private consumption demand:

$$Y_{C,r} \geq \frac{ZHH_r}{P_{C,r}^Y} \quad (\text{G.22})$$

G.4 Income Balance Conditions

Income balance condition for representative agent:

$$\begin{aligned} ZHH_r = & p_{f,r}^F \bar{F}_r + p_{i,r}^{RS} \bar{RS}_{i,r} \\ & + p_r^{co2} \bar{CO2}_r + p_{i,r}^R SPL_{i,r} + p_r^{RC} SPLC_r \\ & - p_{I,r}^Y \bar{Y}_{I,r} - p_{G,r}^Y \bar{Y}_{G,r} + \bar{B}_r + TR_r \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.23})$$

The model maintains the benchmark taxes provided by GTAP throughout. Tax revenues are indicated by TR_r .

G.5 Spillover Calibration and Constraints

Knowledge accounting and calibration is shown below. First R&D expenditures data is obtained and assumed to equal demand for knowledge services, as shown below:

$$\bar{dk}_{i,r} = R\&D \text{ exp data}_{i,r} \quad (\text{G.24})$$

Then the absorption rate is calculated:

$$\gamma_{i,r} = \frac{\bar{dk}_{i,r}}{\sum_{r \in \text{enth}} \bar{dk}_{i,r}} \quad (\text{G.25})$$

and then modified to allow for flows from region r to region s , shown below:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS} &= \gamma_{i,r} \\ \alpha_{i,r \in \text{enth}, r \in \text{enth}}^{ABS} &= 1 \\ \alpha_{i,s \in \text{sth}, r \in \text{enth}}^{ABS} &= 0 \\ \alpha_{i,s \in \text{sth}, r \in \text{sth}}^{ABS} &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.26})$$

Once the absorption parameter is specified, before moving to spillovers, it is necessary to use the perpetual inventory method to determine R&D investment, given demand for knowledge services, below:

$$\overline{rd}_{i,r} = \frac{(\delta + g)\overline{dk}_{i,r}}{\delta + r} \quad (G.27)$$

Once investment is obtained, ensure that knowledge markets clear by specifying a pre-existing knowledge stock that cannot be adjusted:

$$\overline{ks}_{i,r} = \overline{dk}_{i,r} - \overline{rd}_{i,r} \quad (G.28)$$

Now spillovers can be specified. Spillovers for conventional knowledge:

$$SPLi,r = \overline{ks}_{i,r} + 3 \sum_{s \in nth} \alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS} (R_{i,s} - \overline{rd}_{i,s}) \quad (G.29)$$

Spillovers for carbon-saving knowledge:

$$SPLC_r = 0.01 * \overline{rdc}_r \overline{cb}_r + 3 \sum_{s \in nth} \left[\sum_i \left(\frac{\alpha_{i,s,r}^{ABS}}{card(i)} \right) (0.01 * \overline{rdc}_s \overline{cb}_s RC_s) \right] \quad (G.30)$$

where $\overline{rdc}_r = 1$ and \overline{cb}_r is benchmark raw co2 emissions.

G.6 Emissions cap and tariff constraints

Carbon emissions restriction is shown below:

$$\overline{CO2}_r = \sum_i \sum_g Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial (p_{i,r}^A + a_{i,g,r}^{co2} p_r^{CRB})} \frac{\partial \Pi_r^{CRB}}{\partial p_r^{co2}} a_{i,g,r}^{co2} \quad (G.31)$$

Tariff is set by establishing a benchmark co2 endowment in the North due to imports from Southern regions. The tariff rate ($p_{s,r}^{co2}$) is set equal to the prevailing carbon factor price in the north (p_r^{co2}). The marginal of the constraint yields the adjustment to the benchmark imported CO2 endowment in the North ($TAR_{r,s}$).

$$p_r^{co2} = p_{s,r}^{sncO2} \quad \perp \quad TAR_{r,s} > 0 \quad (G.32)$$

$$\overline{cbim}_{s,r} * TAR_{s,r} = SNC_{r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{r,s}^{SNC}}{\partial p_{r,s}^{sncO2}} \quad \perp \quad p_{r,s}^{sncO2} > 0 \quad (G.33)$$

Then modify the income balance equation for northern households to include the tariff revenues generated:

$$ZHH_r = \dots + p_{s,r}^{sncO2} * \overline{cbim}_{r,s} * TAR_{r,s} \quad (G.34)$$

Southern output for use in the South and Southern output for export to the North are disaggregated in the numerical model. Production of effective carbon services in the South for export to the North now allows a strictly positive carbon price $p_{r,s}^{CO2}$ and carbon-saving knowledge spillovers from northern countries to influence production and export decisions.

G.7 Southern modifications to general model

G.7.1 Zero Profit Conditions

Southern output for use domestically or for export to other Southern regions is defined below:

The unit profit function for effective carbon-services is shown below, market clears with zero price:

$$\Pi_r^{SSC} = p_r^{SSC} - p_r^{sco2} \leq 0 \quad (G.35)$$

The unit profit function for all goods except conventional knowledge services index shows substitution between VA, FE, and all other goods except r&d (NRD). Assuming FE is produced in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{FE} = 0$) and that NRD is in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{NRD} = 0$), yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{g,r}^{NRD} &= p_{g,r}^{NRD} - \\ &\left[\theta_{VA,g,r}^{NRD} p_{g,r}^{VA} + \sum_{i \in FE} \theta_{i,g,r}^{NRD} (p_{i,r}^A + p_r^{SSC} a_{i,g,r}^{CO2}) + \sum_{i \in NE} \theta_{i,g,r}^{NRD} p_{i,r}^A \right] \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (G.36)$$

The unit profit function for non-fossil-fuel goods: $g \notin xe$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{g,r}^D &= p_{g,r}^D - \\ &\left[\theta_{g,r}^{RD} p_{g,r}^{R^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} + (1 - \theta_{g,r}^{RD}) p_{g,r}^{NRD^{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \\ &\leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (G.37)$$

The unit profit function for fossil-fuel goods: $g \in xe$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{g,r}^D &= p_{g,r}^D - \\
&\left[\theta_{RS,g,r}^{RS} p_{gr}^{RS 1-\sigma^{RS}} \right. \\
&\left. + \theta_{RD,g,r}^{RS} p_{gr}^{R 1-\sigma^{RS}} + (1 - \theta_{RS,g,r}^{RS} - \theta_{RD,g,r}^{RS}) p_{gr}^{NRD 1-\sigma^{RS}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RS}}} \\
&\leq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{G.38}$$

Southern output for export to specific northern regions is defined below:

The unit profit function for effective carbon-services is shown below:

$$\Pi_{r,s}^{SNC} = p_{r,s}^{SNC} - \left[\theta_{r,s}^{SNC} p_{r,s}^{snc o 2^{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} + (1 - \theta_{r,s}^{SNC}) p_r^{RC 1-\sigma^{CRB}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{CRB}}} \leq 0 \tag{G.39}$$

The unit profit function for the value-added index is shown below:

$$\Pi_{g,r,s}^{VA} = p_{g,r,s}^{VA} - \left[\sum_f \theta_{f,g,r,s}^{VA} p_{f,r}^F 1-\sigma^{VA} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{VA}}} \leq 0 \tag{G.40}$$

The unit profit function for all goods except conventional knowledge services index shows substitution between VA, FE, and all other goods except r&d (NRD). Assuming FE is produced in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{FE} = 0$) and that NRD is in fixed proportions ($\sigma^{NRD} = 0$), yields:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{g,r,s}^{NRD} &= p_{g,r,s}^{NRD} - \\
&\left[\theta_{VA,g,r,s}^{NRD} p_{g,r}^{VA} + \sum_{i \in FE} \theta_{i,g,r,s}^{NRD} (p_{i,r}^A + p_{r,s}^{SNC} a_{i,g,r}^{co2}) + \sum_{i \in NE} \theta_{i,g,r,s}^{NRD} p_{i,r}^A \right] \\
&\leq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{G.41}$$

The unit profit function for non-fossil-fuel goods: $g \notin xe$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{g,r,s}^{XS} &= p_{g,r,s}^{XS} - \\
&\left[\theta_{g,r,s}^{RD} p_{g,r}^{R 1-\sigma^{RD}} \right. \\
&\left. + (1 - \theta_{g,r,s}^{RD}) p_{g,r,s}^{NRD 1-\sigma^{RD}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RD}}} \\
&\leq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{G.42}$$

The unit profit function for fossil-fuel goods: $g \in xe$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_{g,r,s}^{XS} &= p_{g,r,s}^{XS} - \\
&\left[\theta_{RS,g,r,s}^{RS} p_{g,r}^{RS 1-\sigma^{RS}} \right. \\
&\left. + \theta_{RD,g,r,s}^{RS} p_{g,r}^{R 1-\sigma^{RS}} + (1 - \theta_{RS,g,r,s}^{RS} - \theta_{RD,g,r,s}^{RS}) p_{g,r,s}^{NRD 1-\sigma^{RS}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{RS}}} \\
&\leq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{G.43}$$

Aggregating D, X, and XS into Y

Export aggregation amongst northern destinations:

$$\Pi_{i,r}^X = p_{i,r}^X - \left[\sum_s \theta_{i,r,s}^{XS} p_{i,r,s}^{XS 1-\sigma^X} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^X}} \tag{G.44}$$

Aggregation between domestic and export to north:

$$\Pi_{g,r}^Y = p_{g,r}^Y - \left[\theta_{g,r}^D p_{g,r}^{D 1-\sigma^{DX}} + \theta_{g,r}^X p_{g,r}^{X 1-\sigma^{DX}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^{DX}}} \tag{G.45}$$

G.7.2 Market Clearance for South

Supply of exports from a given Southern region to a given Northern region enters the aggregated Export block of a given Southern regions exports to the North in general:

$$XS_{i,r,s} \geq X_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^X}{\partial p_{i,r,s}^{XS}} \quad \perp p_{i,r,s}^{XS} \geq 0 \tag{G.46}$$

Exports from a given Southern region to the North enter the Southern output block:

$$X_{i,r} \geq Y_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^X} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^X \geq 0 \tag{G.47}$$

Southern production for domestic use or for export to other Southern regions enters the output block:

$$D_{g,r} \geq Y_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^Y}{\partial p_{g,r}^D} \quad \perp p_{g,r}^D \geq 0 \tag{G.48}$$

Armington supply enters:

$$A_{i,r} \geq \sum_g D_{g,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{g,r}^D}{\partial p_{i,r}^A} + \sum_j \sum_s XS_{j,r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r,s}^{XS}}{\partial p_{i,r}^A} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^A \geq 0 \tag{G.49}$$

Output enters:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{i,r} \geq & \sum_j A_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^A}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + \sum_s M_{i,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,s}^M}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \\
& + \sum_j R_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^R}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} + \sum_j RC_{j,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{j,r}^{RC}}{\partial p_{i,r}^Y} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^Y \geq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{G.50}$$

Effective carbon services provided by a Southern region exported to a given Northern region enter:

$$SNC_{r,s} \geq \sum_i XS_{i,r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r,s}^{XS}}{\partial p_{r,s}^{SNC}} a_{i,g,r} \quad \perp p_{r,s}^{SNC} \geq 0 \tag{G.51}$$

Factor market clearance:

$$\bar{F}_{f,r} \geq \sum_i D_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^D}{\partial p_{f,r}^F} + \sum_i \sum_s XS_{i,r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r,s}^{XS}}{\partial p_{f,r}^F} \quad \perp p_{f,r}^F \geq 0 \tag{G.52}$$

Fixed resource factor market clearance:

$$\bar{RS}_{i,r} \geq D_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^D}{\partial p_{i,r}^{RS}} + \sum_s XS_{i,r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r,s}^{XS}}{\partial p_{i,r}^{RS}} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^{RS} \geq 0 \tag{G.53}$$

Conventional R&D market clearance:

$$\bar{R}_{i,r} + SPL_{i,r} \geq Y_{i,r} \frac{\partial \Pi_{i,r}^Y}{\partial p_{i,r}^R} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^R \geq 0 \tag{G.54}$$

Carbon-saving R&D market clearance:

$$SPLC_r \geq SNC_{r,s} \frac{\partial \Pi_{r,s}^{SNC}}{\partial p_r^{RC}} \quad \perp p_{i,r}^{RC} \geq 0 \tag{G.55}$$

APPENDIX H - TPS MODEL CODE

Files included:

1. replicate.bat - calls run_tps.bat and run_sstps.bat and organizes output
2. run_tps.bat - calls model file for baseline tps analysis
3. run_sstps.bat - calls sensitivity scenarios for discount rate sensitivity and welfare results
4. v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms - contains all cobalt models and calculations

replicate.bat

```
1 echo begin replication of results in tps paper
2
3 cd v5_nolp
4 call run_tps.bat
5
6 cd ..\v5_nolp_sstps
7 call run_sstps.bat
8
9 cd ..
10
11 del /Q media\*
12
13 copy v5_nolp\plots\merged\comp1_init_dg.pdf media\comp1_init_dg.pdf
14 copy v5_nolp\plots\merged\tps_i2_plot.pdf media\tps_i2_plot.pdf
15 copy v5_nolp\plots\merged\cap_util_plot.pdf media\cap_util_plot.pdf
16 copy v5_nolp\plots\merged\tps_emit_plot.pdf media\tps_emit_plot.pdf
17 copy v5_nolp\plots\merged\comp1_ss_dg.pdf media\comp1_ss_dg.pdf
18 copy v5_nolp\ss_ac.tex media\ss_ac.tex
19 copy v5_nolp_sstps\rep_ss.tex media\rep_ss.tex
20
21 echo end replication of results
22
23
```

run_tps.bat

```
1 echo begin
2
3 del /Q output\*
4 mkdir output
5
6 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1A.lst s=output\S1A lo=2 logFile=output\S1A.log
7 --gdxfile=output\S1A --scennum=1 --scenlet=A --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01
8 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2A.lst s=output\S2A lo=2 logFile=output\S2A.log
9 --gdxfile=output\S2A --scennum=2 --scenlet=B --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01
10 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S3A.lst s=output\S3A lo=2 logFile=output\S3A.log
11 --gdxfile=output\S3A --scennum=3 --scenlet=C --swnoeq=3 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01
12 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1B.lst s=output\S1B lo=2 logFile=output\S1B.log
13 --gdxfile=output\S1B --scennum=1 --scenlet=A --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.3 --drval=0.01
14 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2B.lst s=output\S2B lo=2 logFile=output\S2B.log
15 --gdxfile=output\S2B --scennum=2 --scenlet=B --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.3 --drval=0.01
16 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S3B.lst s=output\S3B lo=2 logFile=output\S3B.log
17 --gdxfile=output\S3B --scennum=3 --scenlet=C --swnoeq=3 --scaleval=0.3 --drval=0.01
18
19 gdxmerge output\S*.gdx output=output\merged.gdx
20
21 Rscript plot_comp_tps.R
22
23 echo end
24
25
```

run_sstps.bat

```
1 echo begin
2
3 del /Q output\*
4 mkdir output
5
6 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Aaa.lst s=output\S1Aaa lo=2 logFile=output\S1Aaa.log --gdxfile=output\S1Aaa
7 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Aaa --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=0
8 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Baa.lst s=output\S1Baa lo=2 logFile=output\S1Baa.log --gdxfile=output\S1Baa
9 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Baa --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=0
10 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Aab.lst s=output\S1Aab lo=2 logFile=output\S1Aab.log --gdxfile=output\S1Aab
11 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Aab --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=0
12 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bab.lst s=output\S1Bab lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bab.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bab
13 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bab --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=0
14 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Aac.lst s=output\S1Aac lo=2 logFile=output\S1Aac.log --gdxfile=output\S1Aac
15 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Aac --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=0
16 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bac.lst s=output\S1Bac lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bac.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bac
17 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bac --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=0
18 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Aba.lst s=output\S1Aba lo=2 logFile=output\S1Aba.log --gdxfile=output\S1Aba
19 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Aba --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=100
20 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bba.lst s=output\S1Bba lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bba.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bba
21 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bba --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=100
22 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Abb.lst s=output\S1Abb lo=2 logFile=output\S1Abb.log --gdxfile=output\S1Abb
23 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Abb --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=100
24 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bbb.lst s=output\S1Bbb lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bbb.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bbb
25 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bbb --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=100
26 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Abc.lst s=output\S1Abc lo=2 logFile=output\S1Abc.log --gdxfile=output\S1Abc
27 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Abc --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=100
28 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bbc.lst s=output\S1Bbc lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bbc.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bbc
29 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bbc --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=100
30 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Aca.lst s=output\S1Aca lo=2 logFile=output\S1Aca.log --gdxfile=output\S1Aca
31 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Aca --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=200
32 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bca.lst s=output\S1Bca lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bca.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bca
33 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bca --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=200
34 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Acb.lst s=output\S1Acb lo=2 logFile=output\S1Acb.log --gdxfile=output\S1Acb
35 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Acb --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=200
36 gams v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bcb.lst s=output\S1Bcb lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bcb.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bcb
37 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bcb --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=200
```

```

38 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Acc.lst s=output\S1Acc lo=2 logFile=output\S1Acc.log --gdxfile=output\S1Acc
39 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Acc --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=200
40 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S1Bcc.lst s=output\S1Bcc lo=2 logFile=output\S1Bcc.log --gdxfile=output\S1Bcc
41 --scennum=1 --scenlet=Bcc --slope=4e5 --inter=0 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=200
42
43
44 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Aaa.lst s=output\S2Aaa lo=2 logFile=output\S2Aaa.log --gdxfile=output\S2Aaa
45 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Aaa --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=0
46 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Baa.lst s=output\S2Baa lo=2 logFile=output\S2Baa.log --gdxfile=output\S2Baa
47 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Baa --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=0
48 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Aab.lst s=output\S2Aab lo=2 logFile=output\S2Aab.log --gdxfile=output\S2Aab
49 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Aab --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=0
50 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bab.lst s=output\S2Bab lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bab.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bab
51 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bab --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=0
52 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Aac.lst s=output\S2Aac lo=2 logFile=output\S2Aac.log --gdxfile=output\S2Aac
53 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Aac --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=0
54 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bac.lst s=output\S2Bac lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bac.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bac
55 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bac --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=0
56 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Aba.lst s=output\S2Aba lo=2 logFile=output\S2Aba.log --gdxfile=output\S2Aba
57 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Aba --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=100
58 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bba.lst s=output\S2Bba lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bba.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bba
59 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bba --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=100
60 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Abb.lst s=output\S2Abb lo=2 logFile=output\S2Abb.log --gdxfile=output\S2Abb
61 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Abb --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=100
62 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bbb.lst s=output\S2Bbb lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bbb.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bbb
63 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bbb --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=100
64 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Abc.lst s=output\S2Abc lo=2 logFile=output\S2Abc.log --gdxfile=output\S2Abc
65 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Abc --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=100
66 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bbc.lst s=output\S2Bbc lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bbc.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bbc
67 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bbc --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=100
68 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Aca.lst s=output\S2Aca lo=2 logFile=output\S2Aca.log --gdxfile=output\S2Aca
69 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Aca --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0 --cil=200
70 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bca.lst s=output\S2Bca lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bca.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bca
71 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bca --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0 --cil=200
72 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Acb.lst s=output\S2Acb lo=2 logFile=output\S2Acb.log --gdxfile=output\S2Acb
73 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Acb --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.01 --cil=200
74 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bcb.lst s=output\S2Bcb lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bcb.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bcb
75 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bcb --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.01 --cil=200
76 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Acc.lst s=output\S2Acc lo=2 logFile=output\S2Acc.log --gdxfile=output\S2Acc

```

```
77 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Acc --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.7 --drval=0.03 --cil=200
78 gams v5LINDr_nolp_toy.gms o=output\S2Bcc.lst s=output\S2Bcc lo=2 logFile=output\S2Bcc.log --gdxfile=output\S2Bcc
79 --scennum=2 --scenlet=Bcc --slope=4e4 --inter=9e5 --scaleval=0.9 --drval=0.03 --cil=200
80
81 gdxmerge output\S*.gdx output=output\merged.gdx
82
83 python rep_ss.py
84
85 echo end file
86
87
```

v5LINdr_nolp_toy.gms

```
1 $TITLE analytical tps model
2 $ontext
3
4 Scenarios:
5 1: slope = 4.0e5, inter = 0
6 2: slope = 2.0e5, inter = 5e5
7 3: slope = 4.0e4, inter = 9e5
8 4: slope_l = 3e5, slope_h = 1.5e5, inter = 5e5 (swnoeq=3)
9
10 A: scaleval = 0.9
11 B: scaleval = 0.8
12 C: scaleval = 0.7
13
14 FUN (run to 800 periods):
15 *gams v3LINdr_nolp_toy.gms --gdxfile=fun --drval=0.02 --trepval=600 --cil=0 --swfunval=1 --swnoeq=3
16
17 -----
18 Add Discount rate/factor to model
19 -----
20
21 $offtext
22
23 $if not setglobal gdxfile $setglobal gdxfile "outputLIN"
24 $if not setglobal slope $setglobal slope 4e5
25 $if not setglobal inter $setglobal inter 0
26 $if not setglobal scaleval $setglobal scaleval 0.9
27 $if not setglobal swnoeq $setglobal swnoeq 0
28 $if not setglobal scenario $setglobal scenario %gdxfile%
29 $if not setglobal scennum $setglobal scennum 0
30 $if not setglobal scenlet $setglobal scenlet "Z"
31 $if not setglobal trepval $setglobal trepval 200
32 $if not setglobal drval $setglobal drval 0
33 $if not setglobal swlicval $setglobal swlicval 1
34 $if not setglobal swtival $setglobal swtival 0
35 $if not setglobal delasval $setglobal delasval -0.3
36 $if not setglobal cih $setglobal cih 2000
37 $if not setglobal cil $setglobal cil 0
```

```

38 $if not setglobal swfunval $setglobal swfunval 0
39 $if not setglobal tval $setglobal tval 500
40 $if not setglobal cdamval $setglobal cdamval 20
41
42 $show
43 *$exit
44
45 SETS
46 t                time horizon          /1*%tval%/
47 f                fuel type             /H,L/
48 tf(t)            first period
49 tl(t)            last period
50 tsl(t)           second to last period
51 trepf(t)         periods used for reporting parameters
52 trepf(t)         last period used for reporting parameter
53 swCAP(t)         switch to enable [yes] or disable [no] CAP
54 swTPS(t)         switch to enable [yes] or disable [no] TPS
55 ;
56
57 tf(t) = yes$(ord(t)=1);
58 tl(t) = yes$(ord(t)=card(t)) ;
59 tsl(t) = yes$(ord(t)=(card(t)-1)) ;
60 trepf(t) = yes$(ord(t) le %trepval%) ;
61 trepf(t) = yes$(ord(t)=%trepval%) ;
62
63 alias(t,t2) ;
64
65 swCAP(t) = no ;
66 swTPS(t) = no ;
67
68 scalar swCAPS      switch to enable [1] disable [0] CAP          /0/;
69 scalar swTPSS      switch to enable [1] disable [0] TPS          /0/;
70 scalar swLIC        switch to enable [1] disable [0] linear investment cost      /0/;
71 scalar swTI         switch to enable [1] disable [0] terminal investment          /0/;
72 scalar swDE         switch to enable [1] disable [0] constraints related to elastic demand /0/;
73 scalar swFUN        switch to enable [1] disable [0] FUN          /0/;
74
75 PARAMETERS
76 vc_x(f)            variable operating costs

```



```

77 k0(f,t)          initial capacity
78 d(t)            quantity demanded
79 delta           depreciation rate
80 i_in(f)         intercept for marginal investment cost function
81 i_sl(f)         slope term for marginal investment cost function
82 phi(t)          reference level of carbon intensity
83 psi(t)          reference level of aggregate emissions
84 sigma(t)        TPS policy target
85 sigma0          TPS policy target that results in 0 change in PD in SS
86 omega(t)        CAP policy target
87 ci(f)           carbon intensity of each fuel (co2 per mwh)
88 scale           used to scale sigma in relation to sigma0
89 delas           elasticity of demand < 0
90 pd0(t)          reference electricity price
91 ielas(f)       elasticity of investment > 0
92 i0(f,t)         reference investment level
93 pi0(f,t)        reference investment price (initial capital price)
94 hiy             hours in year
95 dr              discount rate
96 df(t)           discount factor
97 ;
98
99 parameter i_ss(f,t) steady state investment for fix;
100
101 PARAMETERS
102 pis0(f)         SS reference investment price
103 is0(f)          SS reference investment level
104 pds0            SS reference electricity price
105 sigma_s         SS sigma
106 omega_s         SS omega
107 ds             SS demand
108 ;
109
110
111 POSITIVE VARIABLES
112 Q(t)            total quantity
113 X(f,t)          generation
114 I(f,t)          investment
115 K(f,t)          capacity

```

```

116 PD(t)          electricity price (shadow on demand constraint)
117 PK(f,t)        capacity rental rate
118 PI(f,t)        investment price
119 PIT(f,t)       shadow price of post-terminal capital
120 PTPS(t)        TPS emissions permit price
121 PCAP(t)        CAP emissions permit price
122 ;
123 PD.L(t) = 1e-8;
124 PD.lo(t) = 1e-8;
125 Q.lo(t) = 1e-8 ;
126
127 *Steady State Variables
128 POSITIVE VARIABLES
129 XS(f)
130 IS(f)
131 KS(f)
132 PDS
133 PKS(f)
134 PIS(f)
135 PTPSS
136 PCAPS
137 ;
138 PDS.lo=1e-4;
139
140 EQUATIONS
141 mkt_pd(t)       market clearance condition (PD)
142 mkt_pk(f,t)     market clearance condition (PK)
143 mkt_pi(f,t)     market clearance condition (PI)
144 zpf_q(t)        zero profit condition (Q)
145 zpf_x(f,t)      zero profit condition (X)
146 zpf_k(f,t)      zero profit condition (K)
147 zpf_i(f,t)      zero profit condition (I)
148 mkt_pit(f,t)    terminal investment constraint (PIT)
149 tpseq(t)        TPS policy constraint (PTPS)
150 capeq(t)        CAP policy constraint (PCAP)
151 ;
152
153 *Steady State Equations
154 EQUATIONS

```

```

155 mkt_pd_ss
156 mkt_pk_ss
157 mkt_pi_ss
158 zpf_x_ss
159 zpf_k_ss
160 zpf_i_ss
161 tpseqss
162 capeqss
163 ;
164
165 *****
166 * Define equations
167 *****
168
169 zpf_q(t)$[swDE]..          df(t)*(pd0(t)/df(t))*(Q(t)/d(t)**(1/delas) - PD(t) =g= 0 ;
170
171 mkt_pd(t)..                sum(f,X(f,t)) =g= Q(t)$[swDE] + d(t)$[not swDE] ;
172 *mkt_pd(t)..              sum(f,X(f,t)) =g= d(t)*(PQ(t)/pq0(t)**(delas) ;
173 *mkt_pd(t)..              sum(f,X(f,t)) =g= d(t)*((PD(t)/df(t))/(pd0(t)/df(t))** (delas) ;
174
175
176 mkt_pk(f,t)..             K(f,t) =g= X(f,t) ;
177
178 mkt_pi(f,t)..             k0(f,t)$tf(t) + K(f,t-1) * (1-delta) + I(f,t) =g= K(f,t) ;
179 *mkt_pi(f,t)..           K(f,t-1) * (1-delta) + I(f,t) =g= K(f,t) ;
180
181 zpf_x(f,t)..              df(t)*vc_x(f)*hiy + PK(f,t) - PD(t)
182 + PTPS(t)$[swTPS(t)]*(ci(f) - sigma(t))*hiy
183 + PCAP(t)$[swCAP(t)]*(ci(f))*hiy
184 =g= 0 ;
185
186 zpf_k(f,t)..              -PK(f,t) - PI(f,t+1)*(1-delta) + PI(f,t)
187 + delta*PIT(f,t)$[swTI$tl(t)]
188 =g= 0 ;
189
190 * t indices tripping me up here:
191 * this means PK(f,t) =g= PI(f,t) - (PI(f,t+1)*(1-delta))*(1+dr)
192 ***** PK(f,t) = (PI(f,t) - PI(f,t+1)) + PI(f,t+1)*delta
193 ***** PK(f,t) = (PI(f,t) - PI(f,t+1)*(1+dr)) - PI(f,t+1)*(1+dr)*(-delta)

```

```

194 ***** PK(f,t) = (PI(f,t) - PI(f,t+1)*(1+dr)) + PI(f,t+1)*(1+dr)*delta
195
196 zpf_i(f,t)..      df(t)*[i_in(f) + pi0(f,t)*(I(f,t)/i0(f,t))*(1/ielas(f))](not swlic)
197 + df(t)*[i_in(f) + i_sl(f)*I(f,t)](swlic)
198 - PI(f,t)
199 - PIT(f,t)[swTI$tl(t)]
200 =g= 0 ;
201
202 mkt_pit(f,tl)(swTI)..      I(f,tl) - delta * K(f,tl) =g= 0 ;
203
204 tpseq(t)$swTPS(t)..      sigma(t) * sum(f,X(f,t)) =g= sum(f,X(f,t)*ci(f)) ;
205
206 capeq(t)$swCAP(t)..      omega(t) =g= sum(f,X(f,t)*ci(f)) ;
207
208
209 * Steady-State equations
210 mkt_pd_ss..      sum(f,XS(f)) =e= ds*(PDS/pds0)**(delas) ;
211
212 mkt_pk_ss(f)..      KS(f) =e= XS(f);
213
214 mkt_pi_ss(f)..      KS(f) * (1-delta) + IS(f) =e= KS(f) ;
215
216 zpf_x_ss(f)..      vc_x(f)*hiy + PKS(f) - PDS
217 + PTPSS$(swTPSS)*(ci(f) - sigma_s)*hiy
218 + PCAPS$(swCAPS)*(ci(f))*hiy
219 =e= 0 ;
220
221 zpf_k_ss(f)..      -PKS(f) - PIS(f) * (1-delta) + PIS(f) =e= 0 ;
222
223 zpf_i_ss(f)..      [i_in(f) + pis0(f)*(IS(f)/is0(f))*(1/ielas(f))](not swlic)
224 + [i_in(f) + i_sl(f)*IS(f)](swlic)
225 - PIS(f)
226 =e= 0 ;
227
228 tpseqss$swTPSS..      sigma_s * sum(f,XS(f)) =e= sum(f,XS(f)*ci(f)) ;
229
230 capeqss$swCAPS..      omega_s =e= sum(f,XS(f)*ci(f)) ;
231
232 *****

```

```

233 * Define models
234 *****
235
236 model nolpMCP
237 /
238 mkt_pd.pd
239 mkt_pk.pk
240 mkt_pi.pi
241 zpf_q.q
242 zpf_x.x
243 zpf_k.k
244 zpf_i.i
245 mkt_pit.pit
246 tpseq.ptps
247 capeq.pcap
248 /
249 ;
250
251
252 model ssMCP
253 /
254 mkt_pd_ss.pds
255 mkt_pk_ss.pks
256 mkt_pi_ss.pis
257 zpf_x_ss.xs
258 zpf_k_ss.ks
259 zpf_i_ss.is
260 tpseqss.ptpss
261 capeqss.pcaps
262 /
263 ;
264
265 *****
266 * Initialize parameters
267 *****
268
269 * Hours in year
270 hiy = 8760 ;
271

```

```

272 *Variable operating plus fuel costs
273 vc_x(f) = 30 ;
274
275 *Initial capacity
276 k0(f,t) = 0;
277
278
279 *Asset depreciation rate / decay rate
280 delta = 0.05 ;
281
282 * lbs co2 / mwh
283 ci('H') = %cih% ;
284 ci('L') = %cil% ;
285
286 *Elasticity of demand - perfectly inelastic
287 delas = 0 ;
288
289 *Discount rate/factor
290 dr = %drval% ;
291 df(t)$(dr > 0) = (1/(1+dr))**(ord(t)-1) ;
292 df(t)$(dr = 0) = 1 ;
293 display df;
294
295 * Benchmark yearly demand initialized to 100 (MW)
296 d(t) = 100 ;
297 *d(t) = d(t) * ((1+dr)**(ord(t)-1));
298 *d(t) = d(t) * df(t) ;
299
300 * Slopes of investment cost curves initialization
301 ielas(f) = 1 ;
302 *ielas('L') = 0.5;
303
304 i_in(f) = %inter%;
305 i_sl(f) = %slope%;
306
307 *initialize empty parameters
308 sigma(t) = 1e10 ;
309 omega(t) = 1e10 ;
310 pd0(t) = 1 ;

```

```

311 i0(f,t) = 1 ;
312 pi0(f,t) = %slope%;
313
314 ds = 100 ;
315 sigma_s = 1e10;
316 omega_s = 1e10;
317 pds0 = 1;
318 is0(f) = 1;
319 pis0(f) = %slope%;
320
321 swlic = %swlicval% ;
322 swti = %swtival% ;
323 swDE = 1 - 1$[delas=0] ;
324
325
326 swfun = %swfunval% ;
327
328 * Switches for various cases
329 $ifthen.noeq1 %swnoeq%==1
330 i_in(f) = 5e5 ;
331 i_in('L') = 0 ;
332 i_sl(f) = 2e5 ;
333 i_sl('L') = i_sl('H') * 2 ;
334 $endif.noeq1
335
336 $ifthen.noeq2 %swnoeq%==2
337 i_in(f) = 5e5 ;
338 i_sl(f) = 2e5 ;
339 i_sl('L') = i_sl('H') * 2 ;
340 $endif.noeq2
341
342 $ifthen.noeq3 %swnoeq%==3
343 i_in(f) = 5e5 ;
344 i_sl('H') = 1.5e5 ;
345 i_sl('L') = 3e5 ;
346 $endif.noeq3
347
348 *****
349 *Steady State the Easy Way

```

```

350 *****
351
352 solve ssMCP using MCP;
353
354 PARAMETERS
355 rep_xf_ss
356 rep_kf_ss
357 rep_x_ss
358 rep_k_ss
359 rep_i_ss
360 rep_pd_ss
361 rep_pk_ss
362 rep_pi_ss
363 rep_emit_ss
364 rep_perm_ss
365 rep_mpc_ss
366 ;
367
368 rep_xf_ss("SSEXOBAU") = sum(f,XS.l(f)) ;
369 rep_kf_ss("SSEXOBAU") = sum(f,KS.l(f)) ;
370 rep_x_ss(f,"SSEXOBAU") = XS.l(f) ;
371 rep_k_ss(f,"SSEXOBAU") = KS.l(f) ;
372 rep_i_ss(f,"SSEXOBAU") = IS.l(f) ;
373 rep_pd_ss("SSEXOBAU") = PDS.l/hiy ;
374 rep_pk_ss(f,"SSEXOBAU") = PKS.l(f) ;
375 rep_pi_ss(f,"SSEXOBAU") = PIS.l(f) ;
376 rep_emit_ss("SSEXOBAU") = sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f))*hiy ;
377
378 display rep_x_ss ;
379
380 *initialize BAU values
381 *PD.l(t) = PDS.l ;
382 *PK.l(f,t) = PKS.l(f);
383 *PI.l(f,t) = PIS.l(f);
384 *X.l(f,t) = XS.l(f);
385 *K.l(f,t) = KS.l(f);
386 *I.l(f,t) = IS.l(f);
387 *pd0(t) = PDS.l;
388 *i0(f,t) = IS.l(f);

```



```

389 *pi0(f,t) = PIS.l(f);
390 pds0=PDS.l;
391 is0(f) = IS.l(f);
392 pis0(f) = PIS.l(f) - i_in(f);
393 delas = %delasval% ;
394 swDE = 1 - 1$[delas=0] ;
395
396 ssMCP.iterlim = 0
397 solve ssMCP using MCP;
398 ssMCP.iterlim=100000;
399
400 rep_xf_ss("SSBAU") = sum(f,XS.l(f)) ;
401 rep_kf_ss("SSBAU") = sum(f,KS.l(f)) ;
402 rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU") = XS.l(f) ;
403 rep_k_ss(f,"SSBAU") = KS.l(f) ;
404 rep_i_ss(f,"SSBAU") = IS.l(f) ;
405 rep_pd_ss("SSBAU") = PDS.l/hiy ;
406 rep_pk_ss(f,"SSBAU") = PKS.l(f) ;
407 rep_pi_ss(f,"SSBAU") = PIS.l(f) ;
408 rep_emit_ss("SSBAU") = sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f))*hiy ;
409
410 display rep_x_ss ;
411
412 scale = %scaleval%;
413 sigma0 = ci('L')+[(i_sl('L')*(ci('H') - ci('L')))/sum(f,i_sl(f))] ;
414 sigma_s = sigma0 * scale ;
415 sigma_s = (sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f)) / sum(f,XS.l(f)))*scale ;
416
417 swTPSS = 1 ;
418 swCAPS = 0 ;
419
420 solve ssMCP using MCP;
421
422 rep_xf_ss("SSTPS") = sum(f,XS.l(f)) ;
423 rep_kf_ss("SSTPS") = sum(f,KS.l(f)) ;
424 rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS") = XS.l(f) ;
425 rep_k_ss(f,"SSTPS") = KS.l(f) ;
426 rep_i_ss(f,"SSTPS") = IS.l(f) ;
427 rep_pd_ss("SSTPS") = PDS.l/hiy ;

```

```

428 rep_pk_ss(f,"SSTPS") = PKS.l(f) ;
429 rep_pi_ss(f,"SSTPS") = PIS.l(f) ;
430 rep_emit_ss("SSTPS") = sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f))*hiy ;
431 rep_perm_ss("SSTPS") = PTPSS.l ;
432 rep_mpc_ss(f,"SSTPS") = PTPSS.l * (ci(f) - sigma_s) ;
433
434 swTPSS = 0 ;
435 swCAPS = 1 ;
436
437 omega_s = sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f));
438
439 solve ssMCP using MCP;
440
441 rep_xf_ss("SSCAP") = sum(f,XS.l(f)) ;
442 rep_kf_ss("SSCAP") = sum(f,KS.l(f)) ;
443 rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP") = XS.l(f) ;
444 rep_k_ss(f,"SSCAP") = KS.l(f) ;
445 rep_i_ss(f,"SSCAP") = IS.l(f) ;
446 rep_pd_ss("SSCAP") = PDS.l/hiy ;
447 rep_pk_ss(f,"SSCAP") = PKS.l(f) ;
448 rep_pi_ss(f,"SSCAP") = PIS.l(f) ;
449 rep_emit_ss("SSCAP") = sum(f,XS.l(f)*ci(f))*hiy ;
450 rep_perm_ss("SSCAP") = PCAPS.l ;
451 rep_mpc_ss(f,"SSCAP") = PCAPS.l * ci(f) ;
452
453 display rep_x_ss, rep_k_ss, rep_i_ss, rep_pd_ss, rep_pk_ss, rep_pi_ss, rep_emit_ss ;
454
455 *****
456 *Steady State the Hard Way
457 *****
458 delas = 0 ;
459 swDE = 1 - 1$[delas=0] ;
460
461 PD.l(t) = pds0 ;
462 PK.l(f,t) = rep_pk_ss(f,"SSBAU");
463 PI.l(f,t) = pis0(f);
464 X.l(f,t) = rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU");
465 K.l(f,t) = rep_k_ss(f,"SSBAU");
466 I.l(f,t) = is0(f);

```

```

467
468 *$goto skipssnolp
469 solve nlpMCP using MCP ;
470
471 parameter      ss_test(f)      used to test to see if steady state reached ;
472 parameter      sstest(f,t)     used to test to see if steady state reached ;
473 parameter      ss_start(t)     counter;
474 ss_start(t) = no;
475
476 sstest(f,t) = K.l(f,t)-K.l(f,t-1) ;
477
478 loop(t,
479 ss_start(t)=ord(t)$((abs(sstest('L',t)) <= 1e-4))
480 );
481
482 parameter last_ss;
483 parameter first_ss;
484 parameter teststart(t);
485
486 last_ss=smax(t,ss_start(t));
487 teststart(t) = card(t) ;
488 teststart(t)$ss_start(t) = ss_start(t);
489 first_ss = smin(t,teststart(t));
490
491
492 set swSSF(t);
493 set swSS(t) ;
494 set swSSM(t);
495 swSSF(t)=no;
496 swSS(t) = no;
497 swSSM(t) = no;
498 swSSF(t)=yes$(ord(t)=first_ss) ;
499 swSS(t) = yes$(ord(t)=last_ss) ;
500 swSSM(t)=yes$(ord(t)=round(((first_ss+last_ss)/2))) ;
501
502 ss_test(f) = sum(t$swSSM(t),I.l(f,t)-I.l(f,t-1)) ;
503 display ss_test, sstest, ss_start, swSS, swSSF, swSSM, first_ss, last_ss;
504 display X.l, I.l, K.l, PD.l;
505

```

```

506 loop(f,
507 abort$(abs(ss_test(f)) > 1e-4) "Model did not reach steady state", ss_test ;
508 );
509
510 *k0(f,t)          = sum(t2,K.l(f,t2)$t1(t2)) * (1-delta) ;
511 k0(f,t)          = sum(t2$swSSM(t2),K.l(f,t2)) * (1-delta);
512 display k0;
513
514
515 i_ss(f,t) = sum(t2$swSSM(t2),K.l(f,t2)) * delta ;
516 display i_ss ;
517
518 *$label skipssnolp
519
520 *****
521 * specify the steady state
522 *****
523 Q.l(t) = sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
524
525 solve nlpMCP using mcp;
526
527 PARAMETERS
528 rep_xf
529 rep_kf
530 rep_x
531 rep_k
532 rep_i
533 rep_pd
534 rep_pk
535 rep_pi
536 rep_perm
537 rep_emit
538 rep_mpc
539 rep_pq
540 rep_q
541 ;
542
543 rep_xf(t,"EXOBAUMCP") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
544 rep_kf(t,"EXOBAUMCP") = sum(f,K.l(f,t)) ;

```

```

545 rep_x(f,t,"EXOBAUMCP") = X.l(f,t) ;
546 rep_k(f,t,"EXOBAUMCP") = K.l(f,t) ;
547 rep_i(f,t,"EXOBAUMCP") = I.l(f,t) ;
548 rep_pd(t,"EXOBAUMCP") = (PD.l(t)/hiy) ;
549 rep_pk(f,t,"EXOBAUMCP") = PK.l(f,t) ;
550 rep_pi(f,t,"EXOBAUMCP") = PI.l(f,t) ;
551 rep_emit(t,"EXOBAUMCP") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f))*hiy ;
552
553 display rep_x, rep_k, rep_i, rep_pd, rep_pk, rep_pi, rep_emit;
554 *$exit
555 *****
556 * Replicate the benchmark with elastic demand
557 *****
558 *k0(f,t) = 0 ;
559 nolpMCP.iterlim = 0;
560 i0(f,t) = I.l(f,t) ;
561 pi0(f,t) = PI.l(f,t)/df(t) - i_in(f);
562 pd0(t) = PD.l(t);
563 *pd0(t) = sum(t2$tf(t2),PD.l(t2)) ;
564 *pd0(t) = pds0*df(t) ;
565 *pd0(t) = 1 ;
566 delas = %delasval% ;
567 swDE = 1 - 1$[delas=0] ;
568
569 display pi0, pd0 ;
570
571 solve nolpMCP using mcp;
572 abort$(nolpMCP.objval gt 1e-6) "Data calibration error. Cannot replicate benchmark.", nolpMCP.objval ;
573 abort$(nolpMCP.solvestat <> %solvestat.NormalCompletion%) "Model not normally completed", nolpMCP.solvestat ;
574 abort$(nolpMCP.modelstat <> %modelstat.Optimal%) "model not optimal", nolpMCP.modelstat ;
575
576 nolpMCP.iterlim = 100000;
577
578 rep_xf(t,"BAU") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
579 rep_kf(t,"BAU") = sum(f,K.l(f,t)) ;
580 rep_x(f,t,"BAU") = X.l(f,t) ;
581 rep_k(f,t,"BAU") = K.l(f,t) ;
582 rep_i(f,t,"BAU") = I.l(f,t) ;
583 rep_pd(t,"BAU") = PD.l(t)/hiy ;

```

```

584 rep_pk(f,t,"BAU") = PK.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
585 rep_pi(f,t,"BAU") = PI.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
586 rep_emit(t,"BAU") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f))*hiy ;
587 rep_pq(t,"BAU") = PD.l(t)/hiy/df(t) ;
588 rep_q(t,"BAU") = Q.l(t) ;
589
590 display rep_x, rep_k, rep_i, rep_pd, rep_pk, rep_pi, rep_emit;
591 *execute_unload "output.gdx"
592 *$exit
593 *****
594 * Establish additional benchmark values
595 *****
596
597 psi(t) = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f)) ;
598 phi(t) = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f)) / sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
599 sigma0 = ci('L')+[(i_sl('L')*(ci('H') - ci('L')))/sum(f,i_sl(f))] ;
600 display phi, sigma0 ;
601 *display phi ;
602
603 *****
604 *Run TPS counterfactual case
605 *****
606
607 swTPS(t) = yes;
608
609 parameter fun(t)          variable scale that approaches zero ;
610
611 scale = %scaleval% ;
612 *fun(t) = 1$(ord(t)<=10) + [(1/(1.02))**(ord(t)-10)]$(ord(t)>10) ;
613 sigma(t) = sigma0 * scale ;
614 sigma(t)$[ord(t)<20] = ci('H') ;
615 sigma(t)$[not swFUN] = phi(t) * scale ;
616 *sigma(t)$[swFUN] = phi(t) * fun(t);
617
618 solve nlpMCP using MCP ;
619 abort$(nlpMCP.solvestat <> %solvestat.NormalCompletion%) "TPS Model not normally completed", nlpMCP.solvestat ;
620 abort$(nlpMCP.modelstat <> %modelstat.Optimal%) "TPS model not optimal", nlpMCP.modelstat ;
621
622 display K.l, I.l, PK.l, PI.l, PD.l, PTPS.l ;

```

```

623
624 rep_xf(t,"TPS") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
625 rep_kf(t,"TPS") = sum(f,K.l(f,t)) ;
626 rep_x(f,t,"TPS") = X.l(f,t) ;
627 rep_k(f,t,"TPS") = K.l(f,t) ;
628 rep_i(f,t,"TPS") = I.l(f,t) ;
629 rep_pd(t,"TPS") = (PD.l(t)/hiy) ;
630 rep_pk(f,t,"TPS") = PK.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
631 rep_pi(f,t,"TPS") = PI.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
632 rep_emit(t,"TPS") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f))*hiy ;
633 rep_perm(t,"TPS") = PTPS.l(t)/df(t) ;
634 rep_mpc(f,t,"TPS") = (PTPS.l(t) * (ci(f) - sigma(t)))/df(t) ;
635 rep_pq(t,"TPS") = PD.l(t)/hiy/df(t) ;
636 rep_q(t,"TPS") = Q.l(t) ;
637
638 *****
639 *Run CAP counterfactual case that matches emissions to TPS
640 *****
641
642 swTPS(t) = no;
643 swCAP(t) = yes;
644
645 omega(t) = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f)) ;
646
647 solve nolpMCP using MCP ;
648 abort$(nolpMCP.solvestat <> %solvestat.NormalCompletion%) "CAP Model not normally completed", nolpMCP.solvestat ;
649 abort$(nolpMCP.modelstat <> %modelstat.Optimal%) "CAP model not optimal", nolpMCP.modelstat ;
650
651 rep_xf(t,"CAP") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)) ;
652 rep_kf(t,"CAP") = sum(f,K.l(f,t)) ;
653 rep_x(f,t,"CAP") = X.l(f,t) ;
654 rep_k(f,t,"CAP") = K.l(f,t) ;
655 rep_i(f,t,"CAP") = I.l(f,t) ;
656 rep_pd(t,"CAP") = (PD.l(t)/hiy) ;
657 rep_pk(f,t,"CAP") = PK.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
658 rep_pi(f,t,"CAP") = PI.l(f,t)/df(t) ;
659 rep_emit(t,"CAP") = sum(f,X.l(f,t)*ci(f))*hiy ;
660 rep_perm(t,"CAP") = PCAP.l(t)/df(t) ;
661 rep_mpc(f,t,"CAP") = (PCAP.l(t) * ci(f))/df(t) ;

```

```

662 rep_pq(t,"CAP") = PD.l(t)/hiy/df(t) ;
663 rep_q(t,"CAP") = Q.l(t) ;
664
665 display rep_x, rep_k, rep_i, rep_pd, rep_pk, rep_pi, rep_emit, phi, sigma ;
666
667
668
669 *****
670 *Reporting Parameters Declaration
671 *****
672
673 * Difference from BAU
674 parameters
675 xf_d           change in quantity demanded (total gen) for all t
676 kf_d           change in total capacity for all t
677 x_d            change in generation for all t
678 k_d            change in capacity for all t
679 i_d            change in investment for all t
680 pd_d           change in electricity price for all t
681 pk_d           change in capacity rental rate for all t
682 pi_d           change in investment price for all t
683 mpc_d          change in marginal policy costs for all t
684 perm_d         change in permit prices for all t
685 emit_d         change in emissions levels for all t
686 pq_d           change in undiscounted electricity price
687 q_d            change in quantity demanded
688 ;
689
690 parameters
691 cs_d           change in consumer surplus for each t
692 cs_dt          change in consumer surplus total
693 ps             producer surplus for each t
694 ps_d           change in producer surplus for each t
695 ps_dt          change in producer surplus total
696 pc_d           change in policy costs for each t
697 pc_dt          change in policy costs total
698 cinv           investment costs for each t
699 cinv_d         change in investment costs for each t
700 cinv_dt        change in investment costs total

```



```

701 dam                damages for each t
702 dam_d              damages avoided for each t
703 dam_dt             damages avoided total
704 ac_d               abatement cost for each t
705 ac_dt              abatement cost total
706 ss_d               change in social surplus for each t
707 ss_dt              change in social surplus total
708 ;
709
710 *"r" indicates discounted value
711 parameters
712 cs_dr               change in consumer surplus for each t DISCOUNTED
713 cs_dtr              change in consumer surplus total DISCOUNTED
714 psr                 producer surplus for each t DISCOUNTED
715 ps_dr              change in producer surplus for each t DISCOUNTED
716 ps_dtr              change in producer surplus total DISCOUNTED
717 pc_dr               change in policy costs for each t DISCOUNTED
718 pc_dtr              change in policy costs total DISCOUNTED
719 cinvr               investment costs for each t DISCOUNTED
720 cinv_dr             change in investment costs for each t DISCOUNTED
721 cinv_dtr            change in investment costs total DISCOUNTED
722 damr                damages for each t DISCOUNTED
723 dam_dr              damages avoided for each t DISCOUNTED
724 dam_dtr             damages avoided total DISCOUNTED
725 ac_dr               abatement cost for each t DISCOUNTED
726 ac_dtr              abatement cost total DISCOUNTED
727 ss_dr               change in social surplus for each t DISCOUNTED
728 ss_dtr              change in social surplus total DISCOUNTED
729 ;
730
731 parameters
732 ss_dr_perp           social surplus steady-state perpetuity
733 ac_dr_perp           abatement cost steady-state perpetuity
734 dam_dr_perp          damages avoided steady-state perpetuity
735 ;
736
737 parameter            csps_d            consumer plus producer surplus difference;
738
739 *Steady-state

```

```

740 parameters
741 xf_d_ss          change in quantity demanded (total gen) for all t steady-state
742 kf_d_ss          change in total capacity for all t steady-state
743 x_d_ss           change in generation for all t steady-state
744 k_d_ss           change in capacity for all t steady-state
745 i_d_ss           change in investment for all t steady-state
746 pd_d_ss          change in electricity price for all t steady-state
747 pk_d_ss          change in capacity rental rate for all t steady-state
748 pi_d_ss          change in investment price for all t steady-state
749 mpc_d_ss         change in marginal policy costs for all t steady-state
750 perm_d_ss        change in permit prices for all t steady-state
751 emit_d_ss        change in emissions levels for all t steady-state
752 ;
753
754 parameters
755 cs_d_ss          change in consumer surplus for each t steady-state
756 ps_ss            producer surplus for each t steady-state
757 ps_d_ss          change in producer surplus for each t steady-state
758 pc_d_ss          change in policy costs for each t steady-state
759 cinv_ss          investment costs for each t steady-state
760 cinv_d_ss        change in investment costs for each t steady-state
761 dam_ss           damages for each t steady-state
762 dam_d_ss         damages avoided for each t steady-state
763 ac_d_ss          abatement cost for each t steady-state
764 ss_d_ss          change in social surplus for each t steady-state
765 ;
766
767
768 *****
769 *Postprocess
770 *****
771
772 xf_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_xf(t,"TPS") - rep_xf(t,"BAU") ;
773 xf_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_xf(t,"CAP") - rep_xf(t,"BAU") ;
774
775 kf_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_kf(t,"TPS") - rep_kf(t,"BAU") ;
776 kf_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_kf(t,"CAP") - rep_kf(t,"BAU") ;
777
778 pd_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_pd(t,"TPS") - rep_pd(t,"BAU") ;

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```

779 pd_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_pd(t,"CAP") - rep_pd(t,"BAU") ;
780
781 x_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_x(f,t,"TPS") - rep_x(f,t,"BAU") ;
782 x_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_x(f,t,"CAP") - rep_x(f,t,"BAU") ;
783
784 k_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_k(f,t,"TPS") - rep_k(f,t,"BAU") ;
785 k_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_k(f,t,"CAP") - rep_x(f,t,"BAU") ;
786
787 i_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_i(f,t,"TPS") - rep_i(f,t,"BAU") ;
788 i_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_i(f,t,"CAP") - rep_i(f,t,"BAU") ;
789
790 pk_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_pk(f,t,"TPS") - rep_pk(f,t,"BAU") ;
791 pk_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_pk(f,t,"CAP") - rep_pk(f,t,"BAU") ;
792
793 pi_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_pi(f,t,"TPS") - rep_pi(f,t,"BAU") ;
794 pi_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_pi(f,t,"CAP") - rep_pi(f,t,"BAU") ;
795
796 mpc_d(f,t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_mpc(f,t,"TPS");
797 mpc_d(f,t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_mpc(f,t,"CAP");
798
799 perm_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_perm(t,"TPS");
800 perm_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_perm(t,"CAP");
801
802 emit_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_emit(t,"TPS") - rep_emit(t,"BAU") ;
803 emit_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_emit(t,"CAP") - rep_emit(t,"BAU") ;
804
805 pq_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_pq(t,"TPS") - rep_pq(t,"BAU") ;
806 pq_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_pq(t,"CAP") - rep_pq(t,"BAU") ;
807
808 q_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = rep_q(t,"TPS") - rep_q(t,"BAU") ;
809 q_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = rep_q(t,"CAP") - rep_q(t,"BAU") ;
810
811 *Steady-state
812 xf_d_ss("SSTPS") = rep_xf_ss("SSTPS") - rep_xf_ss("SSBAU") ;
813 xf_d_ss("SSCAP") = rep_xf_ss("SSCAP") - rep_xf_ss("SSBAU") ;
814
815 kf_d_ss("SSTPS") = rep_kf_ss("SSTPS") - rep_kf_ss("SSBAU") ;
816 kf_d_ss("SSCAP") = rep_kf_ss("SSCAP") - rep_kf_ss("SSBAU") ;
817

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```

818 pd_d_ss("SSTPS") = rep_pd_ss("SSTPS") - rep_pd_ss("SSBAU") ;
819 pd_d_ss("SSCAP") = rep_pd_ss("SSCAP") - rep_pd_ss("SSBAU") ;
820
821 x_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS") - rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
822 x_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP") - rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
823
824 k_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_k_ss(f,"SSTPS") - rep_k_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
825 k_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_k_ss(f,"SSCAP") - rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
826
827 i_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_i_ss(f,"SSTPS") - rep_i_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
828 i_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_i_ss(f,"SSCAP") - rep_i_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
829
830 pk_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_pk_ss(f,"SSTPS") - rep_pk_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
831 pk_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_pk_ss(f,"SSCAP") - rep_pk_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
832
833 pi_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_pi_ss(f,"SSTPS") - rep_pi_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
834 pi_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_pi_ss(f,"SSCAP") - rep_pi_ss(f,"SSBAU") ;
835
836 mpc_d_ss(f,"SSTPS") = rep_mpc_ss(f,"SSTPS");
837 mpc_d_ss(f,"SSCAP") = rep_mpc_ss(f,"SSCAP");
838
839 perm_d_ss("SSTPS") = rep_perm_ss("SSTPS");
840 perm_d_ss("SSCAP") = rep_perm_ss("SSCAP");
841
842 emit_d_ss("SSTPS") = rep_emit_ss("SSTPS") - rep_emit_ss("SSBAU") ;
843 emit_d_ss("SSCAP") = rep_emit_ss("SSCAP") - rep_emit_ss("SSBAU") ;
844
845
846 *****
847 *Consumer Surplus
848 *****
849
850 * Undiscounted
851 cs_d(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
852 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU"))**(delas) *
853 ((pd0(t)/hiy/df(t)) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU"))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy/df(t))**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU"))) /
854 (-delas - 1)
855 ;
856

```

```

857 cs_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
858 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS"))**(delas) *
859 ((pd0(t)/hiy/df(t)) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS"))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy/df(t))**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS"))) /
860 (-delas - 1)
861 ;
862
863 cs_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
864 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP"))**(delas) *
865 ((pd0(t)/hiy/df(t)) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP"))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy/df(t))**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP"))) /
866 (-delas - 1)
867 ;
868
869 * Discounted
870 cs_dr(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
871 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU")*df(t))**(delas) *
872 ((pd0(t)/hiy) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU")*df(t))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy)**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"BAU")*df(t))) /
873 (-delas - 1)
874 ;
875
876 cs_dr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
877 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS")*df(t))**(delas) *
878 ((pd0(t)/hiy) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS")*df(t))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy)**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"TPS")*df(t))) /
879 (-delas - 1)
880 ;
881
882 cs_dr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
883 -1*d(t) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP")*df(t))**(delas) *
884 ((pd0(t)/hiy) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP")*df(t))**(-delas) - (pd0(t)/hiy)**(-delas) * (rep_pq(t,"CAP")*df(t))) /
885 (-delas - 1)
886 ;
887
888
889 *Steady-state
890 cs_d_ss("SSBAU") =
891 -ds * rep_pd_ss("SSBAU")**(delas)
892 * [(pds0/hiy) * rep_pd_ss("SSBAU")**(-delas) - (pds0/hiy)**(-delas) * rep_pd_ss("SSBAU")]
893 / (-delas - 1)
894 ;
895

```

```

896 cs_d_ss("SSTPS") =
897 -ds * rep_pd_ss("SSTPS")**(delas)
898 * [(pds0/hiy)*rep_pd_ss("SSTPS")**(-delas) - (pds0/hiy)**(-delas)*rep_pd_ss("SSTPS")]
899 / (-delas - 1)
900 ;
901
902 cs_d_ss("SSCAP") =
903 -ds * rep_pd_ss("SSCAP")**(delas)
904 * [(pds0/hiy)*rep_pd_ss("SSCAP")**(-delas) - (pds0/hiy)**(-delas)*rep_pd_ss("SSCAP")]
905 / (-delas - 1)
906 ;
907
908 *total across t
909 cs_dt("BAU") = sum(t,cs_d(t,"BAU"));
910 cs_dt("TPS") = sum(t,cs_d(t,"TPS"));
911 cs_dt("CAP") = sum(t,cs_d(t,"CAP"));
912
913 cs_dtr("BAU") = sum(t,cs_dr(t,"BAU"));
914 cs_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,cs_dr(t,"TPS"));
915 cs_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,cs_dr(t,"CAP"));
916
917
918 *****
919 *Producer Surplus
920 *****
921
922 ps(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
923 (rep_pq(t,"BAU")) * rep_q(t,"BAU")
924 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"BAU")*vc_x(f))
925 ;
926
927 ps(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
928 (rep_pq(t,"TPS")) * rep_q(t,"TPS")
929 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"TPS")*vc_x(f))
930 ;
931
932 ps(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
933 (rep_pq(t,"CAP")) * rep_q(t,"CAP")
934 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*vc_x(f))

```

```

935 ;
936
937 psr(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
938 (rep_pq(t,"BAU")*df(t)) * rep_q(t,"BAU")
939 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"BAU")*vc_x(f))*df(t)
940 ;
941
942 psr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
943 (rep_pq(t,"TPS")*df(t)) * rep_q(t,"TPS")
944 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"TPS")*vc_x(f))*df(t)
945 ;
946
947 psr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
948 (rep_pq(t,"CAP")*df(t)) * rep_q(t,"CAP")
949 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*vc_x(f))*df(t)
950 ;
951
952
953 ps_d(t,"TPS") = ps(t,"TPS") - ps(t,"BAU") ;
954 ps_d(t,"CAP") = ps(t,"CAP") - ps(t,"BAU") ;
955
956 ps_dr(t,"TPS") = psr(t,"TPS") - psr(t,"BAU") ;
957 ps_dr(t,"CAP") = psr(t,"CAP") - psr(t,"BAU") ;
958
959 *Steady-state
960 ps_ss("SSBAU") =
961 rep_pd_ss("SSBAU") * sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU"))
962 - sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSBAU")*vc_x(f))
963 ;
964
965 ps_ss("SSTPS") =
966 rep_pd_ss("SSTPS") * sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS"))
967 - sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS")*vc_x(f))
968 *      - sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS")*rep_perm_ss("SSTPS")*(ci(f)-sigma_s))
969 ;
970
971 ps_ss("SSCAP") =
972 rep_pd_ss("SSCAP") * sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP"))
973 - sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP")*vc_x(f))

```

```

974 ;
975
976 ps_d_ss("SSTPS") = ps_ss("SSTPS") - ps_ss("SSBAU") ;
977 ps_d_ss("SSCAP") = ps_ss("SSCAP") - ps_ss("SSBAU") ;
978
979
980 *total across t
981 ps_dt("TPS") = sum(t,ps_d(t,"TPS"));
982 ps_dt("CAP") = sum(t,ps_d(t,"CAP"));
983
984 ps_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,ps_dr(t,"TPS"));
985 ps_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,ps_dr(t,"CAP"));
986
987 csps_d(t,"TPS") = ps_d(t,"TPS") + cs_d(t,"TPS") ;
988 csps_d(t,"CAP") = ps_d(t,"CAP") + cs_d(t,"CAP") ;
989
990 parameter cpk          rental profits (cost) ;
991 parameter cpk_d        change in rental profits (cost) ;
992
993 cpk(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
994 sum(f, rep_pk(f,t,"BAU")*rep_k(f,t,"BAU")) / hiy
995 ;
996
997 cpk(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
998 sum(f, rep_pk(f,t,"TPS")*rep_k(f,t,"TPS")) / hiy
999 ;
1000
1001 cpk(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1002 sum(f, rep_pk(f,t,"CAP")*rep_k(f,t,"CAP")) / hiy
1003 ;
1004
1005 cpk_d(t,"TPS") = cpk(t,"TPS") - cpk(t,"BAU") ;
1006 cpk_d(t,"CAP") = cpk(t,"CAP") - cpk(t,"BAU") ;
1007
1008
1009
1010 *****
1011 *Policy Costs
1012 *****

```



```

1013 *cpk + polc = ps if things are correct
1014 *pc_d = 0 for all cases if revenues from cap refunded to producers
1015 parameter polc policy costs no refunding used as check against cpk and ps;
1016
1017 polc(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1018 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"TPS")*mpc_d(f,t,"TPS"))
1019 ;
1020
1021 polc(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1022 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*mpc_d(f,t,"CAP"))
1023 ;
1024
1025 pc_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1026 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"TPS")*mpc_d(f,t,"TPS"))
1027 ;
1028
1029 pc_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1030 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*mpc_d(f,t,"CAP"))
1031 *revenues refunded to producers
1032 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*mpc_d(f,t,"CAP"))
1033 ;
1034
1035 pc_dr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1036 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"TPS")*mpc_d(f,t,"TPS"))*df(t)
1037 ;
1038
1039 pc_dr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1040 sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*mpc_d(f,t,"CAP"))*df(t)
1041 *revenues refunded to producers
1042 - sum(f,rep_x(f,t,"CAP")*mpc_d(f,t,"CAP"))*df(t)
1043 ;
1044
1045
1046 *Steady-state
1047 pc_d_ss("SSTPS") =
1048 sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSTPS")*rep_perm_ss("SSTPS")*(ci(f)-sigma_s))
1049 ;
1050
1051 pc_d_ss("SSCAP") =

```

```

1052 sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP")*rep_perm_ss("SSCAP")*ci(f))
1053 *revenues refunded to producers
1054 - sum(f,rep_x_ss(f,"SSCAP")*rep_perm_ss("SSCAP")*ci(f))
1055 ;
1056
1057 *total across t
1058 pc_dt("TPS") = sum(t,pc_d(t,"TPS"));
1059 pc_dt("CAP") = sum(t,pc_d(t,"CAP"));
1060
1061 pc_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,pc_dr(t,"TPS"));
1062 pc_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,pc_dr(t,"CAP"));
1063
1064 *****
1065 *Investment Costs
1066 *****
1067
1068
1069 cinv(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
1070 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"BAU") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"BAU")**2))/hiy]$(swlic)
1071 + [sum(f,(1/(1/ielas(f)+1))*pi0(f,t)*(rep_i(f,t,"BAU")**(1/ielas(f) + 1))*(i0(f,t)**(-1/ielas(f))))/hiy]$(not swlic)
1072 ;
1073
1074 cinv(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1075 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"TPS") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"TPS")**2))/hiy]$(swlic)
1076 + [sum(f,(1/(1/ielas(f)+1))*pi0(f,t)*(rep_i(f,t,"TPS")**(1/ielas(f) + 1))*(i0(f,t)**(-1/ielas(f))))/hiy]$(not swlic)
1077 ;
1078
1079 cinv(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1080 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"CAP") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"CAP")**2))/hiy]$(swlic)
1081 + [sum(f,(1/(1/ielas(f)+1))*pi0(f,t)*(rep_i(f,t,"CAP")**(1/ielas(f) + 1))*(i0(f,t)**(-1/ielas(f))))/hiy]$(not swlic)
1082 ;
1083
1084
1085 cinvr(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] =
1086 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"BAU") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"BAU")**2))/hiy]*df(t)
1087 ;
1088
1089 cinvr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1090 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"TPS") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"TPS")**2))/hiy]*df(t)

```

```

1091 ;
1092
1093 cinvr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1094 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i(f,t,"CAP") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i(f,t,"CAP")**2))/hiy]*df(t)
1095 ;
1096
1097 cinv_d(t,"TPS") = cinv(t,"TPS") - cinv(t,"BAU") ;
1098 cinv_d(t,"CAP") = cinv(t,"CAP") - cinv(t,"BAU") ;
1099
1100 cinv_dr(t,"TPS") = cinvr(t,"TPS") - cinvr(t,"BAU") ;
1101 cinv_dr(t,"CAP") = cinvr(t,"CAP") - cinvr(t,"BAU") ;
1102
1103 *Steady-state
1104 cinv_ss("SSBAU") =
1105 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i_ss(f,"SSBAU") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i_ss(f,"SSBAU")**2))]/hiy
1106 ;
1107
1108 cinv_ss("SSTPS") =
1109 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i_ss(f,"SSTPS") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i_ss(f,"SSTPS")**2))]/hiy
1110 ;
1111
1112 cinv_ss("SSCAP") =
1113 [sum(f,i_in(f)*rep_i_ss(f,"SSCAP") + (1/2)*i_sl(f)*(rep_i_ss(f,"SSCAP")**2))]/hiy
1114 ;
1115
1116 cinv_d_ss("SSTPS") = cinv_ss("SSTPS") - cinv_ss("SSBAU") ;
1117 cinv_d_ss("SSCAP") = cinv_ss("SSCAP") - cinv_ss("SSBAU") ;
1118
1119 *total across t
1120 cinv_dt("TPS") = sum(t,cinv_d(t,"TPS"));
1121 cinv_dt("CAP") = sum(t,cinv_d(t,"CAP"));
1122
1123 cinv_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,cinv_dr(t,"TPS"));
1124 cinv_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,cinv_dr(t,"CAP"));
1125
1126 *****
1127 *Abatement Costs
1128 *****
1129 * Abatement costs are positive (cost)

```

```

1130 * ss_d = benefits - abatement costs
1131 * ss_d = dam_d - ac_d
1132
1133 ac_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1134 -1*(
1135 *consumer surplus
1136 cs_d(t,"TPS")
1137 *producer surplus
1138 + ps_d(t,"TPS")
1139 *policy cost
1140 - pc_d(t,"TPS")
1141 *investment cost
1142 - cinv_d(t,"TPS")
1143 )
1144 ;
1145
1146
1147 ac_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1148 -1*(
1149 *consumer surplus
1150 cs_d(t,"CAP")
1151 *producer surplus
1152 + ps_d(t,"CAP")
1153 *policy cost
1154 - pc_d(t,"CAP")
1155 *investment cost
1156 - cinv_d(t,"CAP")
1157 )
1158 ;
1159
1160 ac_dr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] =
1161 -1*(
1162 *consumer surplus
1163 cs_dr(t,"TPS")
1164 *producer surplus
1165 + ps_dr(t,"TPS")
1166 *policy cost
1167 - pc_dr(t,"TPS")
1168 *investment cost

```

```

1169 - cinv_dr(t,"TPS")
1170 )
1171 ;
1172
1173
1174 ac_dr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] =
1175 -1*(
1176 *consumer surplus
1177 cs_dr(t,"CAP")
1178 *producer surplus
1179 + ps_dr(t,"CAP")
1180 *policy cost
1181 - pc_dr(t,"CAP")
1182 *investment cost
1183 - cinv_dr(t,"CAP")
1184 )
1185 ;
1186
1187
1188 *Steady-state
1189 ac_d_ss("SSTPS") =
1190 -1*(
1191 *consumer surplus
1192 cs_d_ss("SSTPS")
1193 *producer surplus
1194 + ps_d_ss("SSTPS")
1195 *policy cost
1196 - pc_d_ss("SSTPS")
1197 *investment cost
1198 - cinv_d_ss("SSTPS")
1199 )
1200 ;
1201
1202 ac_d_ss("SSCAP") =
1203 -1*(
1204 *consumer surplus
1205 cs_d_ss("SSCAP")
1206 *producer surplus
1207 + ps_d_ss("SSCAP")

```

```

1208 *policy cost
1209 - pc_d_ss("SSCAP")
1210 *investment cost
1211 - cinv_d_ss("SSCAP")
1212 )
1213 ;
1214
1215 *total across t
1216 ac_dt("TPS") = sum(t,ac_d(t,"TPS"));
1217 ac_dt("CAP") = sum(t,ac_d(t,"CAP"));
1218
1219 ac_dr_perp("TPS")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t),ac_dr(t,"TPS")) / dr ;
1220 ac_dr_perp("CAP")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t),ac_dr(t,"CAP")) / dr ;
1221
1222 ac_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,ac_dr(t,"TPS")) + ac_dr_perp("TPS");
1223 ac_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,ac_dr(t,"CAP")) + ac_dr_perp("CAP");
1224
1225 *****
1226 *Damages
1227 *****
1228
1229 parameter cdam          marginal cost of emissions (marginal damages) ;
1230
1231 cdam = %cdamval% ;
1232
1233 dam(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] = cdam * rep_emit(t,"BAU") / 2204 / hiy ;
1234 dam(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = cdam * rep_emit(t,"TPS") / 2204 / hiy ;
1235 dam(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = cdam * rep_emit(t,"CAP") / 2204 / hiy ;
1236
1237 damr(t,"BAU")$[trep(t)] = [cdam * rep_emit(t,"BAU") / 2204 / hiy]*df(t) ;
1238 damr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = [cdam * rep_emit(t,"TPS") / 2204 / hiy]*df(t) ;
1239 damr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = [cdam * rep_emit(t,"CAP") / 2204 / hiy]*df(t) ;
1240
1241
1242 *damages avoided (benefit)
1243 dam_d(t,"TPS") = -1*(dam(t,"TPS") - dam(t,"BAU")) ;
1244 dam_d(t,"CAP") = -1*(dam(t,"CAP") - dam(t,"BAU")) ;
1245
1246 dam_dr(t,"TPS") = -1*(damr(t,"TPS") - damr(t,"BAU")) ;

```

```

1247 dam_dr(t,"CAP") = -1*(damr(t,"CAP") - damr(t,"BAU")) ;
1248
1249 *Steady-state
1250 dam_ss("SSBAU") = cdam * rep_emit_ss("SSBAU") / 2204 / hiy ;
1251 dam_ss("SSTPS") = cdam * rep_emit_ss("SSTPS") / 2204 / hiy ;
1252 dam_ss("SSCAP") = cdam * rep_emit_ss("SSCAP") / 2204 / hiy ;
1253
1254 *damages avoided (benefit)
1255 dam_d_ss("SSTPS") = -1*(dam_ss("SSTPS") - dam_ss("SSBAU")) ;
1256 dam_d_ss("SSCAP") = -1*(dam_ss("SSCAP") - dam_ss("SSBAU")) ;
1257
1258 *total across t
1259 dam_dt("TPS") = sum(t,dam_d(t,"TPS"));
1260 dam_dt("CAP") = sum(t,dam_d(t,"CAP"));
1261
1262 dam_dr_perp("TPS")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t),dam_dr(t,"TPS")) / dr ;
1263 dam_dr_perp("CAP")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t),dam_dr(t,"CAP")) / dr ;
1264
1265 dam_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,dam_dr(t,"TPS")) + dam_dr_perp("TPS");
1266 dam_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,dam_dr(t,"CAP")) + dam_dr_perp("CAP");
1267
1268
1269 *****
1270 *Social Surplus
1271 *****
1272 * Change in Social Surplus = Benefit - Cost
1273
1274 ss_d(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = dam_d(t,"TPS") - ac_d(t,"TPS") ;
1275 ss_d(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = dam_d(t,"CAP") - ac_d(t,"CAP") ;
1276
1277 ss_dr(t,"TPS")$[trep(t)] = dam_dr(t,"TPS") - ac_dr(t,"TPS") ;
1278 ss_dr(t,"CAP")$[trep(t)] = dam_dr(t,"CAP") - ac_dr(t,"CAP") ;
1279
1280
1281 *Steady-state
1282 ss_d_ss("SSTPS") = dam_d_ss("SSTPS") - ac_d_ss("SSTPS") ;
1283 ss_d_ss("SSCAP") = dam_d_ss("SSCAP") - ac_d_ss("SSCAP") ;
1284 ss_d_ss("SSTPS-SSCAP") = ss_d_ss("SSTPS") - ss_d_ss("SSCAP") ;
1285

```

```

1286 *total across t
1287 ss_dt("TPS") = sum(t,ss_d(t,"TPS"));
1288 ss_dt("CAP") = sum(t,ss_d(t,"CAP"));
1289
1290 ss_dr_perp("TPS")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t), ss_dr(t,"TPS")) / dr ;
1291 ss_dr_perp("CAP")$[dr>0] = sum(t$trepf(t), ss_dr(t,"CAP")) / dr ;
1292
1293 ss_dtr("TPS") = sum(t,ss_dr(t,"TPS")) + ss_dr_perp("TPS");
1294 ss_dtr("CAP") = sum(t,ss_dr(t,"CAP")) + ss_dr_perp("CAP");
1295
1296 *SS Comparisons
1297 ss_d(t,"TPS-CAP") = ss_d(t,"TPS") - ss_d(t,"CAP") ;
1298 ss_dr(t,"TPS-CAP") = ss_dr(t,"TPS") - ss_dr(t,"CAP") ;
1299 ss_dt("TPS-CAP") = ss_dt("TPS") - ss_dt("CAP") ;
1300 ss_dtr("TPS-CAP") = ss_dtr("TPS") - ss_dtr("CAP") ;
1301
1302 ac_d(t,"TPS-CAP") = ac_d(t,"TPS") - ac_d(t,"CAP") ;
1303 ac_dr(t,"TPS-CAP") = ac_dr(t,"TPS") - ac_dr(t,"CAP") ;
1304 ac_dt("TPS-CAP") = ac_dt("TPS") - ac_dt("CAP") ;
1305 ac_dtr("TPS-CAP") = ac_dtr("TPS") - ac_dtr("CAP") ;
1306
1307
1308 *Key parameters for sensitivity
1309 parameter ss_dtr_sens(*,*,*) sensitivity parameter for social surplus;
1310
1311 ss_dtr_sens("TPS","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_dtr("TPS") ;
1312 ss_dtr_sens("CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_dtr("CAP") ;
1313 ss_dtr_sens("TPS-CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_dtr("TPS-CAP") ;
1314
1315 parameter ss_d_ss_sens(*,*,*) sensitivity for steady-state social surplus ;
1316
1317 ss_d_ss_sens("TPS","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_d_ss("SSTPS") ;
1318 ss_d_ss_sens("CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_d_ss("SSCAP") ;
1319 ss_d_ss_sens("TPS-CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%") = ss_d_ss("SSTPS-SSCAP") ;
1320
1321 * parameter ss_d_ss_sens_alt(*,*,*,*,*) alternate sens for ss social surplus;
1322 * ss_d_ss_sens_alt("TPS","%scennum%","%scenlet%","%scaleval%","%drval%","%cil%") = ss_d_ss("SSTPS") ;
1323 * ss_d_ss_sens_alt("CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%","%scaleval%","%drval%","%cil%") = ss_d_ss("SSCAP") ;
1324 * ss_d_ss_sens_alt("TPS-CAP","%scennum%","%scenlet%","%scaleval%","%drval%","%cil%") = ss_d_ss("SSTPS-SSCAP") ;

```



```
1325
1326 *****
1327 *OUTPUT to readable format
1328 *****
1329
1330 execute_unload "%gdxfile%" ;
1331
```

APPENDIX I - COBALT MODEL CODE

Files included:

1. run_scenarios.bat - specifies setup for each benchmark and which calibration file to call
2. cur_data.gms - calibrates current benchmark scenario (CUR)
3. fut_data.gms - calibrates future benchmark scenarios (NPS or E30)
4. model_cob.gms - cobalt model

run_scenarios.gms

```
1 title Sensitivity Testing
2
3 del ..\scenout\runout\*.gdx
4
5 set run_name=%1
6 echo %run_name%
7
8 pause
9
10 ::Scenario Name Key
11 ::(CUR, NPS, E30) Current, NPS, EV30@30
12 ::(1,2) quoteval (0.25,1)
13 ::(A,B) swdelas (no, yes) or esomcval = 0
14 ::(a,b,c) esldvval (0.5, 0.1, 2)
15
16 ::Present Day / Current Scenario
17 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Aa --quoteval=025
18 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Aa --quoteval=100
19 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Ba --quoteval=025
20 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
21 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Ba --quoteval=100
```

```

22 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
23 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Ab --quoteval=025
24 --esldvval=0.10
25 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Ab --quoteval=100
26 --esldvval=0.10
27 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Ac --quoteval=025
28 --esldvval=2.00
29 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Ac --quoteval=100
30 --esldvval=2.00
31 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Bb --quoteval=025
32 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10
33 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Bb --quoteval=100
34 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10
35 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_1Bc --quoteval=025
36 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
37 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=CUR_2Bc --quoteval=100
38 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
39
40 ::NPS Scenario
41 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Aa --bmkyr=future
42 --swfutscen=NPS --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025
43 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Aa --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
44 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100
45 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Ba --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
46 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
47 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Ba --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
48 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
49 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Ab --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
50 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvval=0.10
51 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Ab --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
52 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvval=0.10
53 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Ac --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
54 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvval=2.00
55 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Ac --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
56 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvval=2.00
57 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Bb --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
58 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10
59 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Bb --bmkyr=future --swfutscen=NPS
60 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10

```

```

61 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_1Bc --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=NPS
62 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
63 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=NPS_2Bc --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=NPS
64 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
65
66 ::EV30@30 Scenario
67 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Aa --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
68 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025
69 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Aa --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
70 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100
71 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Ba --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
72 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
73 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Ba --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
74 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0
75 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Ab --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
76 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvval=0.10
77 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Ab --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
78 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvval=0.10
79 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Ac --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
80 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvval=2.00
81 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Ac --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
82 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvval=2.00
83 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Bb --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
84 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10
85 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Bb --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
86 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=0.10
87 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_1Bc --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
88 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=025 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
89 gams model_cob.gms --run_name=%run_name% --gdxname=E30_2Bc --bmkyl=future --swfutscen=E30
90 --capadj=notdefault --bcrep=0.135 --quoteval=100 --esldvieval=0 --esomcval=0 --esldvval=2.00
91
92
93 COPY runs_%run_name%.dat ..\scenout\runs_%run_name%.dat
94 DEL runs_%run_name%.dat
95
96
97 gdxmerge ..\scenout\runout\*.gdx output=..\scenout\runs_%run_name%.gdx
98
99

```

cur_data.gms

```
1 $title Data pre-processing for cobalt cge main model (Current Scenarios)
2
3 *===== Populate/update existing sets =====
4 $onmulti
5 set g(*)    goods plus C and G /
6 cob        "refined cobalt general met/chem aggregate"
7 mcob       "refined cobalt metal"
8 ccob       "refined cobalt chemical"
9 ldv        "light duty vehicles index"
10 ice       "internal combustion vehicles within ldv"
11 bev       "battery electric vehicles within ldv"
12 phev      "plug-in hybrid electric vehicles within ice"
13 omvh      "other motor vehicles and parts - substitutable with ldv index"
14 /;
15
16 $onmulti
17 set i(g)    goods /
18 cob        "refined cobalt general met/chem aggregate"
19 mcob       "refined cobalt metal"
20 ccob       "refined cobalt chemical"
21 ldv        "light duty vehicles index"
22 ice       "internal combustion vehicles within ldv"
23 bev       "battery electric vehicles within ldv"
24 phev      "plug-in hybrid electric vehicles within ldv"
25 omvh      "other motor vehicles and parts - substitutable with ldv index"
26 /;
27
28 $onmulti
29 set f(*)    factors /
30 rco        "fixed cobalt resource factor"
31 /;
32
33 display g,i,f;
34
35 *add subsets for set control later
36 set cob(g) cobalt general /cob/;
37 set ccob(g) cobalt chemical /ccob/;
```

```

38 set mcob(g) cobalt metal /mcob/;
39 set cobmc(g) cobalt chem and met /ccob, mcob/;
40 set coball(g) all cobalt sets /cob, ccob, mcob/;
41
42 set cmm(g) cmm index /cmm/;
43 *set ele(g) ele index /ele/;
44 set omc(g) omc index /omc/;
45 set omi(g) omi index /omi/;
46 set aog(g) aog index /aog/;
47
48 set ldv(g) light duty vehicles /ldv/;
49 set ice(g) internal combustion /ice/;
50 set bev(g) battery electric /bev/;
51 set phev(g) plug-in hybrid /phev/;
52 set omvh(g) other mvh /omvh/;
53 set ev(g) EV technologies /bev, phev/;
54 set ldvie(g) ice and ev /ice, bev, phev/;
55 set ldvall(g) all ldv /ldv, ice, bev, phev/;
56
57 set mvh(g) mvh index /mvh/;
58 set mvhlo(g) ldv and omvh /ldv, omvh/;
59 set mvhall(g) all mvh /mvh, ldv, omvh/;
60 set mvhall2(g) all mvh /mvh, ldv, omvh, bev, phev, ice/;
61 set mvhall3(g) all mvh /ldv, omvh, bev, phev, ice/;
62
63 set rco(f) fixed cobalt resource /rco/;
64 set cap(f) capital /cap/;
65 set lab(f) labor /lab/;
66
67
68 set chn(r) references china (chn) /chn/ ;
69 set usa(r) references usa (usa) /usa/ ;
70 set row(r) references row (row) /row/ ;
71
72 *specify mobile/sluggish factors (k and l are mobile)
73 mf(f)$[not rco(f)] = yes$(1/etrae(f)=0);
74 sf(f)$[not rco(f)] = yes$(1/etrae(f)>0);
75
76

```

```

77 *===== Raw Data =====
78
79 parameters
80 prd_q0(g,r)    "benchmark production quantity"
81 prd_p0(g,r)    "benchmark production price"
82 prd_v0(g,r)    "benchmark production value(output) unadjusted for gtap base year"
83 ;
84
85 *Cobalt DATA
86
87 table  cobprd_q0(r,i)      "Cobalt Production - table to import cobalt production (tons Co)"
88 COB  CCOB  MCOB
89 USA 300   300   0
90 CHN 72200 59000 13200
91 ROW 44200 9300  34900
92
93 ;
94
95 scalar  pg_cob  "global cobalt price"  /20/;
96 prd_p0(i,r)[cob(i)] = pg_cob ;
97
98
99 *LDV, BEV, PHEV, ICE DATA
100
101 table  ldvprd_q0(r,i)      "LDV Production - table to import ldv production (# of vehicles)"
102
103 LDV      BEV      PHEV      ICE
104 USA 11000000 104040 99960  10796000
105 CHN 25000000 486000 114000 24400000
106 ROW 39000000 201960 194040 38604000
107
108 ;
109
110
111 parameter  ldv_sales(r)    "ldv sales by country"
112 /
113 USA      16000000
114 CHN      25000000
115 ROW      34000000

```

```

116 /
117 ;
118
119 *https://www.statista.com/outlook/1000000/117/passenger-cars/china#market-pricePerUnit
120 *https://www.statista.com/statistics/425095/eu-car-sales-average-prices-in-by-country/
121 parameter rep_ldvprice(r) "average ldv sales price by region"
122 /
123 USA      38000,
124 CHN      22000,
125 ROW      30000
126 /
127 ;
128
129 scalar avg_ldvprice "average global ldv sale price";
130 avg_ldvprice = sum(r, ldv_sales(r) * rep_ldvprice(r)) / sum(r, ldv_sales(r));
131
132 parameter ldv_cost_scale(r) "Scaling factor for ldv costs - used for country level vehicle cost adjustments";
133 ldv_cost_scale(r) = rep_ldvprice(r) / avg_ldvprice ;
134
135 parameter rep_ldvcost(i) "production cost of representative vehicle"
136 /
137 ICE      25000,
138 BEV      40000,
139 PHEV     30000
140 /
141 ;
142
143 parameter rep_ldvcap(i) "capacity of battery in representative vehicle"
144 /
145 ICE      0,
146 BEV      45,
147 PHEV     12
148 /
149 ;
150
151 parameter rep_packcost(i) "cost/kwh of battery pack in representative vehicle"
152 /
153 ICE      0,
154 BEV      175,

```



```

155 PHEV      175
156 /
157 ;
158
159 table     avg_cap(r,i)    "average electric vehicle battery capacity (kwh)"
160
161 BEV PHEV
162 USA 65 12
163 CHN 27 15
164 ROW 39 12
165
166 ;
167
168 parameter  ldv_battcap(i,r)  "total battery capacity in each ldv sector";
169 ldv_battcap(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) * avg_cap(r,i);
170
171 * Calculate benchmark indices for electric vehicles
172 prd_q0(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) ;
173 prd_p0(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = [rep_ldvcost(i) + (avg_cap(r,i) - rep_ldvcap(i)) * rep_packcost(i)] * ldv_cost_scale(r) ;
174 prd_v0(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = prd_q0(i,r) * prd_p0(i,r);
175
176 *Battery Capacity for Portable Electronics - ELE sector
177 *SOURCE: Roskill Cobalt Report
178
179 *A different source with some incomplete information suggesting consumer electronics
180 *are close to roskill shares
181 *https://intrepidsourcing.com/industry-reports/consumer-electronics-industry-report/
182
183 parameter  ele_battcap(r)  "portable electronics battery capacity (kwh)"
184 /
185 USA      40000000,
186 CHN      110000000,
187 ROW      210000000
188 /
189 ;
190
191 *Battery Chemistry Data
192
193 set bc  "battery chemistry"

```

```

194 /
195 NCA,
196 NCM111,
197 NCM433,
198 NCM523,
199 NCM622,
200 NCM811,
201 LCO,
202 LFP,
203 LMO
204 /
205 ;
206
207 parameter rep_chem(bc) "Cobalt contained within battery chemistry (kg/kwh)"
208 /
209 NCA 0.13,
210 NCM111 0.4,
211 NCM433 0.35,
212 NCM523 0.23,
213 NCM622 0.19,
214 NCM811 0.09,
215 LCO 0.6,
216 LFP 0,
217 LMO 0
218 /
219 ;
220
221 set u "use categories"
222 /
223 batt "battery",
224 supa "superalloys",
225 hard "hard metals/tools",
226 pigm "pigments/inks/ceramics",
227 cata "catalysts",
228 soap "soaps and detergents",
229 mago "magnets and other applications"
230 /
231 ;
232

```

```

233 alias(u,z);
234 set batt(u) "battery chemistry" /batt/;
235
236 table sh_cob_globe_use(u,*) "data related to cobalt use and global distribution of use"
237 use USA CHN ROW
238 batt 0.48 0.08 0.65 0.27
239 supa 0.19 0.42 0.17 0.41
240 hard 0.09 0.07 0.50 0.43
241 pigm 0.06 0.11 0.65 0.24
242 cata 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.77
243 soap 0.03 0.32 0.21 0.47
244 mago 0.09 0.10 0.58 0.32
245 ;
246
247 display sh_cob_globe_use;
248
249 *===== Cobalt use (tons) =====
250
251 parameter cob_used(i,r) "pure cobalt used in production of goods (kg or tons)";
252
253 *----- Choose a Representative Chemistry -----
254 *cobalt used in production of vehicles (tons)
255 *cob_used(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * rep_chem("NCM111")) * (2.204 / 2000);
256 cob_used(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * %bcrep%) * (2.204 / 2000);
257
258 *cobalt used in production of portable electronic devices (tons)
259 *cob_used(i,r)$[ele(i)] = (ele_battcap(r) * rep_chem("LCO")) * (2.204 / 2000);
260
261
262 *Determine cobalt use(tons co) by country in OMC sector after EV use accounted for
263 cob_used(i,r)$[omc(i)] =
264 [sum(u$(not batt(u)), sum(s,cobprd_q0(s,"cob"))*sh_cob_globe_use(u,"use")*sh_cob_globe_use(u,r))]
265 + [sum(u$batt(u), (sum(s,cobprd_q0(s,"cob")) * sh_cob_globe_use(u,"use")
266 - sum((j,s)$ldvie(j),cob_used(j,s))
267 - sum(s,(ele_battcap(s) * rep_chem("LCO")) * (2.204 / 2000)))
268 * sh_cob_globe_use(u,r))]
269 *
270 + [(ele_battcap(r) * rep_chem("LCO")) * (2.204 / 2000)]
271 ;

```

```

272
273 *OR...
274
275 *----- What is the implied battery chemistry? -----
276 *Rather than representative chemistry - use implied chemistry
277 parameter  cob_use_ev      "cobalt used in the EV sector 2017 (tons Co)";
278 *6% of global cobalt production is used in LDV EVs
279 *Source: IEA 2018 global ev outlook
280 cob_use_ev = sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) * 0.06;
281
282 parameter  imp_chem      "implied battery chemistry (kg/kwh)";
283 imp_chem("IEA") = (cob_use_ev * 2000 / 2.204) / sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), ldv_battcap(i,r));
284
285 parameter  imp_cob_use(i,r)  "implied pure cobalt used in production of goods (kg or tons)";
286 imp_cob_use(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * imp_chem("IEA")) * (2.204 / 2000) ;
287
288 parameter  jrc_cob_use(i,r)  "guess using shares from jrc report";
289
290 imp_chem("jrc") = rep_chem("NCM111")*.42 + rep_chem("NCM433")*.05 + rep_chem("NCM523")*.07
291 + .07*rep_chem("LMO") + rep_chem("NCA")*.14 + rep_chem("LFP")*.24
292 ;
293
294 jrc_cob_use(i,r) = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * imp_chem("jrc")) * (2.204 / 2000);
295
296 parameter  share_cob_use_imp;
297
298 share_cob_use_imp("ncm111") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), cob_used(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
299 share_cob_use_imp("IEA") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), imp_cob_use(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
300 share_cob_use_imp("JRC") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), jrc_cob_use(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
301
302 display rep_chem, imp_chem, share_cob_use_imp, cob_use_ev, imp_cob_use, cob_used, jrc_cob_use ;
303
304 *-----
305
306 *----- Determine cobalt used in OMC Sector -----
307
308 parameter  cob_globe_use(i)  "total cobalt use within each sector";
309
310 *If Scenario is Future --- Already have present day OMC data

```

```

311 *Need Switch or something to adjust cobalt production when running future scenarios
312 *--- this could go at beginning of the file
313 *I could hold cobalt use in omc the same as first benchmark setup... then adjust production accordingly
314 *I would also have no need for previous two lines of code or some of the lines below
315 *cob_used(i,r)$[omc(i)] = benchmark_cob_used(i,r);
316 *cob_globe_use(i) = sum(r, cob_used(i,r)) ;
317
318
319 *If Scenario is Current --- no OMC data Exists
320 *Given total value of OMC sectoral activity
321 *and total value of cobalt used after LDV and ELE use (global OMC cob use value)
322 *I assume cobalt is weighted in each region by OMC sector share of global to equate supply and demand globally
323
324 *cob_globe_use(i)$[not omc(i)] = sum(r,cob_used(i,r));
325 *cob_globe_use(i)$[omc(i)] = sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) - sum(j,cob_globe_use(j));
326 cob_globe_use(i) = sum(r,cob_used(i,r));
327
328 Parameter check_sd_cob "check to make sure production equals use (supply=demand)" ;
329 check_sd_cob("dem-sup") = sum(i,cob_globe_use(i)) - sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
330
331 display check_sd_cob, cob_globe_use, cob_used;
332
333
334 parameter vom_shrg(i,r) "output share of global";
335 vom_shrg(i,r)$[omc(i)] = vom(i,r) / sum(s,vom(i,s)) ;
336
337 *cob_used(i,r)$[omc(i)] = cob_globe_use(i) * vom_shrg(i,r) ;
338
339 check_sd_cob("dem-sup-alt") = sum((i,r), cob_used(i,r)) - sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob"));
340
341 display check_sd_cob, cob_used;
342 *$exit
343 *NOTE:
344 *cob_used(i,r) contains cobalt use (tons Co) in all modeled sectors in current year (2017)
345
346 *=====
347
348 *===== MVH nesting structure in terms of values and value shares =====
349

```

```

350 *Average new car price 2010 --- 28k
351 *Average new car price 2018 --- 36k
352 *Growth Rate --- (36/28)**(1/(2018-2010)) = 1 + r --- r = 0.03 (approximate) --
353
354 *unido db says 7-10% (approx) based on output in motor vehicles production (4 digit isic)
355
356 *Given r and unchanged vehicles production - 2011 value of automobiles can be determined
357 **This can be used to disaggregate mvh into omvh and ldv
358 **ldv can be further disaggregated given value shares calculated as a result of a given point in time
359 **Need to establish base year vehicles output in order to infer cobalt production based on sharing
360
361 $ontext
362 mvh omvh ldv ice bev phev
363 mvh
364 omvh x
365 ldv x
366 ice x
367 bev x
368 phev x
369 aog x x x x
370 $offtext
371
372 *total value of all ldv
373 prd_v0(i,r)$[ldv(i)] = sum(j$ldvie(j), prd_v0(j,r)) ;
374
375 parameter sh_ldv_v0(i,r) "share of total ldv output attributable to BEV, PHEV, and ICE";
376 sh_ldv_v0(i,r)$[ldvall(i)] = prd_v0(i,r) / sum(j$ldv(j), prd_v0(j,r)) ;
377
378 *gtap base year (2011) - need to bring 2017-2018 figures back
379 scalar base_yr "gtap base year" /2011/;
380 scalar data_yr "year for cost data" /2017/;
381
382 *based on unido database cagr automobiles sector --- roughly 7-10% for period
383 *scalar cost_r "annual growth rate" /0.08/;
384 parameter cost_r(r) "annual automobiles unido growth rate (cagr) by country"
385 /
386 USA 0.08,
387 CHN 0.08,
388 ROW 0.08

```

```

389 /
390 ;
391
392 *adjust current values so that they represent appropriate value shares of GTAP 2011 database
393 parameter prd_v0_base(i,r) "base year (2011) output value -- consistent with GTAP9";
394 *prd_v0_base(i,r)$[ldv(i)] = prd_v0(i,r) * [(1/(1+cost_r))**(data_yr-base_yr)];
395 prd_v0_base(i,r)$[ldv(i)] = prd_v0(i,r) * [(1/(1+cost_r(r))**(data_yr-base_yr)];
396
397 parameter sh_vdfm(j,i,r) "share of input value /output";
398
399 *First compute share for LDV and OMOVH in MVH
400 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)$ldv(j)] = 1e-9 * prd_v0_base(j,r) / vom(i,r) ;
401 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)$omvh(j)] = 1 - sh_vdfm("ldv",i,r);
402
403 *For reporting purposes/curiosity --- may come in handy as validation tool
404 parameter wt_avg_vh_cost(r) "weighted average ldv cost implied in benchmark";
405 wt_avg_vh_cost(r) = prd_v0("ldv",r) / ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv") ;
406
407 display prd_v0, sh_ldv_v0, prd_v0_base, sh_vdfm, wt_avg_vh_cost ;
408
409 *Define intermediate input shares in MVH sector
410 *There are different ways to share out - for now assume same structure as MVH in omvh and ldv
411 parameters
412 sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r) "cost shares of mvh in original SAM (vdfm)"
413 sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r) "cost share of mvh in original SAM (vifm)"
414 sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r) "cost share of mvh in original SAM (vfm)"
415 ;
416
417 sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vdfm(j,i,r) / vom(i,r);
418 sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vifm(j,i,r) / vom(i,r);
419 sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vfm(f,i,r) / vom(i,r);
420
421 parameter zpf_share_chk(i,r);
422 zpf_share_chk(i,r)$mvh(i) =
423 1*(1-rt0(i,r))
424 - sum(j, sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
425 - sum(f, sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
426 ;
427

```

```

428 display sh_vdfm_mvh0, sh_vifm_mvh0, sh_vfm_mvh0, zpf_share_chk ;
429
430 *recall sh_ldv_v0(i,r) from earlier
431 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[ldvie(j)$ldv(i)] = sh_ldv_v0(j,r) ;
432
433 *sh_vdfm lacks a representation of cobalt within it
434 *cobalt still contained within cmm input
435 display sh_vdfm;
436
437 *=====
438
439 *need cobalt value in use as a percentage of output in bev, phev, ele, omc
440 *if cobalt use in EV is x% of value of EV (same for base vs 2017)
441 *and cobalt price is assumed to be the same, then I can infer the value or amount of cobalt
442 *in other sectors based on the shares of cobalt use of country total
443
444 parameter cob_val_shr(i,r) "share of cobalt used value / value in sector used" ;
445 parameter cob_v0(i,r) "value of cobalt used in each sector i for each region r";
446
447 cob_v0(i,r) = cob_used(i,r) * sum(j$cob(j), prd_p0(j,r) * 2000);
448 cob_val_shr(i,r)$ldvie(i) = cob_v0(i,r) / prd_v0(i,r) ;
449
450 parameter sh_cob_use(i,r) "share of cobalt used in industry i of total country use";
451 sh_cob_use(i,r) = cob_used(i,r) / sum(j,cob_used(j,r)) ;
452
453 *calculate prd_v0_base(i,r) before this section
454
455 *once have base year ldv production
456 vom(i,r)$ldv(i) = prd_v0_base(i,r) * 1e-9 ;
457 vom(i,r)$ldvie(i) = sum(j$ldv(j), vom(j,r)) * sh_ldv_v0(i,r) ;
458 cob_v0(i,r)$ldvie(i) = vom(i,r)*cob_val_shr(i,r);
459 cob_v0(i,r)$[not ldvie(i)] = sh_cob_use(i,r) * cob_v0("bev",r) / sh_cob_use("bev",r);
460
461 cob_val_shr(i,r)$vom(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / vom(i,r);
462
463 parameter cob_used_base(i,r) "base year cobalt use (2011)";
464 cob_used_base(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / sum(j$cob(j), prd_p0(j,r) * 2000 * 1e-9);
465
466 display cob_v0, cob_val_shr, cob_used, cob_used_base;

```



```

467
468 *=====
469
470 * Calculate values for mvh nest
471 parameter
472 vdfm_mvh0    "vdfm for mvh0 nest"
473 vifm_mvh0
474 vfm_mvh0
475 ;
476
477 vom(i,r)$[omvh(i)] = vom("mvh",r) * sh_vdfm(i,"mvh",r) ;
478
479 vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
480 vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
481
482 vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vifm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
483 vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vifm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
484
485 vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vfm_mvh0(f,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
486 vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vfm_mvh0(f,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
487
488 rto(i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rto("mvh",r);
489 rtf0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtf0(j,"mvh",r) ;
490 rtfi(j,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtfi(j,"mvh",r) ;
491 rtf0(f,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtf0(f,"mvh",r) ;
492
493 display vdfm_mvh0, vifm_mvh0, vfm_mvh0;
494
495 parameter zpf_chk(i,r);
496 zpf_chk(i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = vom(i,r)*(1-rto(i,r))
497 - sum(j, vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
498 - sum(f, vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
499 ;
500 display zpf_chk;
501
502 *verify that there is enough cmm in bev and phev blocks to share out cobalt use
503 parameter cmm_size(i,r,*)    "check to make sure there is enough cmm to share out cob";
504
505 cmm_size(i,r,"vdfm")$[ldvie(i)] = vdfm_mvh0("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);

```

```

506 *cmm_size(i,r,"vdfm")$[omc(i) or ele(i)] = vdfm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
507 cmm_size(i,r,"vdfm")$[omc(i)] = vdfm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
508
509 cmm_size(i,r,"vifm")$[ldvie(i)] = vifm_mv0("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
510 *cmm_size(i,r,"vifm")$[ele(i) or omc(i)] = vifm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
511 cmm_size(i,r,"vifm")$[omc(i)] = vifm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
512
513 display cmm_size, cob_v0;
514
515 *=====
516
517 *Then determine global cobalt use - use the shares of cobalt production by region
518 *to determine new production levels in each region - then values can be computed for the upstream
519
520
521 parameter sh_cobprdg(i,r)  "cobalt production share of global by region";
522
523 sh_cobprdg(i,r)$[coball(i)] = cobprd_q0(r,i) / sum((s,j)$cob(j), cobprd_q0(s,j)) ;
524
525 display sh_cobprdg;
526
527 parameters
528 cob_v_globe
529 cob_use_globe
530 cob_prod_globe
531 cob_prod_r(r)
532 cob_vprod_r(r)
533
534 ;
535
536 cob_v_globe = sum((i,r), cob_v0(i,r));
537 cob_use_globe("a") = sum((i,r), cob_used_base(i,r));
538 cob_use_globe("b") = 1e9 * cob_v_globe / (20 * 2000);
539
540 *Use and production shares used to determine base year production levels by region
541 cob_prod_globe = cob_use_globe("a") ;
542 cob_prod_r(r) = cob_prod_globe * sh_cobprdg("cob",r) ;
543 cob_vprod_r(r) = cob_prod_r(r) * 20 * 2000 * 1e-9 ;
544

```

```

545 display cob_v_globe, cob_use_globe;
546
547 *Check to make sure supply = demand
548 parameter chk_cob_use_prod;
549 chk_cob_use_prod("prd-use","world") = sum(r,cob_vprod_r(r)) - cob_v_globe;
550 display chk_cob_use_prod;
551
552 *Determine trade flows in terms of net trade with global market
553 parameter chk_impexp(*,*) "net imports/exports of cobalt by country";
554 chk_impexp(r,"net imports") = sum(i,cob_v0(i,r)) - cob_vprod_r(r) ;
555 chk_impexp(r,"net exports") = cob_vprod_r(r) - sum(i,cob_v0(i,r));
556 chk_impexp("world", "net imports") = sum(r, chk_impexp(r,"net imports"));
557 chk_impexp("world", "net exports") = sum(r, chk_impexp(r,"net exports"));
558 display chk_impexp;
559
560 * parameters
561 *   cob_vim(r) "imports of cobalt by country r"
562 *   cob_vex(r) "exports of cobalt by country r"
563 *   cob_vom(r) "production of cobalt by country r"
564 *   cob_vdm(r) "production of cobalt for domestic use by country r"
565 * ;
566
567 *===== Initialize SAM parameters =====
568 *update sam for mvh
569 *update sam for cobalt
570 *share out cobalt from all necessary sectors
571
572 parameters
573 vom0(g,r)
574 vdm0(g,r)
575 vex0(g,r)
576 vxmd0(i,r,s)
577 vim0(g,r)
578 vdfm0(i,g,r)
579 vifm0(i,g,r)
580 vfm0(f,g,r)
581 ;
582
583 *NOTE THIS PARAMETER!!!

```

```

584 vom0(g,r) = vom(g,r) ;
585 vom0(g,r)$cob(g) = cob_vprod_r(r) ;
586
587 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[mvh(g)$mvhlo(i)] = vom(i,r);
588 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[ldv(g)$ldvie(i)] = vom(i,r);
589
590 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vdfm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
591 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vdfm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
592
593 vifm0(i,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vifm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
594 vifm0(i,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vifm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
595
596 vfm0(f,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vfm_mvh0(f,g,r) ;
597 vfm0(f,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vfm_mvh0(f,g,r) ;
598
599 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vdfm(i,g,r) ;
600 vifm0(i,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vifm(i,g,r) ;
601 vfm0(f,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vfm(f,g,r) ;
602
603 rto(i,r)$[mvh(i) or ldv(i)] = 0;
604
605 *----- add cobalt
606 parameters
607 sh_vex0(g,r)    "share of production of good i in country r that is exported"
608 sh_vdm0(g,r)    "share of production of good i in country r for domestic use"
609 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)  "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to factor f"
610 sh_vdfm0(i,g,r) "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to domestically produced good i"
611 sh_vifm0(i,g,r) "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to imported good i"
612 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s) "share of exports of good i from country r that are sent to s (bilateral trade)"
613 ;
614
615 *Add factors --- simple representation with no intermediate goods
616 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[rco(f)$cob(g)] = 0.8;
617 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[cap(f)$cob(g)] = 0.1;
618 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[lab(f)$cob(g)] = 0.1;
619
620 vfm0(f,g,r)$[cob(g)] = vom0(g,r) * sh_vfm0(f,g,r) ;
621
622 *Disaggregate SAM with cobalt representation

```

```

623
624 sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$chn(r)] = chk_impexp(r,"net exports") / vom0(i,r) ;
625 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$chn(r)$not chn(s)] = chk_impexp(s,"net imports") / chk_impexp(r,"net exports") ;
626
627 *sh_vfm0(f,g,r) = vfm0(f,g,r)/vom(g,r);
628
629 *Set very low share of exports to avoid source/sink error and allow bilateral trade
630 *sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$not chn(r)] = 0.1 ;
631 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$usa(r)$not usa(s)] = 0.5 ;
632 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$not row(s)] = 0.25 ;
633 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$row(s)] = 0.5 ;
634
635 *Alternative method to ensure trade flows perfectly offset
636 sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$usa(r)] = 0.1;
637 vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$usa(r)] = vom0(i,r)*sh_vex0(i,r);
638 sh_vex0(i,r)$[vom0(i,r)$cob(i)$row(r)] = vex0(i,"usa") / vom0(i,r);
639 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$usa(r)$row(s)] = 1;
640 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$usa(s)] = 1;
641
642 sh_vdm0(i,r) = 1-sh_vex0(i,r) ;
643
644 vdm0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = vom0(i,r) * sh_vdm0(i,r) ;
645 vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = vom0(i,r) * sh_vex0(i,r) ;
646 vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)] = vex0(i,r) * sh_vxmd0(i,r,s) ;
647
648 *vdfm("cob",g,r) vs. vifm("cob",g,r);
649 parameters
650 sh_cob(g,r)      "cobalt use in sector g by country r share of total use in country r"
651 ;
652
653 *NOTE THIS PARAMETER!!!!
654 sh_cob(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / sum(j, cob_v0(j,r)) ;
655 vim0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r) * vxmd0(i,s,r)) ;
656 vdfm0(j,i,r)$[cob(j)] = sh_cob(i,r) * vdm0(j,r) ;
657 vifm0(j,i,r)$[cob(j)] = sh_cob(i,r) * vim0(j,r) ;
658 *sh_cob used by sector g in r to determine allocation of cob use from domestic production and imports
659
660 vdm0(i,r) = sum(g, vdfm0(i,g,r));
661 vxmd0(i,r,s)$[not cob(i)] = vxmd(i,r,s) ;

```

```

662
663 *===== Disaggregate Cobalt from CMM =====
664
665 *tax rates need updated
666 *convert tax rate to level
667 rto(g,r)    = rto(g,r) * vom0(g,r);
668 rtf0(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) * vfm0(f,j,r);
669 rtf0(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) * vdfm0(i,g,r);
670 rtfi0(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) * vifm0(i,g,r);
671 rtms0(i,r,s) = rtms0(i,r,s) * ((1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s)));
672 rtxs0(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) * vxmd0(i,r,s);
673
674 vom0("cmm",r) = vom0("cmm",r) - vom0("cob",r) ;
675 vdm0("cmm",r) = vdm0("cmm",r) - vdm0("cob",r) ;
676 vxmd0("cmm",r,s) = vxmd0("cmm",r,s) - vxmd0("cob",r,s);
677 vdfm0(i,"cmm",r) = vdfm0(i,"cmm",r) - vdfm0(i,"cob",r) ;
678 vdfm0("cmm",g,r) = vdfm0("cmm",g,r) - vdfm0("cob",g,r) ;
679 vfm0(f,"cmm",r)$[not rco(f)] = vfm0(f,"cmm",r) - vfm0(f,"cob",r) ;
680 vfm0("cap","cmm",r) = vfm0("cap","cmm",r) - vfm0("rco","cob",r) ;
681 vifm0(i,"cmm",r) = vifm0(i,"cmm",r) - vifm0(i,"cob",r);
682 vifm0("cmm",g,r) = vifm0("cmm",g,r) - vifm0("cob",g,r);
683
684 *recalculate tax rate
685 *convert back to rate
686 rto(g,r)$vom0(g,r) = rto(g,r) / vom0(g,r);
687 rtf0(f,j,r)$vfm0(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) / vfm0(f,j,r);
688 rtf0(i,g,r)$vdfm0(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) / vdfm0(i,g,r);
689 rtfi0(i,g,r)$vifm0(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) / vifm0(i,g,r);
690 rtxs0(i,r,s)$vxmd0(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) / vxmd0(i,r,s);
691 rtms0(i,r,s)$[(1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s))]
692 = rtms0(i,r,s) / ((1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s)));
693
694
695 pvxmd(i,s,r) = (1+rtms0(i,s,r)) * (1-rtxs0(i,s,r));
696 pvtwr(i,s,r) = 1+rtms0(i,s,r);
697
698 *=====
699
700 *===== Update SAM and GTAP Parameters =====

```

```

701
702 parameters
703 evom0(f,r)
704 vb0
705 ;
706
707 vom0("c",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"c",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"c",r)) + vifm0(i,"c",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"c",r)))/(1-rto("c",r));
708 vom0("g",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"g",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"g",r)) + vifm0(i,"g",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"g",r)))/(1-rto("g",r));
709 vom0("i",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"i",r)) + vifm0(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"i",r)))/(1-rto("i",r));
710
711 vdm0("c",r) = vom0("c",r);
712 vdm0("g",r) = vom0("g",r);
713 vim0(i,r) = sum(g, vifm0(i,g,r));
714 evom0(f,r) = sum(g, vfm0(f,g,r));
715 vb0(r) = vom0("c",r) + vom0("g",r) + vom0("i",r)
716 - sum(f, evom0(f,r))
717 - sum(g, vom0(g,r)*rto(g,r))
718 - sum(g, sum(i, vdfm0(i,g,r)*rtfd0(i,g,r) + vifm0(i,g,r)*rtfi0(i,g,r)))
719 - sum(g, sum(f, vfm0(f,g,r)*rtf0(f,g,r)))
720 - sum((i,s), rtms0(i,s,r) * (vxmd0(i,s,r) * (1-rtxs0(i,s,r)) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r))))
721 + sum((i,s), rtxs0(i,r,s) * vxmd0(i,r,s));
722
723 vb0("chksum") = sum(r, vb0(r));
724 display vb;
725
726 parameter zpf_chk0(i,r);
727
728 zpf_chk0(i,r) =
729 vom0(i,r)*(1-rto(i,r))
730 - sum(j, vdfm0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
731 - sum(f, vfm0(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
732 ;
733
734 parameter mprofit_chk0(i,r);
735 mprofit_chk0(i,r) = vim0(i,r) - sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r)*vxmd0(i,s,r)+sum(j, vtwr(j,i,s,r))*pvtwr(i,s,r));
736
737 display zpf_chk0, mprofit_chk0;
738
739 vom(g,r) = 0;

```

```

740 vdm(g,r) = 0;
741 vxmd(i,r,s) = 0;
742 vdfm(i,g,r) = 0;
743 vifm(i,g,r) = 0;
744 vfm(f,g,r) = 0;
745 evom(f,r) = 0;
746 vim(i,r) = 0;
747
748 vom(g,r) = vom0(g,r);
749 vdm(g,r) = vdm0(g,r);
750 vxmd(i,r,s) = vxmd0(i,r,s);
751 vdfm(i,g,r) = vdfm0(i,g,r);
752 vifm(i,g,r) = vifm0(i,g,r);
753 vfm(f,g,r) = vfm0(f,g,r);
754 evom(f,r) = evom0(f,r);
755 vim(i,r) = vim0(i,r);
756 vb(r) = vb0(r) ;
757
758 rtf(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) ;
759 rtf(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) ;
760 rtfi(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) ;
761 rtms(i,r,s) = rtms0(i,r,s) ;
762 rtxs(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) ;
763
764 *define numeraire region for denominating international transfers:
765 rnum(r) = yes$(vom("c",r)=smax(s,vom("c",s)));
766 *rnum(r) = no;
767 *rnum(r)$usa(r) = yes;
768 display rnum, vb0;
769
770 *=====
771
772 *$exit
773
774 execute_unload "cur_bmk_data.gdx",
775 vom0
776 vex0
777 vdm0
778 vxmd0

```



```
779 vim0
780 vdfm0
781 vifm0
782 vfm0
783 evom0
784 rto
785 rtf0
786 rtfi0
787 rtf0
788 rtms0
789 rtxs0
790 vb
791 zpf_chk0
792 mprofit_chk0
793 vom
794 vdm
795 vxmd
796 vim
797 vdfm
798 vifm
799 vfm
800 evom
801 i
802 g
803 r
804 f
805 ;
806
807 *$include ..\build\structure_table
808 *$exit
809
810 execute_unload "..\data11\cur_bmk.gdx";
811
812
```

fut_data.gms

```
1 $title Data pre-processing for cobalt cge main model (Future Scenarios)
2
3 *===== Populate/update existing sets =====
4 $onmulti
5 set g(*)          goods plus C and G /
6 cob              "refined cobalt general met/chem aggregate"
7 mcob            "refined cobalt metal"
8 ccob            "refined cobalt chemical"
9 ldv             "light duty vehicles index"
10 ice             "internal combustion vehicles within ldv"
11 bev            "battery electric vehicles within ldv"
12 phev           "plug-in hybrid electric vehicles within ice"
13 omvh           "other motor vehicles and parts - subsitutable with ldv index"
14 /;
15
16 $onmulti
17 set             i(g)          goods /
18 cob             "refined cobalt general met/chem aggregate"
19 mcob            "refined cobalt metal"
20 ccob            "refined cobalt chemical"
21 ldv             "light duty vehicles index"
22 ice             "internal combustion vehicles within ldv"
23 bev            "battery electric vehicles within ldv"
24 phev           "plug-in hybrid electric vehicles within ldv"
25 omvh           "other motor vehicles and parts - subsitutable with ldv index"
26 /;
27
28 $onmulti
29 set f(*)        factors      /
30 rco             "fixed cobalt resource factor"
31 /;
32
33 display g,i,f;
34
35 *add subsets for set control later
36 set cob(g) cobalt general /cob/;
37 set ccob(g) cobalt chemical /ccob/;
```

```

38 set mcob(g) cobalt metal /mcob/;
39 set cobmc(g) cobalt chem and met /ccob, mcob/;
40 set coball(g) all cobalt sets /cob, ccob, mcob/;
41
42 set cmm(g) cmm index /cmm/;
43 *set ele(g) ele index /ele/;
44 set omc(g) omc index /omc/;
45 set omi(g) omi index /omi/;
46 set aog(g) aog index /aog/;
47
48 set ldv(g) light duty vehicles /ldv/;
49 set ice(g) internal combustion /ice/;
50 set bev(g) battery electric /bev/;
51 set phev(g) plug-in hybrid /phev/;
52 set omvh(g) other mvh /omvh/;
53 set ev(g) EV technologies /bev, phev/;
54 set ldvie(g) ice and ev /ice, bev, phev/;
55 set ldvall(g) all ldv /ldv, ice, bev, phev/;
56
57 set mvh(g) mvh index /mvh/;
58 set mvhlo(g) ldv and omvh /ldv, omvh/;
59 set mvhall(g) all mvh /mvh, ldv, omvh/;
60 set mvhall2(g) all mvh /mvh, ldv, omvh, bev, phev, ice/;
61 set mvhall3(g) all mvh /ldv, omvh, bev, phev, ice/;
62
63 set rco(f) fixed cobalt resource /rco/;
64 set cap(f) capital /cap/;
65 set lab(f) labor /lab/;
66
67
68 set chn(r) references china (chn) /chn/ ;
69 set usa(r) references usa (usa) /usa/ ;
70 set row(r) references row (row) /row/ ;
71
72 *specify mobile/sluggish factors (k and l are mobile)
73 mf(f)$[not rco(f)] = yes$(1/etrae(f)=0);
74 sf(f)$[not rco(f)] = yes$(1/etrae(f)>0);
75
76

```

```

77 *===== Load in benchmark data from current scenario =====
78 parameters
79 cob_used0(i,r)          "benchmark value of cobalt use"
80 sh_cobprdg0(i,r)       "benchmark cobalt production share of global by region"
81 cob_val_shr0(i,r)      "benchmark cobalt intermediate input share in output of i in r"
82 ;
83
84 $gdxin ..\data11\cur_bmk.gdx
85 $load cob_used0=cob_used sh_cobprdg0=sh_cobprdg cob_val_shr0=cob_val_shr
86 $gdxin
87 *=====
88
89
90 *===== Raw Data =====
91
92 parameters
93 prd_q0(g,r)            "benchmark production quantity"
94 prd_p0(g,r)            "benchmark production price"
95 prd_v0(g,r)            "benchmark production value(output) unadjusted for gtap base year"
96 ;
97
98 *Cobalt DATA
99
100 table          cobprdq0(r,i)          "Cobalt Production - table to import cobalt production (tons Co)"
101 COB  CCOB  MCOB
102 USA 300   300   0
103 CHN 72200 59000 13200
104 ROW 44200 9300  34900
105
106 ;
107
108 scalar          pg_cob          "global cobalt price"          /20/;
109 prd_p0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = pg_cob ;
110
111
112 *LDV, BEV, PHEV, ICE DATA
113
114 table          ldvprd_q0(r,i)          "LDV Production - table to import ldv production (# of vehicles)"
115

```

```

116 LDV      BEV      PHEV      ICE
117 USA 11000000 104040 99960 10796000
118 CHN 25000000 486000 114000 24400000
119 ROW 39000000 201960 194040 38604000
120
121 ;
122
123
124 *===== update EV penetration =====
125
126 *First specify mixes for China and USA based on given percentages of EV and mix between phev and bev
127 ldvprd_q0("usa","bev") = %usaevpct% * %evmix% * ldvprd_q0("usa","ldv");
128 ldvprd_q0("usa","phev") = %usaevpct% * (1 - %evmix%) * ldvprd_q0("usa","ldv");
129
130 ldvprd_q0("chn","bev") = %chnevpct% * %evmix% * ldvprd_q0("chn","ldv");
131 ldvprd_q0("chn","phev") = %chnevpct% * (1 - %evmix%) * ldvprd_q0("chn","ldv");
132
133 *Given the mixes associated with CHN and USA, find the mix for ROW assuming global total% is x%
134 ldvprd_q0("row","bev") = %evmix% * [%evpct% * sum(r,ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv"))
135 - sum((j,r)$[ev(j)$not row(r)], ldvprd_q0(r,j))]
136 ;
137 ldvprd_q0("row","phev") = (1 - %evmix%) * [%evpct% * sum(r,ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv"))
138 - sum((j,r)$[ev(j)$not row(r)], ldvprd_q0(r,j))]
139 ;
140
141 *Adjust ICE to balance new LDV mix
142 ldvprd_q0(r,"ice") = ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv") - sum(i$ev(i), ldvprd_q0(r,i));
143
144 display ldvprd_q0;
145
146 parameter test_ldvprd;
147 test_ldvprd("shares",r,i) = ldvprd_q0(r,i) / ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv");
148 test_ldvprd("evshare","world",i) = sum(r,ldvprd_q0(r,i)) / sum(r,ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv"));
149 display test_ldvprd;
150
151 *$exit
152 *=====
153
154 parameter          ldv_sales(r)          "ldv sales by country"

```

```

155 /
156 USA          16000000
157 CHN          25000000
158 ROW          34000000
159 /
160 ;
161
162 *https://www.statista.com/outlook/10000000/117/passenger-cars/china#market-pricePerUnit
163 *https://www.statista.com/statistics/425095/eu-car-sales-average-prices-in-by-country/
164 parameter      rep_ldvprice(r)      "average ldv sales price by region"
165 /
166 USA            38000,
167 CHN            22000,
168 ROW            30000
169 /
170 ;
171
172 scalar          avg_ldvprice          "average global ldv sale price";
173 avg_ldvprice = sum(r, ldv_sales(r) * rep_ldvprice(r)) / sum(r, ldv_sales(r));
174
175 parameter        ldv_cost_scale(r)      "Scaling factor for ldv costs - used for country level vehicle cost adjustments";
176 ldv_cost_scale(r) = rep_ldvprice(r) / avg_ldvprice ;
177
178 parameter        rep_ldvcost(i)        "production cost of representative vehicle"
179 /
180 ICE              25000,
181 BEV              40000,
182 PHEV             30000
183 /
184 ;
185
186 parameter        rep_ldvcap(i)         "capacity of battery in representative vehicle"
187 /
188 ICE              0,
189 BEV              45,
190 PHEV             12
191 /
192 ;
193

```

```

194 parameter      rep_packcost(i)      "cost/kwh of battery pack in representative vehicle"
195 /
196 ICE            0,
197 BEV            175,
198 PHEV           175
199 /
200 ;
201
202 table          avg_cap(r,i)          "average electric vehicle battery capacity (kwh)"
203
204 BEV PHEV
205 USA 65 12
206 CHN 27 15
207 ROW 39 12
208
209 ;
210
211 parameter      ldv_battcap(i,r)      "total battery capacity in each ldv sector";
212 ldv_battcap(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) * avg_cap(r,i);
213
214 * Calculate benchmark indices for electric vehicles
215 prd_q0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) ;
216 prd_p0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = [rep_ldvcost(i) + (avg_cap(r,i) - rep_ldvcap(i)) * rep_packcost(i)] * ldv_cost_scale(r) ;
217 prd_v0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = prd_q0(i,r) * prd_p0(i,r);
218
219
220 $if %capadj%==default      $goto endcapadj
221 *===== Update Battery/LDV Size/Cost Assumptions =====
222 *Assumption: Battery Capacity per EV increases
223 *Does average and reference capacity increase via a growth rate?
224 *rep_ldvcap(i) = rep_ldvcap(i) * %capgrowth%;
225 *avg_cap(r,i) = avg_cap(r,i) * %capgrowth%;
226
227 *OR:
228 *Does average capacity equal some specified reference vehicle capacity for all regions
229 rep_ldvcap(i)$[bev(i)] = %capbev%;
230 rep_ldvcap(i)$[phev(i)] = %capphev%;
231 avg_cap(r,i)$[ev(i)] = rep_ldvcap(i);
232

```

```

233 *What does this mean for battery capacity in ev sectors
234 ldv_battcap(i,r)$[ev(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) * avg_cap(r,i) ;
235
236 *Do battery pack costs change?
237 rep_packcost(i)$[ev(i)] = %bpackcost%;
238
239 *-----What set of EV cost assumptions are used?-----
240 *Do EV costs reach parity with ICE? Or does the cost calc method remain unchanged?
241 *rep_ldvcost(i) = rep_ldvcost(i);
242 rep_ldvcost(i)$[ev(i)] = rep_ldvcost("ice");
243
244 * Calculate benchmark indices for electric vehicles
245 prd_q0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = ldvprd_q0(r,i) ;
246 *prd_p0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = [rep_ldvcost(i) + (avg_cap(r,i) - rep_ldvcap(i)) * rep_packcost(i)] * ldv_cost_scale(r) ;
247 prd_p0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = rep_ldvcost(i) * ldv_cost_scale(r) ;
248 prd_v0(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = prd_q0(i,r) * prd_p0(i,r);
249
250 *=====
251 $label endcapadj
252
253 *Battery Capacity for Portable Electronics - ELE sector
254 *SOURCE: Roskill Cobalt Report
255 parameter      ele_battcap(r)      "portable electronics battery capacity (kwh)"
256 /
257 USA              40000000,
258 CHN              110000000,
259 ROW              210000000
260 /
261 ;
262
263 *Battery Chemistry Data
264
265 set      bc      "battery chemistry"
266 /
267 NCA,
268 NCM111,
269 NCM433,
270 NCM523,
271 NCM622,

```



```

272 NCM811,
273 LCO,
274 LFP,
275 LMO
276 /
277 ;
278
279 parameter      rep_chem(bc)      "Cobalt contained within battery chemistry (kg/kwh)"
280 /
281 NCA            0.13,
282 NCM111        0.4,
283 NCM433        0.35,
284 NCM523        0.23,
285 NCM622        0.19,
286 NCM811        0.09,
287 LCO            0.6,
288 LFP            0,
289 LMO            0
290 /
291 ;
292
293
294 *===== Cobalt use (tons) =====
295
296 parameter      cob_used(i,r)      "pure cobalt used in production of goods (kg or tons)";
297
298 *----- Choose a Representative Chemistry -----
299 *cobalt used in production of vehicles (tons)
300 *cob_used(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * rep_chem("NCM111")) * (2.204 / 2000);
301 cob_used(i,r)[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * %bcrep%) * (2.204 / 2000);
302
303 *cobalt used in production of portable electronic devices (tons)
304 *cob_used(i,r)[ele(i)] = (ele_battcap(r) * rep_chem("LCO")) * (2.204 / 2000);
305
306 *OR...
307
308 *NOTES:
309 *----- What is the implied battery chemistry? -----
310 *Rather than representative chemistry - use implied chemistry

```

```

311 parameter      cob_use_ev          "cobalt used in the EV sector 2017 (tons Co)";
312 *6% of global cobalt production is used in LDV EVs
313 *Source: IEA 2018 global ev outlook
314 cob_use_ev = sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) * 0.06;
315
316 parameter      imp_chem            "implied battery chemistry (kg/kwh)";
317 imp_chem("IEA") = (cob_use_ev * 2000 / 2.204) / sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), ldv_battcap(i,r));
318
319 parameter      imp_cob_use(i,r)    "implied pure cobalt used in production of goods (kg or tons)";
320 imp_cob_use(i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * imp_chem("IEA")) * (2.204 / 2000) ;
321
322 parameter      jrc_cob_use(i,r)    "guess using shares from jrc report";
323
324 imp_chem("jrc") = rep_chem("NCM111")*.42 + rep_chem("NCM433")*.05 + rep_chem("NCM523")*.07
325 + .07*rep_chem("LMO") + rep_chem("NCA")*.14 + rep_chem("LFP")*.24
326 ;
327
328 jrc_cob_use(i,r) = (ldv_battcap(i,r) * imp_chem("jrc")) * (2.204 / 2000);
329
330 parameter share_cob_use_imp;
331
332 share_cob_use_imp("ncm111") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), cob_used(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
333 share_cob_use_imp("IEA") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), imp_cob_use(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
334 share_cob_use_imp("JRC") = sum((i,r)$ldvie(i), jrc_cob_use(i,r)) / sum(r,cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
335
336 display rep_chem, imp_chem, share_cob_use_imp, cob_use_ev, imp_cob_use, cob_used, jrc_cob_use ;
337 *END NOTES
338 *-----
339
340 *----- Determine cobalt used in OMC Sector -----
341
342 parameter      cob_globe_use(i)    "total cobalt use within each sector";
343
344 *If Scenario is Future --- Already have present day OMC data
345 *Need Switch or something to adjust cobalt production when running future scenarios
346 *--- this could go at beginning of the file
347 *I could hold cobalt use in omc the same as first benchmark setup... then adjust production accordingly
348 *I would also have no need for previous two lines of code or some of the lines below
349 cob_used(i,r)$[omc(i)] = cob_used0(i,r);

```

```

350 cob_globe_use(i) = sum(r, cob_used(i,r)) ;
351
352 *update cobalt production numbers to satisfy new global use of cobalt
353 cobprd_q0(r,i) = sum(j,cob_globe_use(j)) * sh_cobprdg0(i,r) ;
354
355
356 *If Scenario is Current --- no OMC data Exists
357 *Given total value of OMC sectoral activity
358 *and total value of cobalt used after LDV and ELE use (global OMC cob use value)
359 *I assume cobalt is weighted in each region by OMC sector share of global to equate supply and demand globally
360
361 *cob_globe_use(i)$[not omc(i)] = sum(r,cob_used(i,r));
362 *cob_globe_use(i)$[omc(i)] = sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) - sum(j,cob_globe_use(j));
363
364 Parameter check_sd_cob          "check to make sure production equals use (supply=demand)" ;
365 check_sd_cob("dem-sup") = sum(i,cob_globe_use(i)) - sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob")) ;
366
367 display check_sd_cob, cob_globe_use, cob_used;
368
369
370 parameter vom_shrg(i,r)          "output share of global";
371 vom_shrg(i,r)$[omc(i)] = vom(i,r) / sum(s,vom(i,s)) ;
372
373 cob_used(i,r)$[omc(i)] = cob_globe_use(i) * vom_shrg(i,r) ;
374
375 check_sd_cob("dem-sup-alt") = sum((i,r), cob_used(i,r)) - sum(r, cobprd_q0(r,"cob"));
376
377 display check_sd_cob, cob_used;
378
379 *NOTE:
380 *cob_used(i,r) contains cobalt use (tons Co) in all modeled sectors in current year (2017)
381
382 *=====
383
384 *===== MVH nesting structure in terms of values and value shares =====
385
386 *Average new car price 2010 --- 28k
387 *Average new car price 2018 --- 36k
388 *Growth Rate --- (36/28)**(1/(2018-2010)) = 1 + r --- r = 0.03 (approximate) --

```

```

389
390 *unido db says 7-10% (approx) based on output in motor vehicles production (4 digit isic)
391
392 *Given r and unchanged vehicles production - 2011 value of automobiles can be determined
393 **This can be used to disaggregate mvh into omvh and ldv
394 **ldv can be further disaggregated given value shares calculated as a result of a given point in time
395 **Need to establish base year vehicles output in order to infer cobalt production based on sharing
396
397 $ontext
398 mvh omvh ldv ice bev phev
399 mvh
400 omvh x
401 ldv x
402 ice x
403 bev x
404 phev x
405 aog x x x x
406 $offtext
407
408 *total value of all ldv
409  $prd\_v0(i,r)[ldv(i)] = \text{sum}(j\$ldvie(j), prd\_v0(j,r)) ;$ 
410
411 parameter sh_ldv_v0(i,r) "share of total ldv output attributable to BEV, PHEV, and ICE";
412  $sh\_ldv\_v0(i,r)[ldvall(i)] = prd\_v0(i,r) / \text{sum}(j\$ldv(j), prd\_v0(j,r)) ;$ 
413
414 *gtap base year (2011) - need to bring 2017-2018 figures back
415 scalar base_yr "gtap base year" /2011/;
416 scalar data_yr "year for cost data" /2017/;
417
418 *based on Unido database cagr automobiles sector --- roughly 7-10% for period
419 *scalar cost_r "annual growth rate" /0.08/;
420 parameter cost_r(r) "annual automobiles Unido growth rate (cagr) by country"
421 /
422 USA 0.08,
423 CHN 0.08,
424 ROW 0.08
425 /
426 ;
427

```

```

428 *adjust current values so that they represent appropriate value shares of GTAP 2011 database
429 parameter prd_v0_base(i,r) "base year (2011) output value -- consistent with GTAP9";
430 *prd_v0_base(i,r)$[ldv(i)] = prd_v0(i,r) * [(1/(1+cost_r))**(data_yr-base_yr)];
431 prd_v0_base(i,r)$[ldv(i)] = prd_v0(i,r) * [(1/(1+cost_r(r))**(data_yr-base_yr))];
432
433 parameter sh_vdfm(j,i,r) "share of input value /output";
434
435 *First compute share for LDV and OMOVH in MVH
436 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)$ldv(j)] = 1e-9 * prd_v0_base(j,r) / vom(i,r) ;
437 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)$omvh(j)] = 1 - sh_vdfm("ldv",i,r);
438
439 *For reporting purposes/curiosity --- may come in handy as validation tool
440 parameter wt_avg_vh_cost(r)          "weighted average ldv cost implied in benchmark";
441 wt_avg_vh_cost(r) = prd_v0("ldv",r) / ldvprd_q0(r,"ldv") ;
442
443 display prd_v0, sh_ldv_v0, prd_v0_base, sh_vdfm, wt_avg_vh_cost ;
444
445 *Define intermediate input shares in MVH sector
446 *There are different ways to share out - for now assume same structure as MVH in omvh and ldv
447 parameters
448 sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r) "cost shares of mvh in original SAM (vdfm)"
449 sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r) "cost share of mvh in original SAM (vifm)"
450 sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)      "cost share of mvh in original SAM (vfm)"
451 ;
452
453 sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vdfm(j,i,r) / vom(i,r);
454 sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vifm(j,i,r) / vom(i,r);
455 sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[mvh(i)] = vfm(f,i,r) / vom(i,r);
456
457 parameter zpf_share_chk(i,r);
458 zpf_share_chk(i,r)$mvh(i) =
459 1*(1-rto(i,r))
460 - sum(j, sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtdf0(j,i,r)) + sh_vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtdfi0(j,i,r)))
461 - sum(f, sh_vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)*(1+rtdf0(f,i,r)))
462 ;
463
464 display sh_vdfm_mvh0, sh_vifm_mvh0, sh_vfm_mvh0, zpf_share_chk ;
465
466 *recall sh_ldv_v0(i,r) from earlier

```

```

467 sh_vdfm(j,i,r)$[ldvie(j)$ldv(i)] = sh_ldv_v0(j,r) ;
468
469 *sh_vdfm lacks a representation of cobalt within it
470 *cobalt still contained within cmm input
471 display sh_vdfm;
472
473 *=====
474
475 *need cobalt value in use as a percentage of output in bev, phev, ele, omc
476 *if cobalt use in EV is x% of value of EV (same for base vs 2017)
477 *and cobalt price is assumed to be the same, then I can infer the value or amount of cobalt
478 *in other sectors based on the shares of cobalt use of country total
479
480 parameter cob_val_shr(i,r)          "share of cobalt used value / value in sector used" ;
481 parameter cob_v0(i,r)              "value of cobalt used in each sector i for each region r";
482
483 cob_v0(i,r) = cob_used(i,r) * sum(j$cob(j), prd_p0(j,r) * 2000);
484 cob_val_shr(i,r)$ldvie(i) = cob_v0(i,r) / prd_v0(i,r) ;
485
486 parameter sh_cob_use(i,r) "share of cobalt used in industry i of total country use";
487 sh_cob_use(i,r) = cob_used(i,r) / sum(j,cob_used(j,r)) ;
488
489 *calculate prd_v0_base(i,r) before this section
490
491 *once have base year ldv production
492 vom(i,r)$ldv(i) = prd_v0_base(i,r) * 1e-9 ;
493 vom(i,r)$ldvie(i) = sum(j$ldv(j), vom(j,r)) * sh_ldv_v0(i,r) ;
494 cob_v0(i,r)$ldvie(i) = vom(i,r)*cob_val_shr(i,r);
495 cob_v0(i,r)$[not ldvie(i)] = sh_cob_use(i,r) * cob_v0("bev",r) / sh_cob_use("bev",r);
496
497 cob_val_shr(i,r)$vom(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / vom(i,r);
498 cob_val_shr(i,r)$[omc(i)] = cob_val_shr0(i,r);
499 cob_v0(i,r)$[omc(i)] = cob_val_shr(i,r)*vom(i,r);
500
501 parameter          cob_used_base(i,r)          "base year cobalt use (2011)";
502 cob_used_base(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / sum(j$cob(j), prd_p0(j,r) * 2000 * 1e-9);
503
504 display cob_v0, cob_val_shr, cob_used, cob_used_base;
505

```

```

506 *=====
507
508 * Calculate values for mvh nest
509 parameter
510 vdfm_mvh0      "vdfm for mvh0 nest"
511 vifm_mvh0
512 vfm_mvh0
513 ;
514
515 vom(i,r)$[omvh(i)] = vom("mvh",r) * sh_vdfm(i,"mvh",r) ;
516
517 vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
518 vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vdfm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
519
520 vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vifm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
521 vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vifm_mvh0(j,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
522
523 vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[omvh(i)] = sh_vfm_mvh0(f,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
524 vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)$[ldvie(i)] = sh_vfm_mvh0(f,"mvh",r) * vom(i,r) ;
525
526 rto(i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rto("mvh",r);
527 rtf0(j,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtf0(j,"mvh",r) ;
528 rtfi(j,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtfi(j,"mvh",r) ;
529 rtf0(f,i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = rtf0(f,"mvh",r) ;
530
531 display vdfm_mvh0, vifm_mvh0, vfm_mvh0;
532
533 parameter zpf_chk(i,r);
534 zpf_chk(i,r)$[omvh(i) or ldvie(i)] = vom(i,r)*(1-rto(i,r))
535 - sum(j, vdfm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm_mvh0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
536 - sum(f, vfm_mvh0(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
537 ;
538 display zpf_chk;
539
540 *verify that there is enough cmm in bev and phev blocks to share out cobalt use
541 parameter cmm_size(i,r,*)      "check to make sure there is enough cmm to share out cob";
542
543 cmm_size(i,r,"vdfm")$[ldvie(i)] = vdfm_mvh0("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
544 cmm_size(i,r,"vdfm")$[omc(i)] = vdfm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);

```

```

545
546 cmm_size(i,r,"vifm")$[ldvie(i)] = vifm_mv0("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
547 cmm_size(i,r,"vifm")$[omc(i)] = vifm("cmm",i,r) - cob_v0(i,r);
548
549 display cmm_size, cob_v0;
550
551 *=====
552
553 *Then determine global cobalt use - use the shares of cobalt production by region
554 *to determine new production levels in each region - then values can be computed for the upstream
555
556
557 parameter sh_cobprdg(i,r)          "cobalt production share of global by region";
558
559 sh_cobprdg(i,r)$[coball(i)] = cobprd_q0(r,i) / sum((s,j)$cob(j), cobprd_q0(s,j)) ;
560
561 display sh_cobprdg;
562
563 parameters
564 cob_v_globe
565 cob_use_globe
566 cob_prod_globe
567 cob_prod_r(r)
568 cob_vprod_r(r)
569 ;
570
571 cob_v_globe = sum((i,r), cob_v0(i,r));
572 cob_use_globe("a") = sum((i,r), cob_used_base(i,r));
573 cob_use_globe("b") = 1e9 * cob_v_globe / (20 * 2000);
574
575 *Use and production shares used to determine base year production levels by region
576 cob_prod_globe = cob_use_globe("a") ;
577 cob_prod_r(r) = cob_prod_globe * sh_cobprdg("cob",r) ;
578 cob_vprod_r(r) = cob_prod_r(r) * 20 * 2000 * 1e-9 ;
579
580 display cob_v_globe, cob_use_globe;
581
582 *Check to make sure supply = demand
583 parameter chk_cob_use_prod;

```



```

584 chk_cob_use_prod("prd-use","world") = sum(r,cob_vprod_r(r)) - cob_v_globe;
585 display chk_cob_use_prod;
586
587 *Determine trade flows in terms of net trade with global market
588 parameter chk_impexp(*,*)          "net imports/exports of cobalt by country";
589 chk_impexp(r,"net imports") = sum(i,cob_v0(i,r)) - cob_vprod_r(r) ;
590 chk_impexp(r,"net exports") = cob_vprod_r(r) - sum(i,cob_v0(i,r));
591 chk_impexp("world", "net imports") = sum(r, chk_impexp(r,"net imports"));
592 chk_impexp("world", "net exports") = sum(r, chk_impexp(r,"net exports"));
593 display chk_impexp;
594
595 * parameters
596 *      cob_vim(r)          "imports of cobalt by country r"
597 *      cob_vex(r)          "exports of cobalt by country r"
598 *      cob_vom(r)          "production of cobalt by country r"
599 *      cob_vdm(r)          "production of cobalt for domestic use by country r"
600 * ;
601
602 *===== Initialize SAM parameters =====
603 *update sam for mvh
604 *update sam for cobalt
605 *share out cobalt from all necessary sectors
606
607 parameters
608 vom0(g,r)
609 vdm0(g,r)
610 vex0(g,r)
611 vxmd0(i,r,s)
612 vim0(g,r)
613 vdfm0(i,g,r)
614 vifm0(i,g,r)
615 vfm0(f,g,r)
616 ;
617
618 *NOTE THIS PARAMETER!!!
619 vom0(g,r) = vom(g,r) ;
620 vom0(g,r)$cob(g) = cob_vprod_r(r) ;
621
622 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[mvh(g)$mvhlo(i)] = vom(i,r);

```

```

623 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[ldv(g)$ldvie(i)] = vom(i,r);
624
625 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vdfm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
626 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vdfm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
627
628 vifm0(i,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vifm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
629 vifm0(i,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vifm_mvh0(i,g,r) ;
630
631 vfm0(f,g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = vfm_mvh0(f,g,r) ;
632 vfm0(f,g,r)$[omvh(g)] = vfm_mvh0(f,g,r) ;
633
634 vdfm0(i,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vdfm(i,g,r) ;
635 vifm0(i,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vifm(i,g,r) ;
636 vfm0(f,g,r)$[not mvhall2(g)] = vfm(f,g,r) ;
637
638 rto(i,r)$[mvh(i) or ldv(i)] = 0;
639
640 *----- add cobalt
641 parameters
642 sh_vex0(g,r)      "share of production of good i in country r that is exported"
643 sh_vdm0(g,r)      "share of production of good i in country r for domestic use"
644 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)    "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to factor f"
645 sh_vdfm0(i,g,r)   "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to domestically produced good i"
646 sh_vifm0(i,g,r)   "share of production of good g in country r that is attributable to imported good i"
647 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)  "share of exports of good i from country r that are sent to s (bilateral trade)"
648 ;
649
650 *Add factors --- simple representation with no intermediate goods
651 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[rco(f)$cob(g)] = 0.8;
652 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[cap(f)$cob(g)] = 0.1;
653 sh_vfm0(f,g,r)$[lab(f)$cob(g)] = 0.1;
654
655 vfm0(f,g,r)$[cob(g)] = vom0(g,r) * sh_vfm0(f,g,r) ;
656
657 *Disaggregate SAM with cobalt representation
658
659 sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$chn(r)] = chk_impexp(r,"net exports") / vom0(i,r) ;
660 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$chn(r)$[not chn(s)]] = chk_impexp(s,"net imports") / chk_impexp(r,"net exports") ;
661

```

```

662 *sh_vfm0(f,g,r) = vfm0(f,g,r)/vom(g,r);
663
664 *Set very low share of exports to avoid source/sink error and allow bilateral trade
665 *sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$not chn(r))] = 0.1 ;
666 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$usa(r)$not usa(s))] = 0.5 ;
667 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$not row(s))] = 0.25 ;
668 *sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$row(s)] = 0.5 ;
669
670 *Alternative method to ensure trade flows perfectly offset
671 sh_vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$usa(r)] = 0.1;
672 vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)$usa(r)] = vom0(i,r)*sh_vex0(i,r);
673 sh_vex0(i,r)$[vom0(i,r)$cob(i)$row(r)] = vex0(i,"usa") / vom0(i,r);
674 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$usa(r)$row(s)] = 1;
675 sh_vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)$row(r)$usa(s)] = 1;
676
677 sh_vdm0(i,r) = 1-sh_vex0(i,r) ;
678
679 vdm0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = vom0(i,r) * sh_vdm0(i,r) ;
680 vex0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = vom0(i,r) * sh_vex0(i,r) ;
681 vxmd0(i,r,s)$[cob(i)] = vex0(i,r) * sh_vxmd0(i,r,s) ;
682
683 *vdfm("cob",g,r) vs. vifm("cob",g,r);
684 parameters
685 sh_cob(g,r)                "cobalt use in sector g by country r share of total use in country r"
686 ;
687
688 *NOTE THIS PARAMETER!!!!
689 sh_cob(i,r) = cob_v0(i,r) / sum(j, cob_v0(j,r)) ;
690 vim0(i,r)$[cob(i)] = sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r) * vxmd0(i,s,r)) ;
691 vdfm0(j,i,r)$[cob(j)] = sh_cob(i,r) * vdm0(j,r) ;
692 vifm0(j,i,r)$[cob(j)] = sh_cob(i,r) * vim0(j,r) ;
693 *sh_cob used by sector g in r to determine allocation of cob use from domestic production and imports
694
695 vdm0(i,r) = sum(g, vdfm0(i,g,r));
696 vxmd0(i,r,s)$[not cob(i)] = vxmd(i,r,s) ;
697
698 *===== Disaggregate Cobalt from CMM =====
699
700 *tax rates need updated

```

```

701 *convert tax rate to level
702 rto(g,r)    = rto(g,r) * vom0(g,r);
703 rtf0(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) * vfm0(f,j,r);
704 rtf0(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) * vdfm0(i,g,r);
705 rtfi0(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) * vifm0(i,g,r);
706 rtms0(i,r,s) = rtms0(i,r,s) * ((1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s)));
707 rtxs0(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) * vxmd0(i,r,s);
708
709 vom0("cmm",r) = vom0("cmm",r) - vom0("cob",r) ;
710 vdm0("cmm",r) = vdm0("cmm",r) - vdm0("cob",r) ;
711 vxmd0("cmm",r,s) = vxmd0("cmm",r,s) - vxmd0("cob",r,s);
712 vdfm0(i,"cmm",r) = vdfm0(i,"cmm",r) - vdfm0(i,"cob",r) ;
713 vdfm0("cmm",g,r) = vdfm0("cmm",g,r) - vdfm0("cob",g,r) ;
714 vfm0(f,"cmm",r)$[not rco(f)] = vfm0(f,"cmm",r) - vfm0(f,"cob",r) ;
715 vfm0("cap","cmm",r) = vfm0("cap","cmm",r) - vfm0("rco","cob",r) ;
716 vifm0(i,"cmm",r) = vifm0(i,"cmm",r) - vifm0(i,"cob",r);
717 vifm0("cmm",g,r) = vifm0("cmm",g,r) - vifm0("cob",g,r);
718
719 *recalculate tax rate
720 *convert back to rate
721 rto(g,r)$vom0(g,r) = rto(g,r) / vom0(g,r);
722 rtf0(f,j,r)$vfm0(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) / vfm0(f,j,r);
723 rtf0(i,g,r)$vdfm0(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) / vdfm0(i,g,r);
724 rtfi0(i,g,r)$vifm0(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) / vifm0(i,g,r);
725 rtxs0(i,r,s)$vxmd0(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) / vxmd0(i,r,s);
726 rtms0(i,r,s)$[(1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s))]
727 = rtms0(i,r,s) / ((1-rtxs0(i,r,s)) * vxmd0(i,r,s) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,r,s)));
728
729
730 pvxmd(i,s,r) = (1+rtms0(i,s,r)) * (1-rtxs0(i,s,r));
731 pvtwr(i,s,r) = 1+rtms0(i,s,r);
732
733 *=====
734
735 *===== Update SAM and GTAP Parameters =====
736
737 parameters
738 evom0(f,r)
739 vb0

```

```

740 ;
741
742 vom0("c",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"c",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"c",r)) + vifm0(i,"c",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"c",r)))/(1-rto("c",r));
743 vom0("g",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"g",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"g",r)) + vifm0(i,"g",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"g",r)))/(1-rto("g",r));
744 vom0("i",r) = sum(i, vdfm0(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"i",r)) + vifm0(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"i",r)))/(1-rto("i",r));
745
746 vdm0("c",r) = vom0("c",r);
747 vdm0("g",r) = vom0("g",r);
748 vim0(i,r) = sum(g, vifm0(i,g,r));
749 evom0(f,r) = sum(g, vfm0(f,g,r));
750 vb0(r) = vom0("c",r) + vom0("g",r) + vom0("i",r)
751 - sum(f, evom0(f,r))
752 - sum(g, vom0(g,r)*rto(g,r))
753 - sum(g, sum(i, vdfm0(i,g,r)*rtfd0(i,g,r) + vifm0(i,g,r)*rtfi0(i,g,r)))
754 - sum(g, sum(f, vfm0(f,g,r)*rtf0(f,g,r)))
755 - sum((i,s), rtms0(i,s,r) * (vxmd0(i,s,r) * (1-rtxs0(i,s,r)) + sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r))))
756 + sum((i,s), rtxs0(i,r,s) * vxmd0(i,r,s));
757
758 vb0("chksum") = sum(r, vb0(r));
759 display vb;
760
761 parameter zpf_chk0(i,r);
762
763 zpf_chk0(i,r) =
764 vom0(i,r)*(1-rto(i,r))
765 - sum(j, vdfm0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm0(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
766 - sum(f, vfm0(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
767 ;
768
769 parameter mprofit_chk0(i,r);
770 mprofit_chk0(i,r) = vim0(i,r) - sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r)*vxmd0(i,s,r)+sum(j, vtwr(j,i,s,r))*pvtwr(i,s,r));
771
772 display zpf_chk0, mprofit_chk0;
773
774 vom(g,r) = 0;
775 vdm(g,r) = 0;
776 vxmd(i,r,s) = 0;
777 vdfm(i,g,r) = 0;
778 vifm(i,g,r) = 0;

```

```

779 vfm(f,g,r) = 0;
780 evom(f,r) = 0;
781 vim(i,r) = 0;
782
783 vom(g,r) = vom0(g,r);
784 vdm(g,r) = vdm0(g,r);
785 vxmd(i,r,s) = vxmd0(i,r,s);
786 vdfm(i,g,r) = vdfm0(i,g,r);
787 vifm(i,g,r) = vifm0(i,g,r);
788 vfm(f,g,r) = vfm0(f,g,r);
789 evom(f,r) = evom0(f,r);
790 vim(i,r) = vim0(i,r);
791 vb(r) = vb0(r) ;
792
793 rtf(f,j,r) = rtf0(f,j,r) ;
794 rtfd(i,g,r) = rtf0(i,g,r) ;
795 rtfi(i,g,r) = rtfi0(i,g,r) ;
796 rtms(i,r,s) = rtms0(i,r,s) ;
797 rtxs(i,r,s) = rtxs0(i,r,s) ;
798
799 *define numeraire region for denominating international transfers:
800 rnum(r) = yes$(vom("c",r)=smax(s,vom("c",s)));
801 *rnum(r) = no;
802 *rnum(r)$usa(r) = yes;
803 display rnum, vb0;
804
805 *=====
806
807 *$exit
808
809 execute_unload "fut_bmk_data.gdx",
810 vom0
811 vex0
812 vdm0
813 vxmd0
814 vim0
815 vdfm0
816 vifm0
817 vfm0

```

```
818 evom0
819 rto
820 rtf0
821 rtfi0
822 rtf0
823 rtms0
824 rtxs0
825 vb
826 zpf_chk0
827 mprofit_chk0
828 vom
829 vdm
830 vxmd
831 vim
832 vdfm
833 vifm
834 vfm
835 evom
836 i
837 g
838 r
839 f
840 ;
841
842 *$include ..\build\structure_table
843 *$exit
844
845 *execute_unload      "..\data11\cur_bmk.gdx";
846
847
```

model_cob.gms

```
1 $title Cobalt CGE Model File
2
3 $if not set sd $set sd 1
4
5 option seed=%sd%;
6
7 $if not setglobal run_name $setglobal run_name base
8
9 *===== Switches, includes, and command line variables =====
10 *specify name of.gdx file to be unloaded
11 $if not set.gdxname $set.gdxname output_cur_cob
12
13 *specify whether running current year scenario or future projection scenario (current, future)
14 $if not set bmkyr $set bmkyr current
15
16 *switch to determine evmix in 2030 (current, NPS, E30)
17 *corresponds to IEA No policies scenario or EV30@30
18 $if not set swfutscen $set swfutscen current
19
20 $if %swfutscen%==current          $goto endswfutscen
21 $if %swfutscen%==E30             $goto endNPS
22 *(NPS) EV deployment in terms of percentage of LDVs by country
23 $if not set evpct $set evpct 0.15
24 $if not set usaevpct $set usaevpct 0.08
25 $if not set chnevpct $set chnevpct 0.26
26
27 *(NPS) Mix of EVs that are BEV (1-BEV = PHEV)
28 $if not set evmix $set evmix 0.5
29
30 $label endNPS
31
32 $if %swfutscen%==NPS             $goto endE30
33 *(EV30) EV deployment in terms of percentage of LDVs by country
34 $if not set evpct $set evpct 0.33
35 $if not set usaevpct $set usaevpct 0.3
36 $if not set chnevpct $set chnevpct 0.42
37
```



```

38 *(EV30) Mix of EVs that are BEV (1-BEV = PHEV)
39 $if not set evmix $set evmix 0.7
40
41 $label endE30
42 $label endswfutsцен
43
44 $if not set scale30 $set scale30 current
45
46 $if not %swfutsцен%==current      $goto endcurblock
47 $if "%scale30%"="current"        $goto endcurblock2
48
49 $if not set evpct $set evpct 0.1
50 $if not set usaevpct $set usaevpct 0.1
51 $if not set chnevpct $set chnevpct 0.1
52
53 *(EV30) Mix of EVs that are BEV (1-BEV = PHEV)
54 $if not set evmix $set evmix 0.5
55
56
57 $label endcurblock
58 $label endcurblock2
59
60 *adjust battery capacity and vehicle cost assumptions (default, notdefault)
61 $if not set capadj $set capadj default
62
63 *Average/Representative Battery Capacity of BEV and PHEV (kwh)
64 $if not set capbev $set capbev 75
65 $if not set capphev $set capphev 15
66 *Alternatively specify a growth rate
67 $if not set capgrowth $set capgrowth 1.5
68
69 *Battery Chemistry Assumptions - implied/representative chemistry
70 $if not set bcrep $set bcrep 0.23
71
72 ***
73 *EV Cost - Assume EVs and LDVs same price (parity or some switch that changes costs)
74 $if not set evcost $set evcost parity
75
76 *Cost of EV battery pack per $/kwh

```

```

77 $if not set bpackcost $set bpackcost 175
78
79 ***
80 *Global Cobalt Production Mix (default, or other scenarios)
81 $if not set cobmix $set cobmix default
82
83 *Cobalt Supply Elasticity
84 $if not set esupcobval $set esupcobval 0.2
85
86 *Cobalt demand elasticity (yes/no)
87 $if not set swdelas $set swdelas no
88
89 *Cobalt Demand Elasticity
90 $if not set edemldvieval $set edemldvieval 0.2
91 $if not set edemomcval $set edemomcval 0.2
92 $if not set edemelevel $set edemelevel 0.2
93
94 *Various Substitution Elasticities
95 *--substitution between omvh and ldv
96 $if not set esmvhval $set esmvhval 0.2
97 *--substitution between ice, bev, phev
98 $if not set esldvval $set esldvval 0.5
99 *--cobalt in ldvie, omc, ele with other goods
100 $if not set esldvieval $set esldvieval 0
101 $if not set esomcval $set esomcval 0.2
102 $if not set eseleval $set eseleval 0.1
103 *--cobalt elasticity of export transformation
104 $if not set etcobval $set etcobval 20
105 *--elasticity of substitution between various intermediate goods and va index
106 $if not set esubval $set esubval 0.2
107
108 *Policy/Quota Stringency (% reduction in exports)
109 $if not set quoteval $set quoteval 25
110
111 *-----Initial Pre-processing-----
112 *Load data from gtap.gdx file post-aggregation
113 $if not set yr $set yr 11
114 $if not set ds $set ds cob_main3
115 $include ../build/gtap9data

```

```

116
117 *-----Further Pre-processing-----
118 *include prelude file for present day benchmark setup or future setup
119 $if not %bmkyr%==current      $goto future
120 $include cur_data
121 $label future
122
123 $if %bmkyr%==current          $goto current
124 $include fut_data
125 $label current
126 *=====
127 *$exit
128 *===== Specify Elasticity parameters and other initial model setup =====
129 parameter      esub(g)          Top-level elasticity indemand;
130
131 esub(g) = %esubval%;
132
133 *tweak this as well - maybe this is less than 1
134 esub("C") = 1 ;
135
136
137 *initialize values for cobalt
138 * esub(g)$cob(g) = 0;
139 * esubva(g)$cob(g) = 0 ;
140 * esubd(i)$cob(i) = 0 ;
141
142 *esubva(g)$omvh(g) = esubva('mvh');
143 *esubva(g)$ldvie(g) = esubva('mvh');
144 *esubva(g)$cob(g) = esubva('cmm') ;
145
146 PARAMETERS
147 esupcob(g,r)          elasticity of supply cobalt
148 edemcob(g,r)          elasticity of demand cobalt
149 cobsshr(f,g,r)        value share of fixed factor in production of g
150 cobdshr(g,r)          value share of cobalt in production of g
151 cobishr(i,r)          value share of exports in global output (used for reporting)
152 escob(g,r)            elasticity of substitution top-level cob block
153 escobd(g,r)           elasticity of substitution top-level g block with cobalt input
154 escall(g,r)           elasticity of substitution of cobalt int with other inputs in prod of g

```

```

155 etcob(g,r)                elasticity of transformation in output
156 quote(i,r)               policy target (quota - reduction in emissions)
157 esmvh                    elasticity of substitution in top level mvh nest
158 esldv                    elastitiy of substitution at top level of ldv nest
159 ;
160
161 cobishr(i,r)$cob(i) = vex0(i,r) / sum(s, vom(i,s));
162
163 *Calibrate cobalt production block to supply elasticity (Rutherford Notes)
164 esupcob(i,r)$cob(i) = %esupcobval% ;
165 cobsshr(f,i,r)$rcob(f)$cob(i) = vfm(f,i,r) / vom(i,r) ;
166 escob(i,r)$cob(i) = sum(f$rcob(f), (cobsshr(f,i,r)*esupcob(i,r)) / (1-cobsshr(f,i,r))) ;
167
168
169 *Substitution elasticities of other inputs with cobalt
170 escall(g,r) = 0 ;
171 escall(g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = %esldvieval% ;
172 escall(g,r)$[omc(g)] = %esomcval% ;
173 *escall(g,r)$[ele(g)] = %eselevel% ;
174
175 cobdshr(i,r)$[vom(i,r)] = (vdfm("cob",i,r)+vifm("cob",i,r)) / vom(i,r) ;
176 *initialize/define
177 edemcob(g,r) = 0 ;
178 escobd(g,r) = 0 ;
179
180 $if not %swdelas%==yes      $goto endescall
181 *Calibrate to elasticity of demand
182 edemcob(g,r)$[ldvie(g)] = %edemldvieval% ;
183 edemcob(g,r)$[omc(g)] = %edemomcval% ;
184 *edemcob(g,r)$[ele(g)] = %edemelevel% ;
185
186 escobd(i,r) = edemcob(i,r) * cobdshr(i,r) / (1-cobdshr(i,r)) ;
187 escall(g,r) = escobd(g,r) ;
188
189
190
191 display edemcob, escobd, escall ;
192
193 $label endescall

```

```

194
195 *Substitution between omvh and ldv
196 esmvh = %esmvhval%;
197 *Substitution between bev, phev, ice
198 esldv = %esldvval%;
199
200 *Elasticity of transformation in cobalt export versus production
201 etcob(i,r)$cob(i) = %etcobval%;
202
203 *% reduction in exports for benchmark
204 quote(i,r) = 0 ;
205
206 * Convert to armington specification of trade
207
208
209
210 *=====
211
212 *===== Declare Model =====
213 $ontext
214 $model:gtap9
215
216 $sectors:
217 y(g,r)$vom(g,r)           ! Supply
218 m(i,r)$vim(i,r)          ! Imports
219 yt(j)$vtw(j)             ! Transportation services
220 ft(f,r)$[sf(f) and evom(f,r)] ! Specific factor transformation
221 x(i,r)$[vex0(i,r)$cob(i)] ! Exports - Cobalt
222
223
224 $commodities:
225 p(g,r)$vom(g,r)           ! Domestic output price
226 pm(j,r)$[vim(j,r)$[not cob(j)]] ! Import price
227 pt(j)$vtw(j)             ! Transportation services
228 pf(f,r)$evom(f,r)        ! Primary factors rent
229 ps(f,g,r)$[sf(f) and vfm(f,g,r)] ! Sector-specific primary factors
230 * px(j,r)$[vex0(j,r)$cob(j)] ! Export price - cobalt
231 pg(j)$cob(j)             ! Global price - cobalt
232

```

```

233 $consumers:
234 ra(r)                ! Representative agent
235
236 $auxiliary:
237 QX(g,r)$[vex0(g,r)$cob(g)$chn(r)]      ! Variable associated with export quota constraint
238
239 *All but COB and MVH
240 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$[not cob(g)]$[not mvhall2(g)]]      s:escall(g,r) e:esub(g) i.tl(e):esubd(i) va(e):esubva(g)
241 o:p(g,r)                q:vom(g,r)                a:ra(r) t:rto(g,r)
242 i:p(i,r)$[not cob(i)]    q:vdfm(i,g,r)                p:(1+rtfd0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfd(i,g,r)
243 i:pm(i,r)$[not cob(i)]    q:vifm(i,g,r)                p:(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfi(i,g,r)
244 i:p(i,r)$[cob(i)]        q:(vdfm(i,g,r)+vifm(i,g,r))
245 i:ps(sf,g,r)            q:vfm(sf,g,r)                p:(1+rtf0(sf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(sf,g,r)
246 i:pf(mf,r)              q:vfm(mf,g,r)                p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
247
248 *===== MVH =====
249 *Top Level MHV
250 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$mvh(g)] s:esmvh
251 o:p(g,r)                q:vom(g,r)
252 i:p(i,r)                q:vdfm(i,g,r)
253
254 *Top Level LDV
255 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$ldv(g)] s:esldv
256 o:p(g,r)                q:vom(g,r)
257 i:p(i,r)                q:vdfm(i,g,r)
258
259 *BEV, PHEV, ICE
260 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$ldvie(g)]      s:escall(g,r) e:esub(g) i.tl(e):esubd(i) va(e):esubva(g)
261 o:p(g,r)                q:vom(g,r)                a:ra(r) t:rto(g,r)
262 i:p(i,r)$[not cob(i)]    q:vdfm(i,g,r)                p:(1+rtfd0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfd(i,g,r)
263 i:pm(i,r)$[not cob(i)]    q:vifm(i,g,r)                p:(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfi(i,g,r)
264 i:p(i,r)$[cob(i)]        q:(vdfm(i,g,r)+vifm(i,g,r))
265 i:ps(sf,g,r)            q:vfm(sf,g,r)                p:(1+rtf0(sf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(sf,g,r)
266 i:pf(mf,r)              q:vfm(mf,g,r)                p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
267
268 *OMVH
269 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$omvh(g)]        s:esub(g) i.tl:esubd(i) va:esubva(g)
270 o:p(g,r)                q:vom(g,r)                a:ra(r) t:rto(g,r)
271 i:p(i,r)                q:vdfm(i,g,r)                p:(1+rtfd0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfd(i,g,r)

```

```

272 i:pm(i,r)          q:vifm(i,g,r)          p:(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)) i.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtfi(i,g,r)
273 i:ps(sf,g,r)      q:vfm(sf,g,r)          p:(1+rtf0(sf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(sf,g,r)
274 i:pf(mf,r)        q:vfm(mf,g,r)          p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va: a:ra(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
275 *===== End MVH =====
276
277 *COB
278 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$cob(g)]      s:escob(g,r) T:etcob(g,r) e:esub(g)          i.tl(e):esubd(i)          va(e):esubva(g)
279 o:p(g,r)          q:vom(g,r)
280 *          o:p(g,r)          q:(vom(g,r)-vex0(g,r))
281 *          o:px(g,r)          q:vex0(g,r)          a:ra(r)          N:qx(g,r)$[vex0(g,r)$cob(g)$chn(r)]
282 i:pf(mf,r)        q:vfm(mf,g,r)          va:
283 i:pf(rco,r)       q:vfm(rco,g,r)
284
285 *Transport services
286 $prod:yt(j)$vtw(j) s:1
287 o:pt(j)          q:vtw(j)
288 i:p(j,r)         q:vst(j,r)
289
290 *Imports Armington
291 $prod:m(i,r)$[vim(i,r)$cob(i)]      s:esubm(i) s.tl:0
292 o:pm(i,r)        q:vim(i,r)
293 i:p(i,s)         q:vxmd(i,s,r)          p:pvxmd(i,s,r) s.tl: a:ra(s) t:(-rtxs(i,s,r)) a:ra(r) t:(rtms(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
294 i:pt(j)#(s)      q:vtwr(j,i,s,r) p:pvtwr(i,s,r) s.tl: a:ra(r) t:rtms(i,s,r)
295
296 *Imports COB
297 *cobalt clears in global market
298 $prod:m(i,r)$[vim(i,r)$cob(i)]
299 o:p(i,r)         q:vim(i,r)
300 i:pg(i)          q:(sum(s,vxmd(i,s,r)))
301
302 *Exports COB
303 $prod:x(i,r)$[vex0(i,r)$cob(i)]
304 o:pg(i)          q:(sum(s,vxmd(i,r,s)))
305 i:p(i,r)         q:vex0(i,r)          a:ra(r)          N:qx(i,r)$[vex0(i,r)$cob(i)$chn(r)]
306
307 *Sluggish factor transformation
308 $prod:ft(sf,r)$evom(sf,r) t:etrae(sf)
309 o:ps(sf,j,r)     q:vfm(sf,j,r)
310 i:pf(sf,r)       q:evom(sf,r)

```

```

311
312 $demand:ra(r)
313 d:p("c",r)          q:vom("c",r)
314 e:p("c",rnum)       q:vb(r)
315 e:p("g",r)          q:(-vom("g",r))
316 e:p("i",r)          q:(-vom("i",r))
317 e:pf(f,r)           q:evom(f,r)
318
319 $constraint:QX(i,r)$[vex0(i,r)$cob(i)$chn(r)]
320 (1-quote(i,r)) =g= x(i,r)$[vex0(i,r)$cob(i)$chn(r)] ;
321
322 $report:
323 v:IDd(i,g,r)          i:p(i,r)          prod:y(g,r)
324 v:IDm(i,g,r)          i:pm(i,r)          prod:y(g,r)
325 v:FD(f,g,r)           i:pf(f,r)          prod:y(g,r)
326
327
328 $offtext
329
330 $sysinclude mpsgeset gtap9
331
332 *-----Replicate benchmark-----
333
334
335 p.fx("c",r)$usa(r) = 1 ;
336
337 gtap9.workspace = 128;
338 gtap9.iterlim = 0;
339 $include gtap9.gen
340 solve gtap9 using mcp;
341
342 *$exit
343
344 gtap9.iterlim = 100000;
345
346 *=====
347
348 *===== Specify, Run, Save Output from Counter Factual Scenario(s) =====
349 *$if exist runs_%run_name%.dat $include runs_%run_name%.dat

```



```

350
351 $if not defined yra parameter yra;
352 $if not defined y_r PARAMETER y_r;
353 $if not defined m_r PARAMETER m_r;
354 $if not defined x_r PARAMETER x_r;
355 $if not defined p_r PARAMETER p_r;
356 $if not defined pm_r PARAMETER pm_r;
357 $if not defined pg_r PARAMETER pg_r;
358 $if not defined pf_r PARAMETER pf_r;
359 $if not defined ra_r PARAMETER ra_r;
360 $if not defined qx_r PARAMETER qx_r;
361 $if not defined idd_r PARAMETER idd_r;
362 $if not defined idm_r PARAMETER idm_r;
363 $if not defined ida_r PARAMETER ida_r;
364 $if not defined fd_r PARAMETER fd_r;
365 $if not defined welf_r PARAMETER welf_r;
366 $if not defined welfa_r PARAMETER welfa_r;
367
368 $if not defined evom_r PARAMETER evom_r;
369 $if not defined escall_r parameter escall_r;
370 $if not defined esub_r parameter esub_r;
371 $if not defined esubd_r parameter esubd_r;
372 $if not defined esubva_r parameter esubva_r;
373 $if not defined esmvh_r parameter esmvh_r;
374 $if not defined esldv_r parameter esldv_r;
375 $if not defined escob_r parameter escob_r;
376 $if not defined escobd_r parameter escobd_r;
377 $if not defined etcob_r parameter etcob_r;
378 $if not defined esupcob_r parameter esupcob_r;
379 $if not defined edemcob_r parameter edemcob_r;
380 $if not defined quote_r parameter quote_r;
381 $if not defined cobdshr_r parameter cobdshr_r;
382 $if not defined cobishr_r parameter cobishr_r;
383 $if not defined cobtab_r parameter cobtab_r;
384
385 *save BAU - no quota results in reporting parameters
386
387 y_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = Y.L(g, r);
388 m_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = M.L(i, r);

```

```

389 x_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = X.L(i, r);
390 p_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = P.L(g, r);
391 pm_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = PM.L(i, r);
392 pg_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i) = PG.L(i);
393 pf_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", f, r) = PF.L(f, r);
394 ra_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = RA.L(r);
395 qx_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = QX.L(g, r);
396 idd_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r)$[vdfm(i, g, r)] =
397 IDd.L(i, g, r) / vdfm(i, g, r);
398 idm_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r)$[vifm(i, g, r)] =
399 IDm.L(i, g, r) / vifm(i, g, r);
400 ida_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r)$[vdfm(i, g, r) or vifm(i, g, r)] =
401 (IDm.L(i, g, r) + IDd.L(i, g, r)) / (vdfm(i, g, r)+vifm(i, g, r));
402 fd_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", f, g, r)$[vfm(f, g, r)] =
403 FD.L(f, g, r) / vfm(f, g, r);
404 quote_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = quote(i, r);
405 welf_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = (Y.L("c", r) - 1);
406 welfa_r("BAU", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = (Y.L("c", r) - 1)*11000;
407
408 *Change quota stringency for policy counterfactual
409 quote(i, r)$[cob(i)$chn(r)] = %quoteval%/100 ;
410
411 display quote ;
412
413 $include gtap9.gen
414 solve gtap9 using mcp;
415
416 *save Quota - quota results in reporting parameters
417 y_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = Y.L(g, r);
418 m_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = M.L(i, r);
419 x_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = X.L(i, r);
420 p_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = P.L(g, r);
421 pm_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = PM.L(i, r);
422 pg_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i) = PG.L(i);
423 pf_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", f, r) = PF.L(f, r);
424 ra_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = RA.L(r);
425 qx_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = QX.L(g, r);
426 idd_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r)$[vdfm(i, g, r)] =
427 IDd.L(i, g, r) / vdfm(i, g, r);

```

```

428 idm_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r) $[vifm(i, g, r)] =
429 IDm.L(i, g, r) / vifm(i, g, r);
430 ida_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, g, r) $[vdfm(i, g, r) or vifm(i, g, r)] =
431 (IDm.L(i, g, r) + IDd.L(i, g, r)) / (vdfm(i, g, r) + vifm(i, g, r));
432 fd_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", f, g, r) $[vfm(f, g, r)] =
433 FD.L(f, g, r) / vfm(f, g, r);
434 quote_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = quote(i, r);
435 welf_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = (Y.L("c", r) - 1);
436 welfa_r("Quota", "%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", r) = (Y.L("c", r) - 1) * 11000;
437
438 *save other parameters in report variables
439 evom_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", f, r) = evom(f, r);
440 escall_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = escall(g, r);
441 esub_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g) = esub(g);
442 esubd_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i) = esubd(i);
443 esubva_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g) = esubva(g);
444 esmvh_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%") = esmvh;
445 esldv_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%") = esldv;
446 escob_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = escob(g, r);
447 *escobd_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = escobd(g, r);
448 etcob_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = etcob(g, r);
449 esupcob_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = esupcob(g, r);
450 *edemcob_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = edemcob(g, r);
451 cobdshr_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", g, r) = cobdshr(g, r);
452 cobishr_r("%gdxname%", "%swfutscen%", "%quoteval%", "%esomcval%", "%esldvval%", i, r) = cobishr(i, r);
453
454 *=====
455
456 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "Output", r) = vom0("cob", r);
457 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "Use", r) = sum(i, cob_v0(i, r));
458 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "NetImp", r) = vim0("cob", r) - vex0("cob", r);
459 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "ExpShrCHN", r) = cobishr("cob", r);
460 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "Output", "World") = sum(r, vom0("cob", r));
461 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "Use", "World") = sum((i, r), cob_v0(i, r));
462 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "NetImp", "World") = sum(r, vim0("cob", r) - vex0("cob", r));
463 cobtab_r("%swfutscen%", "ExpShrCHN", "World") = cobishr("cob", "CHN");
464
465
466 * Save model results for this run:

```

```

467
468 execute_unload "..\scenout\runout\%gdxname%.gdx";
469 execute_unload "..\scenout\final_%run_name%.gdx";
470
471 *FILE out /runs_%run_name%.dat/;
472
473 *put out;
474
475
476 * $libinclude gams2prm y_r
477 * $libinclude gams2prm m_r
478 * $libinclude gams2prm x_r
479 * $libinclude gams2prm p_r
480 * $libinclude gams2prm pm_r
481 * $libinclude gams2prm pg_r
482 * $libinclude gams2prm pf_r
483 * $libinclude gams2prm ra_r
484 * $libinclude gams2prm qx_r
485 * $libinclude gams2prm idd_r
486 * $libinclude gams2prm idm_r
487 * $libinclude gams2prm ida_r
488 * $libinclude gams2prm fd_r
489 * $libinclude gams2prm welf_r
490 * $libinclude gams2prm welfa_r
491
492 * $libinclude gams2prm evom_r
493 * $libinclude gams2prm escall_r
494 * $libinclude gams2prm esub_r
495 * $libinclude gams2prm esubd_r
496 * $libinclude gams2prm esubva_r
497 * $libinclude gams2prm esmvh_r
498 * $libinclude gams2prm esldv_r
499 * $libinclude gams2prm escob_r
500 * *$libinclude gams2prm escobd_r
501 * $libinclude gams2prm etcob_r
502 * $libinclude gams2prm esupcob_r
503 * *$libinclude gams2prm edemcob_r
504 * $libinclude gams2prm quote_r
505 * $libinclude gams2prm cobdshr_r

```

506

507

508 * `putclose out;`

509

510

511

APPENDIX J - SPILLOVER MODEL CODE

Files included:

1. run_lim.bat - passes key parameters into model for various scenarios
2. rd_ctar_lim.gms - Loads input data, calibration, model, and reporting

run_lim.bat

```
1 echo begin
2
3 ::Carbon Limit
4
5 ::No Tariff
6 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE1 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=no
7 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE2 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=0.5 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=no
8 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE3 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=0.5 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=no
9 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE4 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=2 --tarval=no
10 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE5 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=no --tthashftval=50
11 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=BASE6 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1.5 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=no --tthashftval=1
12
13 ::Tariff
14 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR1 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=yes
15 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR2 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=0.5 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=yes
16 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR3 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=0.5 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=yes
17 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR4 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=2 --tarval=yes
18 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR5 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=yes --tthashftval=50
19 gams rd_ctar_lim --sd=CTAR6 --carblimval=0.9 --pelascval=1.5 --esubdshft=1 --pelasrdval=1 --tarval=yes --tthashftval=1
20
21 gdxmerge output\runs_rd_ctar_lim*.gdx output=output\runs_lim.gdx
22 gdxmerge output\runs_rd_ctar_lim_BASE1.gdx output\runs_rd_ctar_lim_CTAR1.gdx output=output\runs_comp1.gdx
23
24 echo end
25
```

rd_ctar_lim.gms

```
1
2 $title          Replicate the GTAP9 Benchmark in MPSGE
3
4 * Batch file scenario management
5 $if not set pelasrdval $set pelasrdval 1
6 $if not set pelascval $set pelascval 1
7 $if not set esubdshft $set esubdshft 1
8 $if not set thtashftval $set thtashftval 1
9 $if not set sauswval $set sauswval no
10 $if not set tarmanval $set tarmanval no
11 $if not set tarval $set tarval no
12 $if not set carblimval $set carblimval 0.9
13 $if not set ctaxval $set ctaxval 100
14
15 *===== Monte-Carlo Seed =====
16 $if not set sd $set sd 1
17
18 *option seed=%sd%;
19 *=====
20
21 $if not set yr $set yr 11
22 $if not set ds $set ds rd_toy3
23 $if not set dsomn $set dsomn rd_toy3_omn
24 $if not set df $set df df_rli
25 $include gtap9data
26
27 *Unload bmk data from gtap9data.gms for safekeeping
28 *execute_unload "%ds%_gtap9data.gdx";
29
30 *Load in bmk RD expenditures in production
31
32 parameter rdin(*,*)          "bmk R&D expenditures in production"
33 /
34 $ondelim
35 $include %df%.csv
36 $offdelim
37 /;
```

```

38
39 *rdin(*,*) = round(rdin(*,*), 4);
40 display rdin;
41
42 alias (f,ff), (i,j,k);
43 alias (r,s,rr,ss);
44
45 set mapr(r,rr);
46 mapr(r,rr) = yes$(sameas(r,rr));
47
48 * ===== Adjust R&D data to work with gtap sectors =====
49 *Need to somehow figure out how to get value added from "OMN" sector...
50 *... into raw(i) set, so that r&d (rdin) can be shared out
51 *create a second aggregation routine --- rd_toy3_omn.gdx
52
53 parameter vfm_omn(f,*,r);
54 set gomn(*);
55 set iomn(gomn);
56
57 $if exist %dsomn%.gdx $gdxin "%dsomn%.gdx"
58 $if not exist %dsomn%.gdx $gdxin "%datadir%%dsomn%.gdx"
59 $load vfm_omn=vfm
60 $load gomn=g, iomn=i
61 $gdxin
62
63 display vfm_omn, gomn, iomn;
64 *$exit
65
66 set nei(i)      "nei"      /nei/;
67 set omn(iomn)  "omn"      /omn/;
68 set vkl(f)     "value added set"      /cap, lab/;
69 set raw(i)     "gtap raw set"      /cru, gas, coa/;
70 set raw_omn(iomn)  "gtap raw set"      /cru, gas, coa, omn/;
71 set ene(i)     "gtap ene set"      /ele, gdt/;
72 set ren       "raw and ene"      /raw,ene/;
73 set nren(i)   "not raw or ene";
74 nren(i)$[not raw(i) or not ene(i)] = yes;
75 display nren;
76 set coa(i)     "coal"      /coa/;

```



```

77 set chn(r)          "chn"          /chn/;
78
79 parameter
80 vaene(i,r)         "value added share of total ENE"
81 varaw(iomn,r)      "value added share of total RAW"
82 ;
83
84 vaene(i,r)$[ene(i)] = sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)) / sum((f,ene), vfm(f,ene,r));
85 *varaw(i,r)$[raw(i)] = sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)) / (sum((f,raw), vfm(f,raw,r)) + sum((f,omn), vfm(f,omn,r)));
86 varaw(iomn,r)$[raw_omn(iomn)] = sum(f, vfm_omn(f,iomn,r)) / sum((f,raw_omn), vfm_omn(f,raw_omn,r));
87
88 display vaene, varaw;
89
90 parameter
91 rdexp0             "R&D expenditures under gtap sets"
92 ;
93 rdexp0(r,i)$[nren(i)] = rdin(r,i);
94 rdexp0(r,'cru') = varaw('cru',r) * rdin(r,"RAW");
95 rdexp0(r,'gas') = varaw('gas',r) * rdin(r,"RAW");
96 rdexp0(r,'coa') = varaw('coa',r) * rdin(r,"RAW");
97 rdexp0(r,i)$[nei(i)] = rdexp0(r,i) + varaw('omn',r)*rdin(r,"RAW");
98 rdexp0(r,i)$[ene(i)] = vaene(i,r) * rdin(r,"ENE");
99
100 display rdexp0;
101 *$exit
102 *=====
103
104 *=====Determine N-S regional sets=====
105 $ifthen.rdtoy2 '%ds%'=='rd_toy2'
106 set
107 sth(r)          "Regions that belong to the South"          /SOU/
108 nth(r)          "Regions that belong to the North"
109 ;
110 $endif.rdtoy2
111
112 $ifthen.rdtoy1 '%ds%'=='rd_toy1'
113 set
114 sth(r)          "Regions that belong to the South"          /E12, RUS, CHN, ROW/
115 nth(r)          "Regions that belong to the North"

```

```

116 ;
117 $endif.rdtoy1
118
119 $ifthen.rdtoy3 '%ds%'=='rd_toy3'
120 set
121 sth(r)          "Regions that belong to the South"          /E12, RUS, CHN, ROW/
122 nth(r)          "Regions that belong to the North"
123 ;
124 $endif.rdtoy3
125
126
127 nth(r)$(not sth(r)) = yes;
128 *=====
129
130
131 *===== Calculate Gammas - absorption capacity weights =====
132 parameter        gamma(r,i)          "absorption capacity weights";
133 gamma(r,i) = rdexp@ (r,i) / sum(nth, rdexp@ (nth,i));
134 display gamma;
135 *=====
136
137 set
138 lb(f)            "labor"                /lab/
139 *               fe(i)          "final energy"          /raw, ene/
140 fe(i)            "final energy"          /coa, gas, oil, gdt/
141 nfe(i)           "not final energy"
142 ;
143 nfe(i)$(not fe(i)) = yes;
144
145
146 display fe, nfe, nth, sth;
147
148
149 *GTAP6 Model code --- gtap_arm4.gms
150 *Something to do with income balance and govt collecting taxes
151 *vpm(r) = vom('c',r);
152 *vgm(r) = vom('g',r);
153 *sum(i,vdim(i,r)) = vom('i',r)
154 *vtax(r) = sum(f, evom(f,r)) - (vpm(r) + sum(i,vdim(i,r)));

```

```

155
156 parameter          vtax(r)          "Implicit Tax";
157 vtax(r) = sum(f, evom(f,r)) - (vom('c',r) + vom('i',r));
158 display vtax;
159
160 parameters
161 esubc              "R&D substitution in effective carbon prod"
162 esubrd(g,r) "R&D substitution in sectoral production"
163 esubrdd           "Substitution in RD production"
164 esubrdc          "Substitution in RD production"
165
166 dcb0(*,*,*)      "demand for effective carbon"
167 cb0(r)           "value of carbon good output"
168 carb0(r)         "carbon endowment"
169
170 rd0(i,r)         "bmk value of R&D investments"
171
172 dk0(g,r)         "bmk demand for knowledge"
173 ks0(i,r)         "bmk endowment of knowledge stocks"
174 vktx(r)          "bmk value of tax revs lost in R&D calibration"
175
176 rdc0(r)          "bmk value of carbon R&D"
177 irdc0(f,r)       "bmk value of inputs to carbon R&D"
178
179 rdshr(r)         "share of conventional factors reallocated to R&D"
180 rdcshr           "bmk rd as share of effective carbon prod"
181 ksshr(r)         "share of conventional factors reallocated to knowledge stock"
182 kshr(r)          "total knowledge as share of gdp"
183
184 theta(i,r,s)     "tech spillover coeffs"
185 theta0(i,r,s)    "bmk tech spillover coeffs"
186
187 ctax0(r)         "bmk carbon tax rate"
188
189 ;
190
191 *===== monte carlo parameters =====
192 *esubd(i) = uniform(0.5*esubd(i),1.5*esubd(i));
193 *esubm(i) = uniform(0.5*esubm(i),1.5*esubm(i));

```

```

194
195 *esubrdd = uniform(0.5,1.5);
196 *esubrdc = uniform(0.5,1.5);
197 esubrdd = 1;
198 esubrdc = 1;
199
200 *rdcshr = uniform(0.005,0.015);
201 rdcshr = 0.01;
202 *rdcshr = 1;
203
204 PARAMETER rshft(i);
205 rshft(i) = 1;
206 *rshft(i) = uniform(0.5,1.5);
207 rdexp0(r,i) = rdexp0(r,i)*rshft(i);
208
209 *=====
210
211 set
212 *      xe(g)      "extractive resources - cru, gas, coa" /raw/
213 xe(g)      "extractive resources - cru, gas, coa" /coa, gas, cru/
214 fl(f,g)
215 ;
216 fl("cap",xe) = yes;
217
218 ctax0(r) = 1;
219
220 *Load data into carbon parameters
221 dcb0(i,g,r) = eco2d(i,g,r) + eco2i(i,g,r);
222
223 *cb0(r) = sum((i,g), dcb0(i,g,r));
224 cb0(r) = sum((fe,g), dcb0(fe,g,r));
225 carb0(r) = cb0(r);
226
227 *Data in Mt (million tons) of co2
228 *--Convert to Billion tons of co2,
229 *----so that model carbon prices can be interpreted in $/ton co2
230 dcb0(i,g,r) = dcb0(i,g,r) * 1e-3;
231 cb0(r) = cb0(r) * 1e-3;
232 carb0(r) = carb0(r) * 1e-3;

```

```

233
234
235 display eco2d, eco2i, dcb0, cb0, carb0;
236
237 *Assume that all R&D spillovers can be used domestically... but only
238 * some fraction can be used in the developing world...
239
240 theta0(i,s,r) = gamma(r,i);
241 theta0(i,nth,nth) = 1;
242 theta0(i,sth,nth) = 0;
243 theta0(i,s,r)$(sth(r) and sth(s)) = 0;
244
245 theta(i,r,s) = theta0(i,r,s);
246
247 display theta0;
248
249 * Benchmark calibration with R&D
250 parameters
251 ird0(i,r)      "bmk inputs to R&D production"
252 vitx(i,j,r)   "bmk value of tax on intermediate inputs"
253 vot(i,r)      "bmk value of output taxes"
254 r0            "interest rate"           /0.05/
255 dlt0          "depreciation rate"       /0.20/
256 g0           "growth rate"             /0.01/
257 ;
258
259 alias(i,ii,jj,kk);
260
261 set map_li(*); map_li("lab") = yes;
262 set map_ci(*); map_ci("cap") = yes;
263
264 vitx(i,j,r) = rtf0(i,j,r) * vdfm(i,j,r);
265 vot(i,r) = rto(i,r)*vom(i,r);
266
267 *Calculate value of inputs to R&D production based on perpetual
268 * inventory method:
269
270 *ird0(i,r) = rdexp0(r,i);
271 ird0(i,r) = (dlt0+g0) * rdexp0(r,i) / (dlt0+r0);

```

```

272 *ird0(i,nth) = (dlt0+g0) * rdexp0(nth,i) / (dlt0+r0);
273 display ird0;
274
275 *===== CHECK =====
276 mprofit(i,r) = 0;
277 yprofit(i,r) = 0;
278 mprofit(i,r) = vim(i,r) - sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r)*vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j, vtwr(j,i,s,r))*pvtwr(i,s,r));
279 mprofit(i,r) = round(mprofit(i,r),5);
280 display mprofit;
281
282 yprofit(g,r) = vom(g,r)*(1-rto(g,r))
283 - sum(i, vdfm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfd0(i,g,r))
284 + vifm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)))
285 - sum(f, vfm(f,g,r)*(1+rtf0(f,g,r)));
286
287 yprofit(g,r) = round(yprofit(g,r),6)
288 display yprofit;
289 *===== CHECK =====
290
291 *Now debit intermediate inputs to conventional goods proportionately:
292
293 parameter          vints(i,j,r);
294
295 vints(i,j,r) =
296 (1+rtfd0(i,j,r))*vdfm(i,j,r)
297 - rdexp0(r,j) *
298 [(1+rtfd0(i,j,r))*vdfm(i,j,r) / sum(k, (1+rtfd0(k,j,r))*vdfm(k,j,r))]
299 ;
300
301 vdfm(i,j,r) = vints(i,j,r) - vitx(i,j,r);
302
303 * And calculate the new effective tax rates...
304
305 rtfd0(i,j,r)$vdfm(i,j,r) = vitx(i,j,r)/vdfm(i,j,r) ;
306 rtfd(i,j,r) = rtfd0(i,j,r) ;
307
308 * Re-calculate total demand for intermediates:
309
310 parameters

```

```

311 totdmd(r,i)
312 totsups(r,i)
313 ;
314
315 totdmd(r,i) =
316 sum(g, vdfm(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r))
317 + [sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s)) + vst(i,r)]
318 + ird0(i,r)
319 ;
320 display totdmd;
321
322
323 totsups(r,i) =
324 sum(j, vdfm(j,i,r)*(1+rtdf0(j,i,r)) + vifm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
325 + sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
326 + rdexp0(r,i)
327 + [ sum(j, vdfm(j,i,r)*(1+rtdf0(j,i,r)) + vifm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
328 + sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
329 + rdexp0(r,i) ] * (1/(1-rto(i,r))-1)
330 + vim(i,r)
331 ;
332 display totsups;
333
334
335 parameter chk;
336 chk(i,r) = totdmd(r,i) - totsups(r,i);
337 display chk;
338
339 *And debit value of chk from labor inputs to re-balance the SAM:
340 parameters
341 vfct(f,i,r)
342 vltx(f,i,r)
343 ;
344
345 * OIL R&D is too large to be debited from labor:
346 SET      noil(ii)      Not OIL;
347 noil(ii) = yes; noil("oil") = no;
348
349

```

```

350 vltx(f,i,r) = rtf0(f,i,r)*vfm(f,i,r);
351 vfct(f,i,r) = (1+rtf0(f,i,r))*vfm(f,i,r);
352 display vfct;
353
354 *Adjust Labor
355 *vfct("lab",i,r) = (1+rtf0("lab",i,r))*vfm("lab",i,r) + chk(i,r);
356 vfct("lab",noil,r) = (1+rtf0("lab",noil,r))*vfm("lab",noil,r) + chk(noil,r);
357
358 *Adjust Investment
359 *vdim("OIL",r) = vdim("OIL",r) - chk("OIL",r);
360 vdfm('oil','i',r) = vdfm('oil','i',r) - chk('oil',r);
361
362 *Adjust vom for investment - vom will be adjusted for labor later
363 vom("i",r) = sum(i, vdfm(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfd0(i,"i",r)) + vifm(i,"i",r)*(1+rtfi0(i,"i",r)))/(1-rto("i",r));
364
365 vfm(f,i,r) = vfct(f,i,r) - vltx(f,i,r);
366 rtf0(f,i,r)$rtf0(f,i,r) = vltx(f,i,r)/vfm(f,i,r);
367 rtf(f,i,r) = rtf0(f,i,r);
368
369 evom(f,r) = sum(i, vfm(f,i,r));
370 display vfm, evom, vfct, vltx, rtf;
371
372 *===== CHECK =====
373 mprofit(i,r) = 0;
374 yprofit(i,r) = 0;
375 mprofit(i,r) = vim(i,r) - sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r)*vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j, vtwr(j,i,s,r))*pvtwr(i,s,r));
376 mprofit(i,r) = round(mprofit(i,r),5);
377 display mprofit;
378
379 yprofit(g,r) = vom(g,r)*(1-rto(g,r))
380 - sum(i, vdfm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfd0(i,g,r))
381 + vifm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)))
382 - sum(f, vfm(f,g,r)*(1+rtf0(f,g,r)))
383 - rdexp0(r,g)
384 ;
385
386 yprofit(g,r) = round(yprofit(g,r),6)
387 display yprofit;
388 *===== CHECK =====

```



```

389
390 *Now we must calculate new value of vom...
391 parameter vinputs(i,r);
392
393 vinputs(i,r) =
394 sum(j, vdfm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
395 + sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
396 + rdexp0(r,i)
397 ;
398
399 vom(i,r) = vinputs(i,r) + vot(i,r);
400
401 rto(i,r)$[vom(i,r)] = 1 - vinputs(i,r) / vom(i,r);
402
403 totsup(r,i) =
404 sum(j, vdfm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
405 + sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
406 + rdexp0(r,i)
407 + [      sum(j, vdfm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfd0(j,i,r)) + vifm(j,i,r)*(1+rtfi0(j,i,r)))
408 + sum(f, vfm(f,i,r)*(1+rtf0(f,i,r)))
409 + rdexp0(r,i) ] * (1/(1-rto(i,r))-1)
410 + vim(i,r)
411 ;
412
413 chk(i,r) = 0;
414 chk(i,r) = totsup(r,i) - vim(i,r) - vom(i,r);
415 display totsup, vom, chk;
416
417 *===== CHECK =====
418 mprofit(i,r) = 0;
419 yprofit(i,r) = 0;
420 mprofit(i,r) = vim(i,r) - sum(s, pvxmd(i,s,r)*vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j, vtwr(j,i,s,r))*pvtwr(i,s,r));
421 mprofit(i,r) = round(mprofit(i,r),5);
422 display mprofit;
423
424 yprofit(g,r) = vom(g,r)*(1-rto(g,r))
425 - sum(i, vdfm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfd0(i,g,r))
426 + vifm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfi0(i,g,r)))
427 - sum(f, vfm(f,g,r)*(1+rtf0(f,g,r)))

```

```

428 - rdexp0(r,g)
429 ;
430
431 yprofit(g,r) = round(yprofit(g,r),6)
432 display yprofit;
433 *===== CHECK =====
434
435 rdc0(r) = 1;
436 *irdc0(f,r) = 0;
437 *irdc0(lb,r) = 1;
438
439 *Adjust capital stock for resource-specific factors and calibrate
440 *supply elasticities for these goods:
441
442 evom('cap',r) = evom('cap',r) - sum(xe, vfm('cap',xe,r));
443
444 parameter rsshrs, rdshrs, evom;
445
446 rsshrs(xe,r)$[vom(xe,r)] = vfm('cap',xe,r) / (vom(xe,r)*(1-rto(xe,r)));
447 rdshrs(i,r)$[vom(i,r)] = rdexp0(r,i) / (vom(i,r)*(1-rto(i,r)));
448
449 * Now set price elasticity of R&D equal in all sectors:
450
451 *===== monte carlo parameters =====
452 PARAMETERS
453 elas_shft(g)
454 elasc_shft
455 esup_shft(g)
456 pelas_rd(g)
457 pelas_rdc
458 esup_xe(g)
459 ;
460
461
462 *elas_shft(i) = uniform(0.5,1.5);
463 *elasc_shft = uniform(0.5,1.5);
464 *esup_shft(i) = uniform(0.5,1.5);
465
466 elas_shft(i) = 1;

```

```

467 elasc_shft = 1;
468 esup_shft(i) = 1;
469
470 pelas_rdc(i) = elasc_shft(i) * %pelasrdval%;
471 pelas_rdc = elasc_shft * %pelascval%;
472 esup_xe(i) = 1;
473 esup_xe('COA') = 1;
474 *=====
475
476 ** pelas = thet + (1-thet)*esubrd =>
477 esubrd(i,r) = -((rdshrs(i,r) - pelas_rdc(i))/(1-rdshrs(i,r)));
478 *esubrd(i,r)=0.1;
479 esubc = -((rdcshr - pelas_rdc)/(1-rdcshr));
480 *esubc = pelas_rdc;
481
482 display esubc;
483
484 * In the exhaustible energy sectors, set esub to imply elasticity of supply:
485
486 esubrd(xe,r) = esup_xe(xe) * rsshrs(xe,r) / (1-rsshrs(xe,r));
487
488 display rsshrs, rdshrs, esubrd;
489
490 *setup R&D calibration
491
492 dk0(i,r) = rdexp0(r,i);
493 rd0(i,r) = ird0(i,r);
494 ks0(i,r) = dk0(i,r) - rd0(i,r);
495
496
497 *check that knowledge markets clear
498 parameter chk2;
499 chk2(i,r) = rd0(i,r) + ks0(i,r) - dk0(i,r);
500 display chk2, rd0, ks0, dk0;
501
502
503 *Convert to Armington specification of trade:
504 parameters
505 vafm

```

```

506 a0
507 rtfa0
508 rtfa
509 ;
510
511 vafm(i,g,r) = vdfm(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r);
512 a0(i,r) = sum(g, vdfm(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r));
513 rtfa0(i,g,r)$[vafm(i,g,r)] = (vdfm(i,g,r)*rtfd0(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r)*rtfi0(i,g,r)) / vafm(i,g,r);
514 rtfa(i,g,r) = rtfa0(i,g,r);
515
516 display vafm, a0, rtfa0;
517 *$exit
518
519
520 set      cn(g)      "consumption"      /c/;
521 set      gv(g)      "government"      /g/;
522 set iv(g)      "investment"      /i/;
523 set      cg(g)      "consumption & government"      /c,g/;
524 set cgi(g)      "cgi"      /c,g,i/;
525 set aggs(g) "aggregated sectors -- eii, nei"      /eii, nei/;
526
527 parameter      esub(g)      Top-level elasticity indemand /C 0.5/;
528 esub(i)$[not xe(i)] = 0.2;
529 esubd(i)$[aggs(i)] = esubd(i) * %esubdshft%;
530 esubm(i)$[aggs(i)] = esubm(i) * %esubdshft%;
531
532 display esub, esubd, esubva, esubc, esubm, esubrd;
533
534 parameter
535 cc(g,s,r)      "carbon content general"
536 ccsb(g,s,r) "carbon content negative"
537 ccy(g,r)      "carbon content domestic, activity g in region r"
538 ccm(i,r)      "carbon content imports, commodity i in region r"
539 ccele(r)      "carbon content of electricity sector output in region r"
540 ccemb(g,r)      "direct emissions content from fuel consumption and indirect emissions content embodied in electricity"
541 tar(i,s,r)      "carbon tariff switch"
542 tarman(i,s,r) "manual tariff switch"
543 sausw      "switch for endogenous quota"
544 ctar(i,s,r) "carbon import tariff manual"

```

```

545 csub(i,s,r) "carbon export subsidy manual (subsidy when positive)"
546
547 tarsw(r)
548 tars          "Tariff Switch"
549 ;
550
551 tarsw(r) = no;
552 tars = no;
553
554 cc(g,s,r) = 0;
555 ccy(g,r)$[vom(g,r)] = (sum(i, eco2d(i,g,r) + eco2i(i,g,r)))*1e-3 / vom(g,r);
556 ccm(i,r)$[vim(i,r)] = (sum(j, eco2i(j,i,r)))*1e-3 / vim(i,r);
557 ccele(r)$[vom('ele',r)] = sum(i,dcb0(i,'ele',r)) / vom('ele',r);
558 ccemb(g,r)$[vom(g,r)] = [ccy(g,r)*vom(g,r) + ccele(r)*(vdfm('ele',g,r)+vifm('ele',g,r))] / vom(g,r);
559 *cc(g,s,r)$[not mapr(s,r)] = ccemb(g,r);
560 cc(g,s,r)$[vom(g,r)$[not mapr(s,r)]] = sum(fe, dcb0(fe,g,r)) / vom(g,r);
561 ccsb(g,s,r) = -cc(g,s,r);
562 *cc(i,s,r) = cc(i,s,r) * vxmd(i,s,r);
563
564 tar(i,s,r) = no;
565 tarman(i,s,r) = no;
566 sausw = no;
567 ctar(i,s,r) = 0;
568 csub(i,s,r) = 0;
569
570 parameters
571 vx0(g,r)          "exports of good in i produced in region r - south to north only"
572 shvx0(g,r)       "export share of output of good i produced in region r"
573 shvxmd0(i,r,s)
574 shvd0(g,r)       "domestic share of output of good i produced in region r"
575 carbex0(r)       "c02 imports to region r (in north) from southern regions"
576 ;
577
578 vx0(i,r)$[sth(r)] = sum(s$[nth(s)], vxmd(i,r,s));
579 shvx0(g,r)$[vom(g,r)] = vx0(g,r)/vom(g,r);
580 shvd0(g,r) = 1-shvx0(g,r);
581 shvxmd0(i,sth,nth)$[vx0(i,sth)] = vxmd(i,sth,nth) / vx0(i,sth);
582 carbex0(r) = sum((fe,j), shvx0(j,r)*dcb0(fe,j,r));
583

```

```

584 display cc, ccy, ccm, vx0, shvx0, shvd0, shvxd0;
585 *$exit
586 *Clean this section up
587 parameters
588 ex1(i,r,s)
589 ex2(i,r,s)
590 ex3(i,r)
591 ex4(i,r)
592 ex5(r,s)
593 ex6(i,r)
594 ex7(i,r)
595 carbim0(r,s)          "imports of carbon contained in goods from south to country r$north"
596 chkimex
597 ;
598
599 ex1(i,r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)] = vxmd(i,r,s)*cc(i,r,s);
600 *ex2(i,r,s)$[nth(r)$sth(s)] = vxmd(i,r,s)*cc(i,r,s);
601 ex3(i,r)$[sth(r)] = sum(s$[nth(s)], ex1(i,r,s));
602 *ex4(i,s)$[nth(s)] = sum(r$[sth(r)], ex1(i,r,s));
603 ex4(i,nth) = sum(sth, vxmd(i,sth,nth)*cc(i,nth,sth));
604 *carbex0(r) = sum(i,ex3(i,r));
605 *carbim0(r) = sum(i,ex4(i,r));
606 carbim0(nth,sth) = sum(i,vxmd(i,sth,nth)*cc(i,nth,sth));
607 chkimex("carb") = sum((r,s),carbim0(r,s)) - sum(s,carbex0(s));
608 display carbex0, carbim0, chkimex;
609
610 *$exit
611 $ontext
612 $model:itc
613
614 $sectors:
615 y(g,r)$vom(g,r)          ! Supply
616 m(i,r)$vim(i,r)         ! Imports
617 yt(j)$vtw(j)           ! Transportation services
618 *          ft(f,r)$[sf(f) and evom(f,r)]          ! Specific factor transformation
619
620 a(i,r)$[a0(i,r)]        ! Armington Composite
621
622 rd(i,r)$[rd0(i,r)]      ! Conventional R&D sectors

```

```

623 rdc(r)$[rdc0(r)]           ! Carbon R&D sector
624 carbon(r)$[nth(r)]       ! Effective carbon
625
626 x(i,r)$[vx0(i,r)$sth(r)]   ! Southern Export Block - Only Exports going to North
627 d(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$sth(r)]   ! South-South Production and Domestic South
628 sscarbon(r)$[sth(r)]      ! Southern effective emissions domestic and south to south
629 sncarbon(r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)] ! Southern effective emissions - South to North
630 xrs(j,r,s)$[shvxd0(j,r,s)$sth(r)$nth(s)] ! Exports from South to North
631
632 $commodities:
633 p(g,r)$vom(g,r)           ! Domestic output price
634 pm(j,r)$vim(j,r)         ! Import price
635 pt(j)$vtw(j)             ! Transportation services
636 pf(f,r)$evom(f,r)       ! Primary factors rent
637 * ps(f,g,r)$[sf(f) and vfm(f,g,r)] ! Sector-specific primary factors
638
639 pa(i,r)$[a0(i,r)]       ! Armington aggregation
640
641 pr(i,r)$[dk0(i,r)]       ! Sectoral R&D prices
642 prc(r)$[rdc0(r)]        ! Carbon-saving R&D price
643 prcarb(r)$[nth(r)]      ! Effective carbon price
644 pcarb(r)$[carb0(r)]     ! Carbon factor price
645 psncarb(r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)$stars] ! Factor price that south inherits from north
646 prsscارب(r)$[sth(r)]    ! Effective carbon price for south to south and southern domestic
647 prsncarb(r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)]
648
649 prs(i,r)$[xe(i)$vfm("cap",i,r)] ! Fuel resource price
650
651 px(i,r)$[vx0(i,r)$sth(r)]
652 pd(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$sth(r)]
653 pxs(i,r,s)$[shvxd0(i,r,s)$sth(r)$nth(s)]
654
655 $consumers:
656 hh(r)                   ! Representative household
657 govt(r)                 ! Representative government
658
659 $auxiliary:
660 spill(i,r)$[ks0(i,r) or rd0(i,r)] ! conventional technology spillovers
661 spillc(r)$rdc0(r)       ! carbon technology spillovers

```

```

662 ctax(r)                                ! carbon tax rule
663 tariff(r,s)$[nth(r)$sth(s)$stars]      ! carbon tariff constraint
664
665 *zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz OUTPUT Blocks zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
666
667 *=====North=====
668 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$xe(g)$nth(r)]      s:esubrd(g,r)   cm:esub(g)   i.tl(cm):0   va(cm):esubva(g)
669 o:p(g,r)      q:vom(g,r)
670 +            a:govt(r)      t:rto(g,r)
671 i:pa(fe,r)    q:vafm(fe,g,r)      p:(1+rtfa0(fe,g,r))   fe.tl:
672 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtfa(fe,g,r)
673 i:pa(i,r)$[not fe(i)]      q:vafm(i,g,r)      p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r))   cm:
674 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtfa(i,g,r)
675 i:pf(mf,r)    q:vfm(mf,g,r)      p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))   va:
676 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtf(mf,g,r)
677 i:prcarb(r)#(fe)      q:dcb0(fe,g,r)      p:1e-6      fe.tl:
678 i:pr(g,r)$[not cg(g)]      q:dk0(g,r)
679
680
681 $prod:y(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$xe(g)$nth(r)]      s:esubrd(g,r)   cm:esub(g)   i.tl(cm):0   va(cm):esubva(g)
682 o:p(g,r)      q:vom(g,r)
683 +            a:govt(r)      t:rto(g,r)
684 i:pa(fe,r)    q:vafm(fe,g,r)      p:(1+rtfa0(fe,g,r))   fe.tl:
685 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtfa(fe,g,r)
686 i:pa(i,r)$[not fe(i)]      q:vafm(i,g,r)      p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r))   cm:
687 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtfa(i,g,r)
688 i:pf(mf,r)$[not fl(mf,g)]      q:vfm(mf,g,r)      p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))   va:
689 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtf(mf,g,r)
690 i:prcarb(r)#(fe)      q:dcb0(fe,g,r)      p:1e-6      fe.tl:
691 i:pr(g,r)      q:dk0(g,r)
692 i:prs(g,r)    q:vfm("cap",g,r)      p:(1+rtf0("cap",g,r))
693 +            a:govt(r)      t:rtf("cap",g,r)
694 *=====
695
696 *=====South=====
697 *-----Domestic Production Block-----
698 $prod:d(g,r)$[vom(g,r)$xe(g)$nth(r)]      s:esubrd(g,r)   cm:esub(g)   i.tl(cm):0   va(cm):esubva(g)
699 o:pd(g,r)      q:(shvd0(g,r)*vom(g,r))
700 +            a:govt(r)      t:rto(g,r)

```


701 i:pa(fe,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*vafm(fe,g,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(fe,g,r)) fe.tl:
702 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(fe,g,r)
703 i:pa(i,r)\$[not fe(i)] q:(shvd0(g,r)*vafm(i,g,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r)) cm:
704 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(i,g,r)
705 i:pf(mf,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*vfm(mf,g,r)) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
706 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
707 i:prsscarb(r)#(fe) q:(shvd0(g,r)*dcb0(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
708 i:pr(g,r)\$[not cg(g)] q:(shvd0(g,r)*dk0(g,r))
709
710
711 \$prod:d(g,r)\$[vom(g,r)\$xe(g)\$sth(r)] s:esubrd(g,r) cm:esub(g) i.tl(cm):0 va(cm):esubva(g)
712 o:pd(g,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*vom(g,r))
713 + a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
714 i:pa(fe,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*vafm(fe,g,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(fe,g,r)) fe.tl:
715 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(fe,g,r)
716 i:pa(i,r)\$[not fe(i)] q:(shvd0(g,r)*vafm(i,g,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r)) cm:
717 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(i,g,r)
718 i:pf(mf,r)\$[not fl(mf,g)] q:(shvd0(g,r)*vfm(mf,g,r)) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
719 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
720 i:prsscarb(r)#(fe) q:(shvd0(g,r)*dcb0(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
721 i:pr(g,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*dk0(g,r))
722 i:prs(g,r) q:(shvd0(g,r)*vfm("cap",g,r)) p:(1+rtf0("cap",g,r))
723 + a:govt(r) t:rtf("cap",g,r)
724
725 *-----South to North Export Production Block-----
726 \$prod:xrs(j,r,s)\$[shvxd0(j,r,s)\$[not xe(j)]\$sth(r)\$nth(s)] s:esubrd(j,r) cm:esub(j) i.tl(cm):0 va(cm):esubva(j)
727 o:pxs(j,r,s) q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*vom(j,r))
728 + a:govt(r) t:rto(j,r)
729 i:pa(fe,r) q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*vafm(fe,j,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(fe,j,r)) fe.tl:
730 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(fe,j,r)
731 i:pa(i,r)\$[not fe(i)] q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*vafm(i,j,r)) p:(1+rtfa0(i,j,r)) cm:
732 + a:govt(r) t:rtfa(i,j,r)
733 i:pf(mf,r) q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*vfm(mf,j,r)) p:(1+rtf0(mf,j,r)) va:
734 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,j,r)
735 i:prsncarb(r,s)#(fe) q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*dcb0(fe,j,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
736 i:pr(j,r)\$[not cg(j)] q:(shvx0(j,r)*shvxd0(j,r,s)*dk0(j,r))
737
738
739 \$prod:xrs(j,r,s)\$[shvxd0(j,r,s)\$xe(j)\$sth(r)\$nth(s)] s:esubrd(j,r) cm:esub(j) i.tl(cm):0 va(cm):esubva(j)


```

779
780 *=====Effective Carbon Production=====
781 *NORTH
782 $prod:carbon(r)$[nth(r)]          s:esubc
783 o:pcarb(r)                        q:1
784 i:pcarb(r)$[carb0(r)]             q:1                p:1
785 i:p(cn,r)$[not carb0(r)]          q:(1e-6)
786 i:prc(r)$[rdc0(r)]                q:(rdcshr*rdc0(r))    p:1
787
788 *SOUTH - Domestic and South to South
789 $prod:sscarbon(r)$[sth(r)]
790 o:prsscarb(r)                    q:1
791 i:p(cn,r)                          q:1e-6
792
793 *SOUTH to NORTH
794 $prod:sncarbon(r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)] s:esubc
795 o:prsncarb(r,s)                   q:1
796 i:psncarb(r,s)$[tars]             q:1                p:1
797 i:pcarb(r)$[carb0(r)$not tars]    q:1                p:1
798 i:p(cn,r)$[(not carb0(r))$not tars] q:1e-6
799 i:prc(r)$[rdc0(r)$swrd]           q:(rdcshr*rdc0(r))  p:1
800
801 $report:
802 v:rptcrb(r)$nth(r)                i:pcarb(r)          prod:carbon(r)
803 v:rptscrb(r,s)                    i:psncarb(r,s)      prod:sncarbon(r,s)
804 v:rptnprc(r)$nth(r)               i:prc(r)            prod:carbon(r)
805 v:rptsprc(r,s)                    i:prc(r)            prod:sncarbon(r,s)
806
807 *=====
808
809 *=====R&D Production=====
810 *-----conventional-----
811 $prod:rd(i,r)$[rd0(i,r)$nth(r)]    s:esubrdd
812 o:pr(i,r)                          q:rd0(i,r)
813 i:p(j,r)                            q:(ird0(j,r)*rd0(i,r)/sum(k, rd0(k,r)))
814
815 $prod:rd(i,r)$[rd0(i,r)$sth(r)]    s:esubrdd
816 o:pr(i,r)                          q:rd0(i,r)
817 i:p(j,r)                            q:(ird0(j,r)*rd0(i,r)/sum(k, rd0(k,r)))

```

```

818
819
820 *-----carbon-saving-----
821 $prod:rdc(r)$[rdc0(r)$nth(r)]          s:esubrdc
822 o:prc(r)          q:(rdc0(r))
823 i:p(j,r)          q:(ird0(j,r)/sum(k, ird0(k,r))*rdc0(r))
824
825 $prod:rdc(r)$[rdc0(r)$sth(r)]          s:esubrdc
826 o:prc(r)          q:(rdc0(r))
827 *          i:p(j,r)          q:(ird0(j,r)/sum(k, ird0(k,r))*rdc0(r))
828 i:prc(r)          q:(rdc0(r))
829
830 $report:
831 v:rptprc(r)          o:prc(r)          prod:rdc(r)
832
833 *=====
834
835 *Transport Services
836 $prod:yt(j)$vtw(j) s:1
837 o:pt(j)          q:vtw(j)
838 i:p(j,r)          q:vst(j,r)
839
840 *Imports
841 $prod:m(i,r)$vim(i,r)          s:esubm(i) s.tl:0
842 o:pm(i,r)          q:vim(i,r)
843 i:p(i,s)          q:vxmd(i,s,r)          p:pvxmd(i,s,r) s.tl:
844 +          a:govt(s) t:(-rtxs(i,s,r))
845 +          a:govt(r) t:(rtms(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
846 i:pt(j)#(s)          q:vtwr(j,i,s,r) p:pvtwr(i,s,r) s.tl:
847 +          a:govt(r) t:rtms(i,s,r)
848
849
850 *Demand
851 $demand:hh(r)
852 d:p("c",r)          q:vom("c",r)
853 e:p("c",r)          q:(-vtax(r))
854 e:p("i",r)          q:(-vom("i",r))
855 e:pf(f,r)          q:evom(f,r)
856 e:pcarb(r)$[carb0(r)]          q:carb0(r)          r:ctax(r)

```

```

857 e:prc(r)$[rdc0(r)]          q:1          r:spillc(r)
858 e:pr(i,r)$[ks0(i,r) or rd0(i,r)]  q:1          r:spill(i,r)
859 e:prs(j,r)$[xe(j)]          q:vfm("cap",j,r)
860 *          e:psncarb$[tars]          q:carbim0(r)$[nth(r)]          r:tariff(r)$[nth(r)]
861 e:psncarb(s,r)$[sth(s)$nth(r)$stars]          q:carbim0(r,s)$[nth(r)$sth(s)]          r:tariff(r,s)$[nth(r)$sth(s)]
862 *          e:p("c",rnum)          q:vb(r)
863 *          e:p("g",r)          q:(-vom("g",r))
864 *          e:pf(f,r)          q:(sum(i, vfm(f,i,r)))
865
866 *Govt
867 $demand:govt(r)
868 d:p("g",r)          q:vom("g",r)
869 e:p("c",r)          q:vtax(r)
870 e:p("c",rnum)          q:vb(r)
871 *          e:p("c",r)          q:vktx(r)
872
873 *Carbon Tax
874 $constraint:ctax(r)$carb0(r)
875 pcarb(r) =e= ctax0(r);
876
877 *Conventional Spillovers
878 $constraint:spill(i,r)$[ks0(i,r) or rd0(i,r)]
879 spill(i,r) =e= ks0(i,r) + 3*sum(nth, theta(i,nth,r)*(rd0(i,nth)*rd(i,nth) - rd0(i,nth)*1));
880
881 *Carbon-saving Spillovers
882 $constraint:spillc(r)$[rdc0(r)]
883 spillc(r) =e= (rdcshr*rdc0(r)*cb0(r)) + 3*sum(nth, sum(i, theta(i,nth,r))/card(i)*(rdcshr*rdc0(nth)*cb0(nth))*rdc(nth));
884
885 *Carbon-Tariff
886 $constraint:tariff(r,s)$[nth(r)$sth(s)$stars]
887 pcarb(r) =e= psncarb(s,r) ;
888
889 $offtext
890 $sysinclude mpsgeset itc
891
892 tars=%tarval%;
893
894 pcarb.l(r) = 1e-6;
895 prcarb.l(r)= 1e-6;

```

```

896 prsscarb.l(r) = 1e-6;
897 psncarb.l(r,s) = 1e-6;
898 prsncarb.l(r,s) = 1e-6;
899 carbon.l(r)$nth(r) = cb0(r);
900
901 *Start adjusting the benchmark parameters for spillovers and other stuff
902 sscarbon.l(r)$sth(r) = cb0(r)-carbex0(r);
903 sncarbon.l(r,s)$[sth(r)$nth(s)] = sum((fe,j), shvx0(j,r)*shvxmd0(j,r,s)*dcb0(fe,j,r));
904 *carbex0(r) = sum((fe,j), shvx0(j,r)*dcb0(fe,j,r));
905
906 *rdc0(sth) = 0.001;
907
908 prc.l(r) = 1e-6;
909 rdc.l(r) = 1e-6;
910 spillc.l(r) = (rdcshr*rdc0(r)*cb0(r));
911
912 rd.l(i,r) = 1;
913 rd.fx(i,sth) = 1;
914 spill.l(i,r) = ks0(i,r);
915
916 ctax.fx(r) = 1;
917 tariff.fx(r,s) = 1;
918
919 carb0(sth)=0;
920 *rdc0(sth)=0;
921
922 parameter          swrd          /no/;
923
924 itc.workspace = 128;
925 itc.iterlim = 0;
926 $include itc.gen
927 solve itc using mcp;
928
929 *display dk0, rd0, ks0, ird0;
930
931 display drd.l;
932 *$exit
933 * Load datafile from previous runs or defined the report parameters:
934

```

```
935 *$if exist runs_rd_main.dat $include runs_rd_main.dat
936
937 $if not defined carb_r PARAMETER carb_r;
938 $if not defined pcarb_r PARAMETER pcarb_r;
939 $if not defined rd_r PARAMETER rd_r;
940 $if not defined rdc_r PARAMETER rdc_r;
941 $if not defined spill_r PARAMETER spill_r;
942 $if not defined spillc_r PARAMETER spillc_r;
943 $if not defined c_r PARAMETER c_r;
944 $if not defined pc_r PARAMETER pc_r;
945 $if not defined m_r PARAMETER m_r;
946 $if not defined a_r PARAMETER a_r;
947 $if not defined y_r PARAMETER y_r;
948
949 $if not defined sflg_r PARAMETER sflg_r;
950
951 $if not defined pelas_r PARAMETER pelas_r;
952 $if not defined pelasc_r PARAMETER pelasc_r;
953 $if not defined esupxe_r PARAMETER esupxe_r;
954 $if not defined esubd_r PARAMETER esubd_r;
955 $if not defined esubm_r PARAMETER esubm_r;
956 $if not defined esubrdd_r PARAMETER esubrdd_r;
957 $if not defined esubrdc_r PARAMETER esubrdc_r;
958 $if not defined esubc_r PARAMETER esubc_r;
959 $if not defined rdexp0_r PARAMETER rdexp0_r;
960 $if not defined rdcshr_r PARAMETER rdcshr_r;
961 $if not defined theta_r PARAMETER theta_r;
962 $if not defined theta_irs PARAMETER theta_irs;
963 $if not defined prcarb_r PARAMETER prcarb_r;
964 $if not defined pr_r PARAMETER pr_r;
965 $if not defined prc_r PARAMETER prc_r;
966
967 $if not defined d_r PARAMETER d_r;
968 $if not defined x_r PARAMETER x_r;
969 $if not defined xrs_r PARAMETER xrs_r;
970 $if not defined prsncarb_r PARAMETER prsncarb_r;
971 $if not defined prssc_r PARAMETER prssc_r;
972 $if not defined psncarb_r PARAMETER psncarb_r;
973
```

```

974 * Now model the effect of imposing a carbon restriction in North:
975 carb0(nth) = %carblimval% * cb0(nth);
976 *ctax0(nth) = %ctaxval%;
977 *ctax0(sth) = 0;
978 *CTAX.lo(nth) = 0; CTAX.up(nth) = +inf; CTAX.l(nth) = 1;
979
980
981 *pcarb.l(nth) = ctax0(nth);
982
983 * At first, set spillover parameters to zero to model the "PE" effect
984 * of the carbon restriction:
985
986 *theta(r) = 0;
987 theta(i,r,s) = 0;
988
989 * We also want to model the equilibrium reduction without the possibility of R&D:
990 RD.fx(i,r) = 1;
991 RDC.fx(r) = 0;
992 *rdc0(r) = 0;
993 *RD.fx(i,r) = RD.l(i,r);
994 *RDC.fx(r) = RDC.l(r);
995
996 itc.iterlim = 100000;
997
998 $include itc.gen
999 solve itc using mcp;
1000
1001 *$exit
1002
1003 tariff.lo(r,s) = 0; tariff.up(r,s)=+inf; tariff.l(r,s) = 1;
1004
1005 $include itc.gen
1006 solve itc using mcp;
1007
1008 *$exit
1009
1010 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", nth) = rptcrb.l(nth);
1011
1012 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth) =

```



```

1013 sum(nth, rptscrb.l(sth,nth)$[tars] + sncarbon.l(sth,nth)$[not tars]) + sscarbon.l(sth);
1014 pcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", r) = pcarb.l(r);
1015 prcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", nth) = prcarb.l(nth);
1016 prsncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth, nth) =
1017 prsncarb.l(sth, nth);
1018 prsscارب_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth) = prsscارب.l(sth);
1019 psncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth, nth) =
1020 psncarb.l(sth, nth);
1021 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, nth) = pr.l(i, nth);
1022 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", nth) = prc.l(nth);
1023 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, sth) = pr.l(i, sth);
1024 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth) = prc.l(sth);
1025
1026 rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, nth) = rd.l(i, nth);
1027 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", nth) = rdc.l(nth);
1028
1029 spill_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, r) = spill.l(i, r);
1030 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", nth) = spillc.l(nth);
1031 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", sth) = spillc.l(sth);
1032 c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", r) = y.l("c", r);
1033 pc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", r) = p.l("c", r);
1034 m_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, r) = m.l(i, r);
1035 a_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, r) = a.l(i, r);
1036 y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, r) = y.l(i, r);
1037 x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, sth) = x.l(i, sth);
1038 xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, sth, nth) = xrs.l(i, sth, nth);
1039 d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD", i, sth) = d.l(i, sth);
1040
1041 sflg_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORD") = itc.modelstat;
1042
1043 *display ctar, csub, prcarb.l, p.l, cc;
1044
1045 * Now allow for R&D:
1046 RD.lo(i, nth) = 0; RD.up(i, nth) = +inf;
1047 RDC.lo(nth) = 0; RDC.up(nth) = +inf;
1048 *rdc0(r)=1;
1049 *RD.lo(i, sth) = 0; RD.up(i, sth) = +inf;
1050 *RDC.lo(sth) = 0; RDC.up(sth) = +inf;
1051 swrd=yes;

```

```

1052
1053 $include itc.gen
1054 solve itc using mcp;
1055 *$exit
1056 *display spill.l, rd.l, drd.l;
1057 *display ctar, csub, prcarb.l, p.l, cc;
1058
1059 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", nth) = rptcrb.l(nth);
1060 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth) =
1061 sum(nth, rptscrb.l(sth, nth)$[tars] + sncarbon.l(sth, nth)$[not tars]) + sscarbon.l(sth);
1062 pcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", r) = pcarb.l(r);
1063 prcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", nth) = prcarb.l(nth);
1064 prsncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth, nth) =
1065 prsncarb.l(sth, nth);
1066 prsscارب_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth) = prsscارب.l(sth);
1067 psncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth, nth) =
1068 psncarb.l(sth, nth);
1069 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, nth) = pr.l(i, nth);
1070 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", nth) = prc.l(nth);
1071 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, sth) = pr.l(i, sth);
1072 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth) = prc.l(sth);
1073
1074 rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, nth) = rd.l(i, nth);
1075 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", nth) = rdc.l(nth);
1076
1077 spill_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, r) = spill.l(i, r);
1078 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", nth) = spillc.l(nth);
1079 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", sth) = spillc.l(sth);
1080 c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", r) = y.l("c", r);
1081 pc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", r) = p.l("c", r);
1082 m_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, r) = m.l(i, r);
1083 a_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, r) = a.l(i, r);
1084 y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, r) = y.l(i, r);
1085 x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, sth) = x.l(i, sth);
1086 xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, sth, nth) = xrs.l(i, sth, nth);
1087 d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL", i, sth) = d.l(i, sth);
1088 sflg_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "0SPL") = itc.modelstat;
1089
1090

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```

1091 * Now Model spillovers
1092
1093 *populate theta
1094 theta(i,r,s) = theta0(i,r,s);
1095
1096 *===== other scenarios =====
1097 *NSPL
1098 *No Southern Spill - Northern only
1099 theta(i,nth,sth)=0;
1100
1101 $include itc.gen
1102 solve itc using mcp;
1103
1104 *display spill.l, rd.l, drd.l, rd0, ks0;
1105 *display ctar, csub, prcarb.l, p.l, cc;
1106
1107 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", nth) = rptcrb.l(nth);
1108 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth) =
1109 sum(nth, rptscrb.l(sth,nth)$[tars] + sncarbon.l(sth,nth)$[not tars]) + sscarbon.l(sth);
1110 pcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", r) = pcarb.l(r);
1111 prcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", nth) = prcarb.l(nth);
1112 prsncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth, nth) =
1113 prsncarb.l(sth, nth);
1114 prssc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth) = prssc.l(sth);
1115 psncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth, nth) =
1116 psncarb.l(sth, nth);
1117 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, nth) = pr.l(i, nth);
1118 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", nth) = prc.l(nth);
1119 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, sth) = pr.l(i, sth);
1120 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth) = prc.l(sth);
1121
1122 rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, nth) = rd.l(i, nth);
1123 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", nth) = rdc.l(nth);
1124
1125 spill_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, r) = spill.l(i, r);
1126 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", nth) = spillc.l(nth);
1127 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", sth) = spillc.l(sth);
1128 c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", r) = y.l("c", r);
1129 pc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", r) = p.l("c", r);

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1130 m_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, r) = m.l(i, r);
1131 a_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, r) = a.l(i, r);
1132 y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, r) = y.l(i, r);
1133 x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, sth) = x.l(i, sth);
1134 xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, sth, nth) = xrs.l(i, sth, nth);
1135 d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL", i, sth) = d.l(i, sth);
1136 sflg_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NSPL") = itc.modelstat;
1137
1138
1139 *SSPL
1140 *Northern and Southern Spill
1141 PARAMETER thta_shft(i);
1142 *thta_shft(i) = 1;
1143 thta_shft(i) = %tthashftval%;
1144 theta(i, r, s) = theta0(i, r, s);
1145 theta(i, nth, sth) = theta0(i, nth, sth) * %tthashftval%;
1146 *theta('coa', nth, 'chn') = theta0('coa', nth, 'chn');
1147
1148
1149 $include itc.gen
1150 solve itc using mcp;
1151
1152 *display spill.l, rd.l, drd.l, rd0, ks0;
1153 *display ctar, csub, prcarb.l, p.l, cc;
1154
1155 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", nth) = rptcrb.l(nth);
1156 carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth) =
1157 sum(nth, rptscrb.l(sth, nth) $[tars] + sncarbon.l(sth, nth) $[not tars]) + sscarbon.l(sth);
1158 pcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", r) = pcarb.l(r);
1159 prcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", nth) = prcarb.l(nth);
1160 prsncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth, nth) =
1161 prsncarb.l(sth, nth);
1162 prssc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth) = prssc.l(sth);
1163 psncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth, nth) =
1164 psncarb.l(sth, nth);
1165 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, nth) = pr.l(i, nth);
1166 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", nth) = prc.l(nth);
1167 pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, sth) = pr.l(i, sth);
1168 prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth) = prc.l(sth);

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1169
1170 rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, nth) = rd.l(i, nth);
1171 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", nth) = rdc.l(nth);
1172
1173 spill_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, r) = spill.l(i, r);
1174 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", nth) = spillc.l(nth);
1175 spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", sth) = spillc.l(sth);
1176 c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", r) = y.l("c", r);
1177 pc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", r) = p.l("c", r);
1178 m_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, r) = m.l(i, r);
1179 a_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, r) = a.l(i, r);
1180 y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, r) = y.l(i, r);
1181 x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, sth) = x.l(i, sth);
1182 xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, sth, nth) = xrs.l(i, sth, nth);
1183 d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL", i, sth) = d.l(i, sth);
1184 sflg_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "SSPL") = itc.modelstat;
1185
1186
1187 *Theta Sensitivity test - can increasing southern absorption cause an increase in leakage due to spillovers
1188 *Shift southern spill (increase/decrease)
1189 *PARAMETER thta_shft(i);
1190 *thta_shft(i) = 1;
1191 *thta_shft(i) = %tthashftval%;
1192 *theta(i, nth, sth) = theta0(i, nth, sth) * thta_shft(i);
1193
1194
1195 *$include itc.gen
1196 *solve itc using mcp;
1197
1198 *display spill.l, rd.l, drd.l, rd0, ks0;
1199 *display ctar, csub, prcarb.l, p.l, cc;
1200
1201 *carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", nth) = rptcarb.l(nth);
1202 *carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth) =
1203 *      sum(nth, rptscrb.l(sth, nth)$[tars] + sncarbon.l(sth, nth)$[not tars]) + sscarbon.l(sth);
1204 *pcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", r) = pcarb.l(r);
1205 *prcarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", nth) = prcarb.l(nth);
1206 *prsncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth, nth) = prsncarb.l(sth, nth);
1207 *prsscarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth) = prsscarb.l(sth);

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1208 *psncarb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth, nth) = psncarb.l(sth, nth);
1209 *pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, nth) = pr.l(i, nth);
1210 *prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", nth) = prc.l(nth);
1211 *pr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, sth) = pr.l(i, sth);
1212 *prc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth) = prc.l(sth);
1213 *
1214 *rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, nth) = rd.l(i, nth);
1215 *rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", nth) = rdc.l(nth);
1216 *
1217 *spill_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, r) = spill.l(i, r);
1218 *spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", nth) = spillc.l(nth);
1219 *spillc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", sth) = spillc.l(sth);
1220 *c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", r) = y.l("c", r);
1221 *pc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", r) = p.l("c", r);
1222 *m_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, r) = m.l(i, r);
1223 *a_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, r) = a.l(i, r);
1224 *y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, r) = y.l(i, r);
1225 *x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, sth) = x.l(i, sth);
1226 *xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, sth, nth) = xrs.l(i, sth, nth);
1227 *d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA", i, sth) = d.l(i, sth);
1228 *sflg_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "THTA") = itc.modelstat;
1229 *=====
1230
1231
1232 PARAMETER gblcrb, tblcrb, tblcrbpct;
1233 SET      scn          /NORD, 0SPL, NSPL, SSPL/;
1234
1235 gblcrb(r, "BMK") = cb0(r);
1236 gblcrb("Total", "BMK") = sum(r, cb0(r));
1237 gblcrb(r, scn) =
1238 (carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r) - cb0(r))
1239 /cb0(r)*100;
1240 gblcrb("Total", scn) =
1241 (sum(r, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1242 - sum(r, cb0(r)))
1243 /sum(r, cb0(r))*100;
1244 gblcrb("South", scn) =
1245 (sum(r$sth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1246 - sum(r$sth(r), cb0(r)))

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1247 /sum(r$sth(r), cb0(r))*100;
1248 gblcrb("North",scn) =
1249 (sum(r$nth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1250 - sum(r$nth(r), cb0(r)))
1251 /sum(r$nth(r), cb0(r))*100;
1252 gblcrb("Leakage",scn) =
1253 (sum(sth, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth))
1254 - sum(sth, cb0(sth)))
1255 /sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth));
1256
1257 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, "BMK") = cb0(r);
1258 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", "BMK") = sum(r, cb0(r));
1259 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, scn) =
1260 (carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r));
1261 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", scn) =
1262 (sum(r, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)));
1263 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "South", scn) =
1264 (sum(r$sth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)));
1265 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "North", scn) =
1266 (sum(r$nth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)));
1267 tblcrb("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Leakage", scn) =
1268 (sum(sth, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth)) - sum(sth, cb0(sth)))
1269 /sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth));
1270
1271 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, "BMK") = cb0(r);
1272 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", "BMK") = sum(r, cb0(r));
1273 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, scn) =
1274 (carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r) - cb0(r))
1275 /cb0(r)*100;
1276 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", scn) =
1277 (sum(r, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1278 - sum(r, cb0(r)))
1279 /sum(r, cb0(r))*100;
1280 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "South", scn) =
1281 (sum(r$sth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1282 - sum(r$sth(r), cb0(r)))
1283 /sum(r$sth(r), cb0(r))*100;
1284 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "North", scn) =
1285 (sum(r$nth(r), carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))

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1286 - sum(r$nth(r), cb0(r))
1287 /sum(r$nth(r), cb0(r))*100;
1288 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Leakage", scn) =
1289 (sum(sth, carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth))
1290 - sum(sth, cb0(sth)))
1291 /sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth));
1292
1293
1294
1295 display carb_r, gblcrb;
1296
1297 *Add in r&d reporting
1298
1299 parameter gblrd, tblrd, tblrdpct, rdtot;
1300 gblrd(r,i,"BMK") = rd0(i,r);
1301 gblrd(r,i,scn) = rd0(i,r)*rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, r);
1302 gblrd(r,"Carbon",scn) = rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r);
1303
1304 rdtot(nth,scn) = sum(i, gblrd(nth,i,scn)) + gblrd(nth,"Carbon",scn);
1305 rdtot("North",scn) = sum((i,nth), gblrd(nth,i,scn)) + sum(nth, gblrd(nth,"Carbon",scn));
1306 *rdtot("South",scn) = sum((i,sth), gblrd(sth,i,scn)) + sum(sth, gblrd(sth,"Carbon",scn));
1307 rdtot("Total",scn) = sum((i,nth), gblrd(nth,i,scn)) + sum(nth, gblrd(nth,"Carbon",scn));
1308 rdtot(nth,"BMK") = sum(i, gblrd(nth,i,"BMK"));
1309 rdtot("North","BMK") = sum((nth,i), gblrd(nth,i,"BMK"));
1310 *rdtot("South","BMK") = sum((sth,i), gblrd(sth,i,"BMK"));
1311 rdtot("Total","BMK") = sum((nth,i), gblrd(nth,i,"BMK"));
1312
1313 tblrd("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r,i,"BMK") = rd0(i,r);
1314 tblrd("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r,i,scn) =
1315 rd0(i,r)*rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, r);
1316 tblrd("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r,"Carbon",scn) =
1317 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r);
1318 tblrd("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH",i,scn) =
1319 sum(r$[nth(r)], rd0(i,r)*rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, r));
1320 tblrd("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH", "Carbon",scn) =
1321 sum(r$[nth(r)], rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r));
1322
1323
1324 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", nth,i,scn)$[rd0(i,nth)] =

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1325 (rd0(i,nth)*rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, nth) - rd0(i, nth))
1326 / rd0(i, nth) * 100;
1327 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", nth, "Carbon", scn) =
1328 rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth);
1329 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH", i, scn) =
1330 sum(nth, (rd0(i, nth)*rd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, nth)
1331 - rd0(i, nth)))
1332 / sum(nth, rd0(i, nth)) * 100;
1333 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH", "Carbon", scn) =
1334 sum(nth, rdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth));
1335
1336 display gblrd, tblrd;
1337
1338 * Activity level reporting
1339 parameter yreg, xreg, creg, dreg, xrsreg;
1340
1341 yreg(scn, i, "North") =
1342 sum(nth, y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, nth)*vom(i, nth))
1343 /sum(nth, vom(i, nth));
1344 yreg(scn, i, "South") =
1345 sum(sth, y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, sth)*vom(i, sth))
1346 /sum(sth, vom(i, sth));
1347 yreg(scn, i, "Total") =
1348 sum(r, y_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, r)*vom(i, r))
1349 /sum(r, vom(i, r));
1350
1351 xreg(scn, i, "South") =
1352 sum(sth, x_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, sth)*vx0(i, sth))
1353 /sum(sth, vx0(i, sth));
1354
1355 xrsreg(scn, i, "South", nth) =
1356 sum(sth, xrs_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, sth, nth)
1357 *(shvx0(i, sth)*shvxd0(i, sth, nth)*vom(i, sth)))
1358 /sum(sth, (shvx0(i, sth)*shvxd0(i, sth, nth)*vom(i, sth)));
1359
1360 dreg(scn, i, "South-South") =
1361 sum(sth, d_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, i, sth)*(shvd0(i, sth)
1362 *vom(i, sth)))
1363 /sum(sth, (shvd0(i, sth)*vom(i, sth)));

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1364
1365 creg(scn,"North") =
1366 sum(nth, c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth) * vom("c", nth))
1367 / sum(nth, vom("c", nth));
1368 creg(scn,"South") =
1369 sum(sth, c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth) * vom("c", sth))
1370 / sum(sth, vom("c", sth));
1371 creg(scn,"World") =
1372 sum(r, c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r) * vom("c", r))
1373 / sum(r, vom("c", r));
1374 creg(scn,"WorldRAWBMK") = sum(r, vom("c", r));
1375
1376
1377 parameter ac_dam_raw          "abatement cost plus co2 avoided damages";
1378 parameter ac_dam_ind         "abatement cost plus co2 avoided damages index";
1379 parameter ac_raw             "abatement cost";
1380 parameter dam_raw            "avoided damages";
1381 parameter ssc_imp            "implied social cost of carbon assuming abatement at pigouvian level";
1382
1383
1384 scalar      co2dam           "social cost of carbon $/mtco2"          /50/;
1385 *convert to billion $/gigaton co2
1386 *co2dam = 50*1e3/1e9;
1387 parameter test              "1% change in from benchmark welfare";
1388 test = sum(r, cb0(r)*co2dam + vom("c", r))*0.01;
1389
1390 ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, r) =
1391 (cb0(r) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))*co2dam
1392 + (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)-1)*vom("c", r)
1393 ;
1394
1395
1396 ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "South") =
1397 (sum(sth, cb0(sth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth))
1398 *co2dam)
1399 + sum(sth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth)-1)
1400 *vom("c", sth))
1401 ;
1402

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1403 ac_dam_raw("%sd%",scn,"North") =
1404 (sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth))
1405 *co2dam)
1406 + sum(nth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth)-1)
1407 *vom("c", nth))
1408 ;
1409
1410 ac_dam_raw("%sd%",scn,"Total") =
1411 (sum(r, cb0(r) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1412 *co2dam)
1413 + sum(r, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)-1)
1414 *vom("c", r))
1415 ;
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421 ac_dam_ind("%sd%",scn,"South") =
1422 [(sum(sth, cb0(sth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth))
1423 *co2dam)
1424 + sum(sth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, sth)-1)
1425 *vom("c", sth))
1426 ] / sum(sth, cb0(sth)*co2dam + vom("c", sth))
1427 ;
1428
1429 ac_dam_ind("%sd%",scn,"North") =
1430 [(sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth))
1431 *co2dam)
1432 + sum(nth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, nth)-1)
1433 *vom("c", nth))
1434 ] / sum(nth, cb0(nth)*co2dam + vom("c", nth))
1435 ;
1436
1437 ac_dam_ind("%sd%",scn,"Total") =
1438 [(sum(r, cb0(r) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r))
1439 *co2dam)
1440 + sum(r, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn, r)-1)
1441 *vom("c", r))

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1442 ] / sum(r, cb0(r)*co2dam + vom("c",r))
1443 ;
1444
1445
1446 dam_raw("%sd%",scn,r) =
1447 (cb0(r) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,r))
1448 *co2dam;
1449
1450 ac_raw("%sd%",scn,r) =
1451 (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,r)-1)
1452 *vom("c",r);
1453
1454 dam_raw("%sd%",scn,"South") =
1455 (sum(sth, cb0(sth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,sth))
1456 *co2dam);
1457
1458
1459 ac_raw("%sd%",scn,"South") =
1460 sum(sth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,sth)-1)
1461 *vom("c",sth));
1462
1463 dam_raw("%sd%",scn,"North") =
1464 (sum(nth, cb0(nth) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,nth))*co2dam);
1465 ac_raw("%sd%",scn,"North") =
1466 sum(nth, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,nth)-1)*vom("c",nth));
1467
1468 dam_raw("%sd%",scn,"Total") =
1469 (sum(r, cb0(r) - carb_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", scn,r))
1470 *co2dam);
1471 ac_raw("%sd%",scn,"Total") =
1472 sum(r, (c_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%",
1473 scn,r)-1)
1474 *vom("c",r));
1475
1476
1477
1478 * Save model parameters:
1479
1480 esubd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%",i) = esubd(i);

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1481 esubm_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i) = esubm(i);
1482 esubrdd_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%") = esubrdd;
1483 esubrdc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%") = esubrdc;
1484 rdcshr_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%") = rdcshr;
1485 rdexp0_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i) = rshft(i);
1486 pelas_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i) = pelas_rd(i);
1487 pelasc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%") = pelas_rdc;
1488 esupxe_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i) = esup_xe(i);
1489 esubc_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%") = esubc;
1490 theta_r("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i) = thta_shft(i);
1491 theta_irs("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carbvimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", i, r, s) = theta(i, r, s);
1492
1493 * Save model results for this run:
1494
1495 execute_unload "output/runs_rd_ctar_lim_%sd%.gdx",
1496 carb_r
1497 pcarb_r
1498 rd_r
1499 rdc_r
1500 spill_r
1501 spillc_r
1502 c_r
1503 pc_r
1504 m_r
1505 a_r
1506 y_r
1507 sflg_r
1508 pelas_r
1509 pelasc_r
1510 esupxe_r
1511 esubd_r
1512 esubm_r
1513 esubrdd_r
1514 esubrdc_r
1515 esubc_r
1516 rdexp0_r
1517 theta_r
1518 theta_irs
1519 prcarb_r

```

1520 pr_r
1521 prc_r
1522 d_r
1523 x_r
1524 xrs_r
1525 prsncarb_r
1526 prsscarb_r
1527 psncarb_r
1528 gblcrb
1529 gblrd
1530 tblcrb
1531 tblcrbpct
1532 tblrd
1533 tblrdpct
1534 gamma
1535 theta0
1536 yreg
1537 xreg
1538 xrsreg
1539 creg
1540 dreg
1541 ccy
1542 cc
1543 ac_dam_raw
1544 ac_dam_ind
1545 ac_raw
1546 dam_raw
1547 test
1548 rdtot
1549 rdexp0
1550 ird0
1551 rd0
1552 dk0
1553 ks0
1554 esub
1555 ;
1556
1557
1558 parameters

```

1559 rep_crb                "Percentage change in co2 emissions"
1560 rep_rd                  "Percentage change in RD"
1561 rep_leak
1562 deci
1563 rep_ac_dam              "Abatement costs plus avoided damages (Billion USD)"
1564 rep_ac                  "Abatement costs (Billion USD)"
1565 rep_dam                 "Avoided Damages (Billion USD)"
1566 rep_ac_dam_in          "Abatement costs plus avoided damages change from bmk index"
1567 rep_ac_in               "Abatement costs change from bmk index"
1568 *      rep_dam_in       "Avoided damages change from bmk index"
1569 ;
1570
1571 deci(scen)=3;
1572 deci("BMK") = 3;
1573 deci(i) = 3;
1574 deci("Carbon") = 3;
1575
1576 rep_crb(r,scn) =
1577 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, scn);
1578 rep_crb("North",scn) =
1579 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "North", scn);
1580 rep_crb("South",scn) =
1581 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "South", scn);
1582 rep_crb("Total",scn) =
1583 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", scn);
1584 rep_crb(r,"BMK") =
1585 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, "BMK");
1586 rep_crb("North","BMK") =
1587 sum(r$nth(r), tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, "BMK"));
1588 rep_crb("South","BMK") =
1589 sum(r$sth(r), tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", r, "BMK"));
1590 rep_crb("Total","BMK") =
1591 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Total", "BMK");
1592 rep_crb("Leakage",scn) =
1593 tblcrbpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "Leakage", scn);
1594
1595 rep_rd(scen,i) =
1596 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH", i, scn);
1597 rep_rd(scen,"Carbon") =

```

```

1598 tblrdpct("%sd%", "%pelascval%", "%esubdshft%", "%carblimval%", "%tarval%", "%pelasrdval%", "%tthashftval%", "NORTH", "Carbon", scn);
1599
1600
1601 rep_ac_dam(r, scn) = ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, r);
1602 rep_ac_dam("North", scn) = ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "North");
1603 rep_ac_dam("South", scn) = ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "South");
1604 rep_ac_dam("Total", scn) = ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "Total");
1605
1606 rep_ac(r, scn) = ac_raw("%sd%", scn, r);
1607 rep_ac("North", scn) = ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "North");
1608 rep_ac("South", scn) = ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "South");
1609 rep_ac("Total", scn) = ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "Total");
1610
1611 rep_dam(r, scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, r);
1612 rep_dam("North", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "North");
1613 rep_dam("South", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "South");
1614 rep_dam("Total", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "Total");
1615
1616 rep_ac_dam_in(r, scn) = 100*ac_dam_raw("%sd%", scn, r)/(cb0(r)*co2dam + vom("c", r));
1617 rep_ac_dam_in("North", scn) = ac_dam_ind("%sd%", scn, "North")*100;
1618 rep_ac_dam_in("South", scn) = ac_dam_ind("%sd%", scn, "South")*100;
1619 rep_ac_dam_in("Total", scn) = ac_dam_ind("%sd%", scn, "Total")*100;
1620
1621 rep_ac_in(r, scn) = 100*ac_raw("%sd%", scn, r)/vom("c", r);
1622 rep_ac_in("North", scn) = 100*ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "North")/sum(nth, vom("c", nth));
1623 rep_ac_in("South", scn) = 100*ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "South")/sum(sth, vom("c", sth));
1624 rep_ac_in("Total", scn) = 100*ac_raw("%sd%", scn, "Total")/sum(r, vom("c", r));
1625 *
1626 *rep_dam(r, scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, r);
1627 *rep_dam("North", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "North");
1628 *rep_dam("South", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "South");
1629 *rep_dam("Total", scn) = dam_raw("%sd%", scn, "Total");
1630
1631
1632
1633 *loop(scn,
1634 *     rep_rd("North", i, scn);
1635 *     rep_rd("North", "Carbon", scn);
1636 *

```



```

1637 *$libinclude gams2tbl tbl_rd
1638 *);
1639
1640 parameter cc_out          "Carbon content in lbs CO2/USD";
1641 cc_out(r,i) = ccy(i,r)*2000;
1642
1643 FILE out          /"output/%sd%_crb_and_rd_tbls.tex"/;
1644
1645 $setglobal format tex
1646 $setglobal c_decimals deci
1647
1648 put out;
1649
1650 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_crb
1651 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_rd
1652 $libinclude gams2tbl gamma
1653 $libinclude gams2tbl cc_out
1654
1655 putclose out;
1656
1657 FILE outwelf          /"output/%sd%_welfare_tbls.tex"/;
1658
1659 $setglobal format tex
1660 $setglobal c_decimals deci
1661
1662 put outwelf;
1663
1664 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_ac_dam
1665 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_ac
1666 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_dam
1667 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_ac_dam_in
1668 $libinclude gams2tbl rep_ac_in
1669 putclose outwelf;
1670
1671 parameter testing;
1672 testing("outshr") = sum((i,r), dk0(i,r)) / sum((i,r), vom(i,r));
1673 testing("evomshr") = sum((i,r), dk0(i,r)) / sum((f,g,r), vfm(f,g,r));
1674 testing("consshr") = sum((i,r), dk0(i,r)) / sum((r), vom("c",r));
1675 display testing;

```

```
1676 $ontext
1677 FILE out /runs_rd_main.dat/;
1678
1679 put out;
1680
1681 $libinclude gams2prm carb_r
1682 $libinclude gams2prm pcarb_r
1683 $libinclude gams2prm rd_r
1684 $libinclude gams2prm rdc_r
1685 $libinclude gams2prm spill_r
1686 $libinclude gams2prm spillc_r
1687 $libinclude gams2prm c_r
1688 $libinclude gams2prm pc_r
1689 $libinclude gams2prm m_r
1690 $libinclude gams2prm a_r
1691 $libinclude gams2prm y_r
1692
1693 $libinclude gams2prm sflg_r
1694
1695 $libinclude gams2prm pelas_r
1696 $libinclude gams2prm pelasc_r
1697 $libinclude gams2prm esupxe_r
1698 $libinclude gams2prm esubd_r
1699 $libinclude gams2prm esubm_r
1700 $libinclude gams2prm esubrdd_r
1701 $libinclude gams2prm esubrdc_r
1702 $libinclude gams2prm esubc_r
1703 $libinclude gams2prm rdexp0_r
1704 $libinclude gams2prm theta_r
1705
1706 putclose out;
1707 $offtext
1708 $exit
1709
1710
1711
1712
1713
```